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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

HISTORY AS THE ARCHITECT OF THE PRESENT: WHAT MADE KASHMIR THE NUCLEUS OF SOUTH ASIA TERRORISM?
INDIA–PAKISTAN CONFLICT AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY

by

Sunil Dutta

March 2012

Thesis Advisor:	Anders Strindberg
Second Reader:	David Brannan

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This thesis focuses on the root causes of conflict in South Asia that have created the environment in the Afghan–Pakistan border areas, which nurtures insurgency. The causes are rooted in the decisions, made by the British Empire in the 19th and 20th centuries, to perpetuate her rule in the Indian subcontinent. A disregard for the history and its impact on the current events has lead to prolonging of U.S. war in Afghanistan. The conclusion is that colonial history of South Asia has shaped current conflicts in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. These conflicts have manifested in spawning of terrorism from the region.

Ever since the partition of India in 1947 by the British, India and Pakistan remain locked in an enduring conflict over Kashmir. This conflict is tied to destabilization of South Asia, including competition between India and Pakistan over influence in Afghanistan. Thus, the U.S. focus on elimination of al Qaeda is short sighted, as it ignores the reasons for al Qaeda's survival in South Asia. Without Pakistan's support for the Afghan Taliban and associated terrorist organizations, al Qaeda would not have a sanctuary in South Asia.

Without a resolution of the conflict between India and Pakistan, the terrorism problem emanating from South Asia remains a potential threat. Therefore, it is imperative that U.S. policy should expand to include a resolution of India-Pakistan conflict.

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HISTORY AS THE ARCHITECT OF THE PRESENT: WHAT MADE KASHMIR THE NUCLEUS OF SOUTH ASIA TERRORISM? INDIA–PAKISTAN CONFLICT AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANP	Awami National Party
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCR	Frontier Crimes Regulation
HM	Harkat-ul-Mujahedin
HUJI	Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami
HuM	Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
ISI	The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammad
JI	Jamaat-i-Islami
JKLF	The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
JuD	Jamaat-ud-Dawa
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

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Gratitude to Old Teachers

When we stride or stroll across the frozen lake,
We place our feet where they have never been.
We walk upon the unwalked. But we are uneasy.
Who is down there but our old teachers?
Water that once could take no human weight-
We were students then-holds up our feet,
And goes on ahead of us for a mile.
Beneath us the teachers, and around us the stillness.

-Robert Bly

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I. HISTORY AS THE ARCHITECT OF THE PRESENT: WHAT MADE KASHMIR THE NUCLEUS OF SOUTH ASIA TERRORISM? INDIA–PAKISTAN CONFLICT AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY

A. INTRODUCTION

The last ten years have seen an increasing body of available literature and scholarly analysis of the status of Pakistan as an unreliable ally of the United States (U.S.) in the so called "war on terrorism." Furthermore, the realization that India and Pakistan rivalry has impacted U.S. mission in Afghanistan is steadily being brought to light (Ganguly, 2010; Jones, 2007; Jones, 2011). However, specific analyses that reach down to specific colonial roots of the conflict, which has embroiled the U.S. military in South Asia for the last ten years, are few and have yet to enter the mainstream debate. There is limited debate and the body of knowledge available regarding how the conflict between India and Pakistan, specifically over Kashmir, has resulted in terrorist attacks plotted and launched against the United States and its allies (Kapur, 2009; Siddiqa, 2011; Usher, 2009). There is a paucity of analysis of how colonial decisions and historical conflicts in the Indian subcontinent contributed to the extant terrorism problem emanating from Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. It is important to determine whether the regional conflicts in South Asia have and are directly responsible for terrorist threats to the United States. The critical question of why the Pakistani military, specifically The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), have been assisting and harboring the Taliban and the terrorists who plot attacks against the U.S. Army in Afghanistan and targets within the United States can be explained by the historical events that resulted in the partition of British India and territorial conflicts between India and Pakistan. In order to make better decisions in Afghanistan, it is imperative to analyze the historical roots of South Asian regional conflicts and establish their relationship with current instability and terrorism in South Asia.

It is a fact that the United States has relentlessly focused on al Qaeda and the Taliban insurgents and engaged in neutralization of many insurgents through drone attacks and military strikes. However, despite the weakening of al Qaeda, and despite killing of Osama bin Laden,—depriving al Qaeda of its primary brand symbol, the regional conflicts that allowed the exporters of terrorism to operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan have not yet been resolved (Dutta, 2011; Strindberg & Warn, 2011, Staniland, 2011). The disregard for the historical context has not only proven to be a drain on U.S. economy, it has unnecessarily prolonged the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. By fiscal year 2010, the U.S. government had expended approximately $444 billion in Afghanistan for war operations and accessory operations (Belasco, 2011). And although President Obama has initiated an accelerated troop drawdown, the approximate cost of operations in Afghanistan would be over $110 billion dollars the next fiscal year. However, our efforts for the past ten years have not made a serious dent into the causal factors that have impacted our homeland security. A resolution of the issues that perpetuate destabilization in South Asia is of critical importance to United States and its allies; however, these issues continue to destabilize South Asia because of our lack of focus on the conflict between India and Pakistan (Bose, 2003; Ganguly, 2002; Ganguly & Howenstein, 2009; Usher, 2009).

This thesis focuses on the root causes of conflict in South Asia that have created the environment in the Afghan-Pakistan border areas, which nurture insurgency. The causes are rooted in the decisions made by the British Empire in the 19th and 20th centuries, to perpetuate her rule in the Indian subcontinent. Ignorance of history and its impact on the current events has lead to the prolonging of the U.S. war in Afghanistan without a clear-cut end in sight. The thesis would recommend policy actions that lead towards a resolution of historical conflict in South Asia, and, consequently, elimination of the terrorist training camps in the region.

The Pakistan–Afghanistan border area has been described as the most dangerous frontier on earth and the most challenging for the United States' national security interests (Johnson & Mason, 2008). Despite expending vast amounts of money and investment in military, counter-terrorism efforts, diplomatic initiatives, and support for the American-

supported Afghan government, situation in Afghanistan has not yet stabilized. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border continues to harbor actors who support and harbor al Qaeda, engage in attacks against the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments, support and train the Taliban, and plot terrorist attacks against western targets (Chadbourne, 2009; Fair, 2009; Fair, 2011; Haqqani, 2005; Jones, 2007; Jones 2011). The inability of the United States and the coalition forces to win or to stabilize Afghanistan for the last ten years, despite pumping enormous resources in one of the weakest and poorest nations in the world, clearly suggests that U.S. policies and strategies have been fundamentally flawed since their inception in 2001 and need a reassessment.

It is evident that our homeland security depends upon a successful resolution of war in Afghanistan. The border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been a terrorist training factory for radicalized and disaffected Muslims from around the world. Homegrown terrorists in the United States have received spiritual guidance and practical training from al Qaeda remnants and other Jihadist elements entrenched in Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. Furthermore, Pakistan, despite being a U.S. ally, and despite being provided with financial and military aid, continues to work at cross-purposes with the United States. Pakistan is considered by many to be the most dangerous foreign policy problem facing the United States, as it has been termed an unstable, radicalized, and nuclear capable country (Fair, 2009; Goodson, 2009; Jones, 2007). The currently prevailing conclusion in the literature considers Pakistan to be the world's most active sponsor of terrorism, with the possible exception of Iran (Byman, 2005; Vira & Cordesman, 2011). Several high-profile terrorist incidents, including the September 11, 2001 attacks, July 7, 2005 subway bombings in London, and the November 2008 attack on Mumbai had direct or peripheral connections to individuals and groups operating from Pakistan (Ganguly & Kapur, 2010; Riedel, 2011). Pakistan stands as a unique nation, as it is a major victim and a major sponsor of terrorism at the same time. However, it continues, according to a variety of experts, as a sponsor of terrorism, to advance its national security interests using proxies and jihadi elements (Haqqani, 2005; Rashid, 2008; Riedel, 2008; Vira & Cordesman, 2011; Waldman, 2010).

Peace and stability in South Asia is a prerequisite for striking at the root of terrorism emanating from the Afghanistan–Pakistan border region. This thesis suggests that the United States' inability to control and win in the region was due to a focus on short-term goals and ignorance, coupled with a disregard of South Asia's history. There are historical reasons why India and Pakistan have been locked up in a pathological relationship, making them existential enemies ever since their creation by the departing British in 1947. These historical reasons also offer explanations why India and Pakistan have used Afghanistan as a pawn in their power play. Without consideration of these historical factors, any policy to stabilize Afghanistan and eliminate terrorist threats from the region can guarantees but only a short-term success (Barfield, 2007; Tomsen, 2011).

An analysis of the history indicates that decisions made by the British empire in late 19th and early 20th centuries contributed to intractable conflicts in South Asia, leading to regional wars, arms race, including nuclear arms race, and the use of Islamic militants and asymmetric warfare (terrorism) by Pakistan to achieve her primary irredentist objectives in Kashmir and secondary territorial objectives in Afghanistan.

Short-term interests of the British empire were translated into expedient decision making that eventually lead to a partition of colonial India by the British in 1947, leading to a horrendous blood bath and a massive forced population transfer. The partition of India created a poisonous relationship between the two nascent nations and the unresolved issues between India and Pakistan metastasized, eventually turning Pakistan into a state that invested systemically into use of Jihadi fighters and terrorism as state policy (Ali, 2002; Bose, 2003; Ganguly, 2001; Ganguly, 2002; Haqqani, 2005; Jafferlot, 2002).

The primary reason for lack of resolution of the ongoing South Asian conflict and consociate terrorism, despite the world's sole superpower employing the world's most powerful military and full power of her treasury, is American policymaker's persistent disregard for the history of the region (Ahmad, 1973; Haqqani, 2005; Rashid, 2008; Tomsen, 2011; Wirsing, 1994). The colonial history of South Asia has shaped the current conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The United States finds herself entangled in these historical forces; however, the U.S. policymakers have refused to take lessons from

the history of the region and formulate suitable policies. This disregard for history has allowed the conflict in South Asia to continue for almost a decade where the world's strongest nation finds itself expending enormous resources, while earning the ire of people it claims to be helping. All the military and counterterrorism efforts in the region, and all the economic and military aid to Pakistan, have not translated into tangible actions by Pakistan to disengage from supporting and nurturing terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Consequently, despite sustained efforts, the U.S. finds itself in a stalemate in South Asia, without having completely disarmed or eliminated the forces that continue to plot attacks in United States.

While there does exist a body of knowledge regarding the impact of the conflict in South Asia on the terrorist threats that we face, the focus on Pakistan's role as the incubator of terrorist outfits with aims to attack the United States is a relatively recent phenomenon, especially as Pakistan has been generally considered an ally of the United States since the early 1950s (Riedel, 2011). Furthermore, there is a paucity of analysis of how colonial decisions and historical conflicts in the Indian subcontinent have contributed to the extant terrorism problem emanating from Afghanistan–Pakistan border region. It is important to determine whether regional conflicts in South Asia have and are directly responsible for terrorist threats to the United States. Furthermore, in order to make better decisions with broader outcomes in the Afghanistan war, it is imperative to analyze the historical roots of regional conflicts and establish their relationship with current instability and terrorism in South Asia.

This thesis focuses on the root cause of conflict in South Asia that created an environment in the Afghan–Pakistan border areas that nurtures insurgency. The cause is rooted in expedient decisions made by the British Empire in the 19th and 20th centuries to perpetuate her rule in the Indian subcontinent. Besides analyzing the historical context of South Asia terrorism, this thesis focuses on India and Pakistan's role in exacerbation of the situation in Afghanistan and the consequent contribution to terrorism and war in the region. The thesis recommends policy options that may lead towards a resolution of historical conflict in South Asia, and, consequently, reduction and possible elimination of terrorism in the region.

The White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, released in 2009, reiterated the U.S. security goal to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Afghanistan..."[1] The White Paper proposed a new strategy, emphasizing five objectives focusing on security and governance for both Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as a role for the international community. These are 1) disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan; 2) promoting a more capable, accountable and effective government in Afghanistan; 3) developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces; 4) enhancing civilian control and economic development in Pakistan and; 5) involving the international community in achieving these objectives, with a leadership role for the United Nations.

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2011) states, "The preeminent security threat to the United States continues to be from *al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents.*" The Strategy also discusses the elimination of safe-havens for al Qaida:

> Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents rely on the physical sanctuary of ungoverned or poorly governed territories, where the absence of state control permits terrorists to travel, train, and engage in plotting. In close coordination with foreign partners, the United States will continue to contest and diminish al-Qa'ida's operating space through mutually reinforcing efforts designed to prevent al-Qa'ida from taking advantage of these ungoverned spaces. We will also build the will and capacity of states whose weaknesses al-Qa'ida exploits. Persistent insecurity and chaos in some regions can undermine efforts to increase political engagement and build capacity and provide assistance, thereby exacerbating chaos and insecurity. Our challenge is to break this cycle of state failure to constrict the space available to terrorist networks.

The 2009 White Paper and the National Strategy For Counterterrorism fails to focus on two historical and interconnected key factors that continue to perpetuate pathological politics in South Asia—conflict between India and Pakistan over the territory of Kashmir, and conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the status of the Durand Line (Dutta, 2010; Haqqani, 2005; Paul, 2005; Tomsen, 2011; Usher, 2009). Without accommodating

[1] White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf. (Last accessed October 27, 2010.)

the interests of India and Pakistan as they related to Kashmir and Pashtun populations divided across Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and without reconciliation between India and Pakistan, the U.S. strategy cannot achieve full victory in Afghanistan. Focusing on counterterrorism, drone attacks in the tribal areas in Pakistan and relying on Pakistani military as an ally in the fight against the Taliban or al Qaeda remnants, or to prevent hatching of terrorist plots in South Asia, also may not result in lasting success. It is surprising that most analysts have typically ignored the impact of outstanding regional disputes and politics on the war in Afghanistan.

A resolution of the issues that perpetuate destabilization in South Asia is of critical importance to United States and its allies, as it is this destabilized region from which major and minor terrorist plots have been launched against the United States and other nations (Barfield, 2007; Jones, 2011). Our homeland security is clearly impacted if conflicts in South Asia are allowed to fester. Furthermore, due to the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan, and the status of Pakistan as an unstable and troubled nation with profound internecine military, civil, ethnic, and cultural conflicts, the region poses a serious risk to world safety.

This thesis focuses on the historical root cause of the conflict in Afghanistan, connects the past to the present, and proposes concrete policy actions to facilitate a lasting resolution of the conflict and elimination of the factors that act as nurturing agents for terrorism in the region.

B. THE HYPOTHESIS

The current conflict in Afghanistan is related to the partition of British India in 1947, and the creation of the Durand Line in 1893 also contributed to the conflict. The Partition resulted from the deliberate efforts of the British to divide the majority Hindu and the minority Muslim communities against each other in order to fragment nationalistic agitation for self-rule by the Indians, and to perpetuate their colonial rule (Hasan, 1994; Page, 1999; Singh, 1997). Actions by the British to play Muslim elite against the Indian National Congress leaders created deep animosities, which subsequently transformed into irreconcilable conflicts between Hindu and Muslim

communities. The support provided by the British to the Muslim League allowed a select group of Muslim elite, who wanted to preserve Muslim rights under a forthcoming Hindu majority rule after the British departure, to demand a separate nation for the Muslims in India. It has also been argued that the demand for Pakistan was a strategy by the Muslim League to guarantee Muslim rights in a free India under a Hindu majority without any intention of India's division (Jalal, 1985). Jalal argued that agitation for Pakistan was meant as a bargaining tool for the Muslim League leader, Jinnah and not the eventual goal. Within a short period of seven years, between 1940, when the demand for autonomous areas for Indian Muslims, and 1947, when the British India was carved up into a Hindu-majority India and a Muslim-majority Pakistan, two separate nations were created by imposing boundaries by a colonial power, which had lost the power to hold on to her prized colony. Two years before the partition, it was still unclear whether India would be divided or not or if it were divided, what would be the shape and boundary of the new nations (Hasan, 2002; Hasan, 2005; Gilmartin, 1998).

The jockeying for power by the Muslim League and Congress, while the British continued to lose the will and power to control and hold on to India after being weakened by World War II, turned bitter and violent, and, when the British finally partitioned the country, causing a bloody holocaust between the Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs. The ensuing violence resulted in the massacre of one to two million Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs and expulsion of more than 12 million people from their homes (Ahmad, 2002; Brass, 2003; Butalia, 2000; Gilmartin, 1998; Cohen, 2004; Khosla, 1950; Tan & Kudaisya, 2002).

Founded on a matrix of hatred and immense violence, the Partition brought two poisoned nations in existence. Pakistan felt short changed by not getting Kashmir, which was a Muslim-majority state. As soon as Pakistan was created, a war between India and Pakistan broke out over who should rule Kashmir (Bose 1999; Bose 2003; Ganguly, 2002). That perpetual war has been the source of terrorism in South Asia and its impact has been felt around the world. Ever since the Partition, the Pakistani military, which has had an iron-grip over the nation, has remained obsessed over Kashmir and has continued a war of attrition against India in order to win Kashmir. Furthermore, the reason for

creation of Pakistan was to be a haven for South Asia's Muslims. That national identity had to be forged artificially to unite South Asia's incredibly diverse Muslim populations, which had deep sect, linguistic, cultural, regional, and historical divisions. This identity was manufactured by creating an adversarial identity against the majority Hindu population of colonial India. This adversarial identity creation also hardened the conflict over Kashmir, since Kashmir had a Muslim majority and for Pakistan to not get Kashmir was taken by the elite as denial of its foundational identity, and thus, its reason for existence. Conversely, the secular identity created by the Indian republic after the partition made it similarly difficult for India to cede Kashmir or make even the slightest accommodation over Kashmir as it would attack India's secular credentials to accept that Muslims are not equal citizens in India. This has created a durable conflict between India and Pakistan (Ganguly, 2001; Racine, 2002; Nasr, 2005; Shafique, 2011; Tajbakhsh, 2011).

Since Pakistan was militarily weak and unable to win Kashmir in a direct war, it engaged in a war of attrition in Kashmir by initially supporting irregulars and later jihadi militants. Fundamentalists in the Pakistani military created the Taliban, supported and harbored al-Qaida, possibly even protecting and providing sanctuary to Osama bin Laden (Haqqani, 2005; Hussain, 2007; Rashid, 2008).

Since the Partition, India and Pakistan have engaged in a war of varying intensity in Kashmir (Wirsing, 1994). The conflict in Afghanistan has been an extension of the conflict in Kashmir. If this hypothesis were true, the American war or counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan would not end the Taliban insurgency or eradicate al Qaeda. Even efforts for economic uplift or winning of the Afghan hearts, or negotiations with the Taliban leadership will not guarantee success. A solution to Afghanistan turmoil requires a settlement of the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, a resolution of the Pashtun population's alienation would also assist in permanent stabilization of the region.

A successful test of the hypothesis requires a historical analysis of the region and the events that shaped the region. Three interrelated historical streams are analyzed: British actions in colonial India that caused alienation between the Hindu and the Muslim

populations, partition of India in 1947, and the British actions in Afghanistan that laid the foundation of conflict between colonial India and Afghanistan as related to division of the Pashtun population. The first two streams should connect the current India-Pakistan rivalry that has lead to three major wars between the two neighboring countries and provide an insight into how the two rivals have destabilized each other over the status of Kashmir and also entangled Afghanistan in their rivalry. The third historical stream provides an insight into the tenacity and resiliency of the Taliban and al Qaeda in South Asia and exposes how the Pakistan government has been manipulating the Taliban with the aim of overthrowing the Afghan regime and replacing the present Afghan regime with a favorable government. The first two streams should also reveal how the past and current Pakistani governments have utilized/exploited Islamic militants and the name of Islam to win Kashmir during the last six decades.

The testing of my hypothesis should address several pertinent questions, including whether the current situation in South Asia evolved as a result of the colonial decisions made by the British Empire in early 20th century? If so, does the history provide any lessons to shape the current U.S. policy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India? Furthermore, have we considered the current dynamics between Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan while shaping and executing our war in Afghanistan? Is the conflict between India and Pakistan destabilizing Afghanistan and perpetuating the war(s) in the region? Has the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir caused Pakistan to rely on exploitation of Islam and train "Jihadi" warriors to fight against India and Afghanistan? Why is the Pakistani military, specifically the ISI, assisting and harboring the Taliban and the terrorists who plot attacks against the U.S. Army in Afghanistan and targets within the United States? Would a resolution of conflict between India and Pakistan lead to a reduction in South Asia terrorism and elimination of terrorist training camps in Pakistan? Would the U.S. homeland security situation improve if India and Pakistan resolve their differences over Kashmir? Answers to these questions should provide important information to help shape the U.S. policies in South Asia.

C. METHODOLOGY

Any analysis of a complex security-related issue, involving multiple geopolitical interests and inter-state rivalries is essentially limited due to the inherent qualitative nature of the enterprise. Recognizing this limitation, the primary methodology for this thesis relied on a wide contextual analysis of literature covering current events and historical data of the relevant region. The analytical approach of this thesis thus relied upon historical scholarship and data documenting the history of the South Asian region, with particular focus on critical events and decisions made by the British rulers in colonial India and Afghanistan. Declassified documents from the British India Office provide valuable insight into the colonial decision-making. Furthermore, the factors shaping conflicting relationships between Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, since 1947, also provided material for deductive analysis. The analytical framework also relied upon inductive analysis of strategic and logistical response of the regional powers and the United States as related to military conflict and counterterrorism activities in South Asia. The historical framework is critical to understanding the nature of the ongoing conflict, insurgency, religious extremism, terrorism, and their impact upon homeland security. Historical frameworks are also essential as they provide the context to ongoing conflicts and therefore can help shape the policy in a rational and effective manner.

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II. CRITICAL EVENTS IN COLONIAL INDIA THAT SHAPED SOUTH ASIA

> While we hold onto India, we are a first rate power. If we lose India, we will decline to a third rate power. This is the value of India.
>
> Viceroy Curzon, 1905.

> We have not been elected or placed in power by the people, but we are here through our moral superiority, by the force of circumstances, by the will of Providence. This alone constitutes our charter to govern India. In doing the best we can for the people, we are bound by OUR conscience, not theirs.
>
> John Lawrence, Viceroy of India, 1864–9.

The British Empire took root in the Indian subcontinent in 1757 and lasted nearly 200 years. Beginning in mid eighteenth century, the region encompassing present-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh was brought under British control, first by the British East India Company and then directly under the British Crown. British India consisted of territories governed by Her Majesty through the Governor-General of India; the remaining areas, ruled by hereditary kings were classified as the "princely states" (Schofield, 2000; Wirsing, 1994).

India, the centerpiece of the British Empire, was called the *crown jewel* of the British Empire. India held such value to the British Empire that it shaped major policy decisions in Britain, resulting in long-lasting effects on world history (Green & Deasey 1985). One such long lasting and devastating effect of the British Empire's policies is directly connected to current destabilization of Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, which is directly connected to Pakistan's support for insurgents responsible for attacking the U.S. troops in Afghanistan and plotting terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. This chapter showcases British imperial policies that resulted in the crisis that South Asia is in the 21st century. The chapter sketches out critical steps taken by the British in the Indian Subcontinent that laid down the foundation for conflict in the region, almost two centuries after some of the decisions were taken for perpetuation of the Empire.

A. 1857 REBELLION

In May of 1857, in Meerut, where the Bengal army was headquartered, native soldiers in the employ of the British mutinied. The Revolt was fuelled by a combination of political grievances and religiously motivated hostility. On May 11, the mutineers reached Delhi, spreading the revolt and massacring many British residents. The Mughal King of India, Bahadur Shah II, who possessed only nominal power, with real power vested in the British resident at Delhi was designated the leader of the rebellion (Dalrymple, 2007). The naming of the Mughal king as the leader and massing of the rebels in Delhi provided the impetus for other revolts, which subsequently broke out across north and central India. Although the rebellion started as army revolt, it transformed into a popular uprising as peasants, local notables and urban groups, joined together to fight the British rule. Most notable of the collaboration was naming the Muslim king as the revolt's leader by Hindu soldiers and close alliance between Muslim and Hindu soldiers against the foreign rule. British authority was re-established with ruthless force, and, by the end of 1858, British had managed to overwhelm the resistance in all parts of north and central India. The British colonial rule in India was finally consolidated over the entire subcontinent after the rebellion (Lahiri, 2003).

In 1857, the British East India Company was in control of over 1.6 million square miles of territory, having annexed Sindh and Punjab. To control vast swaths of land, the British employed a large military force, which was divided into three separate components centered around Madras, Bombay, and Bengal. A year before the rebellion, the native troops in British Indian army numbered 280,000, making it the largest mercenary army in the world which was used worldwide extensively and ceaselessly for British world dominance (Streets, 2001). The uprising by the Bengal Army units against their British masters was a complex affair. Many reasons are postulated for the rebellion: perceptions of exploitation, discriminatory treatment, racism, and, most significantly, a perception that the Christian officers were deliberately engaging in acts to defile the religious practices of Hindu and Muslim soldiers (Rag, 1998; Rawat, 2007; Habib, 1998; Streets 2001).

The Rebellion (depending upon the sources, the event is alternatively known as the Indian Mutiny, First War of Independence, Muslim Conspiracy, Sepoy Mutiny, et al.) was a watershed event in the history of British India. It was the largest and most widespread threat to the British rule in India in the nineteenth century. As a consequence of the rebellion, the East India Company was removed and the control of India was transferred to the British Crown (Fremont-Barnes, 2007).

After the successful suppression of the mutiny, a devastating purge was undertaken by the British, including indiscriminate mass slaughter, burning of villages, and collective punishment (Habib, 1998; Mukherjee, 1998; Streets, 2001). The last Mughal emperor was humiliatingly treated, imprisoned and exiled. Thousands of people were hanged and vast areas of Delhi, a primary cultural center of the subcontinent and the seat of the Mogul empire, were obliterated. With the fall of Delhi, the once grand Moghul empire, which had ruled the subcontinent for three centuries, the British rule in India became unchallenged and was formally taken over by the British crown. It also signified a destruction of the Muslim political and cultural domain in the subcontinent (Dalrymple, 2007).

Many structural changes in the British military and Indian soldiers in the British employ occurred after the rebellion. The Rebellion dramatically increased racial antagonisms between Britons and Indians. On the British side, the rebellion was portrayed as savage attacks on British women and children, who were allegedly being raped and murdered by fanatic soldiers, causing great public outrage over the violation of ‘innocent’ British by subhuman Indians (Brantlinger, 1988; Mukherjee, 1988; Sharpe, 1991). On the Indian side, widespread slaughter, mass hangings, and atrocities perpetrated on both the soldiers and innocent Indian civilians by vengeful British, and wanton destruction and leveling of Delhi by eventually victorious British left little doubt that British notions of justice and due process did not apply to colonial subjects. The barbarous violence of colonial rule in India was nakedly exposed during the Rebellion (Streets, 2001).

The short-term impact transformation of the rebellion was a humiliating defeat and demise of the Moghul Empire in India and an absolute control over the subcontinent

by the British, as the British East India Company rule in India was replaced by the British crown. Additionally, the reprisals and wholesale slaughter of the rebels and civilians in Delhi purged the Muslim aristocracy and drove majority of the Muslim residents of Delhi outside (Lahiri, 2003). A racial divide evolved between Europeans and Indians, and was institutionalized in a series of discriminatory laws. Resentment against such discrimination was the impetus behind Indian nationalism, which arose later. Until 1857, Indian nationalism was nonexistent (McCully, 1935; Solangi, 1990).

However, the crushing of rebellion had wider and longer-lasting impacts. It was obvious that a reliance on military force alone to control the subcontinent was not sufficient and shifting alliances were required to maintain British colonial domination by playing native associates against the rebellious ones, mastering the art of divide and rule. And, though the defeat of the rebellion resulted in sowing the seed for Indian nationalism, even more consequential ramification was etching of Muslim and Hindu identities in the subcontinent against the British and Indian Muslim identity against the Hindus. These developments were to have major impacts during decolonization nine decades later and continue their impacts on South Asian politics. As Dalrymple describes “The defeat indirectly damaged the syncretic, tolerant, and sophisticated culture and composite Hindu-Muslim Indo-Islamic civilization that the Mughal court under the last emperor had fostered. The Indian Muslim became a pariah in the British eyes. In the period following the rebellion, profoundly contemptible attitudes against Muslims and Mughal culture were openly expressed by the British; these attitudes were absorbed by the now ascendant Hindus” (Dalrymple, 2007).

The most significant strategy employed by the British to defeat the Revolt of 1857 was by taking advantage of internal rivalries amongst the Indians. According to one estimate, the bulk of the British mercenary forces that reconquered the rebellious region were composed of Sikhs, Afghans and Nepali mercenaries. The mercenary motivation was not to help the British save their empire but to plunder from the crumbling Mughal Empire. Besides looting, the Sikhs were also guided by a desire to avenge humiliation they had suffered at the hands of Mughal rulers (Mahadevan, 2011; Spilsbury, 2007). The successful strategy of divide and rule paid dividends to the Empire and perpetuated

British rule in India for 90 more years. However, the strategy was to prove disastrously costly in the long term, not only to the Subcontinent, but also to the rest of the world.

As the British East India Company put the rebellion down, one of the pressing matters for the British was to prevent future rebellions, lest their empire in India crumble. One of the most consequential decisions taken by the British was to change patterns of recruitment for their Indian Army. This changing pattern of recruitment can be connected to eventual breakup of Pakistan in 1971 and consequential hardening of its Islamic identity.

The British Indian Army was a mercenary army employed by the British Raj to quell internal disturbances and also for imperial outreach. However, the mutiny of the Bengal army in 1857 shook British confidence and led to drastic reorganization of the army. The British East India Company administered India until 1858, through three Presidencies each with its own army: Bengal, Madras and Bombay. These armies consisted of British and Indian regiments commanded by British officers. The Bengal Army was the largest of the three. Prior to the mutiny, Bengal army recruitment focused on high caste Hindus, mainly from central and eastern India. After the rebellion, the British made a shift and began to seek recruits from Punjab and North Western regions of India (from present day Pakistan) at the expense of other regions, especially Bengal. The Punjab region provided a reservoir of ready soldiers with a large bank of illiterate villagers, desperate for jobs, and unlikely to engage in agitation for independence—unlike the caste-Hindu soldiers of the Bengal army. This era also heralded the colonial theory of divide and rule on the basis of the so-called 'martial races,' with the British officers suggesting that people from Punjab belonged to "martial races," implying that they were superior and therefore made better warriors (Ali, 1983; Soherwordi, 2010; Tan & Kudaisya, 2000). The shift in recruitment was so radical that by1929, 62% of the whole Indian Army was Punjabi, even though Punjab constituted only ten percent of British Indian population. The selective recruitment is reflected in that Bengal, population 45 million, was allowed only 7,117 recruits to the Indian army, whereas Punjab, with a population of 20 million, provided 349,689 soldiers to the Indian army. Even within Punjab, only a select group, comprising of Muslims and Sikhs, was highly

favored and the rest were discouraged from joining the army. During the Second World War alone, Punjab provided over 800,000 soldiers for the British war efforts (Soherwordi, 2010).

Punjab and the northern regions were favored by the British for recruitment, as these regions were backward, agrarian, and the peasant populations mostly uneducated, facing acute poverty.

Recruiting from this group provided not only dedicated soldiers; the illiterate village-dweller soldiers were presumed to be immune to nationalism. One long-term impact of the British chauvinistic and vengeful attitude towards the Bengalis, who were described variously as untrustworthy, disloyal, and effeminate, was that such prejudiced attitude pervaded in the Indian army. Punjabi soldiers imbibed their colonial master's attitudes and looked down upon Bengalis and considered them untrustworthy (Ali, 1983).

When British India was divided into Pakistan and India, the western part of Punjab became West Pakistan and Bengal province in the east was partitioned to create East Pakistan. Due to the circumstances of its creation, Pakistan came to be dominated by its military, with West Pakistan retaining its military-rural elite complex (Racine, 2002). East Pakistan comprised 56 percent of Pakistan's population; however, the Punjabi-dominated military continued the racist colonial pattern of recruitment by excluding Bengalis from Pakistani military. The Punjabi-controlled military, with its historical chauvinistic attitude towards Bengalis, not only excluded Bengali Muslims from joining the army, but also looked down upon Bengalis as untrustworthy. Discrimination against Bengalis resulted in less than 7 percent of Bengalis serving in Pakistan army in 1960s. The racial myths of the British were assumed and propagated by Pakistani officers, maintaining that Bengalis were short and dark; they could not fight well; they were nature's cowards. Consequent to such attitude that pervaded in the military-bureaucratic elite of the newly emergent Pakistan, Bengali-Muslims not only faced discrimination, resources of East Pakistan were exploited by the Punjabi elite based in the West. The protests by Bengalis were ignored or repressed by the Punjabi-led regimes based in West

Pakistan. The resentment of Bengali-Muslims peaked in 1970 when Awami League, based in East Pakistan, won elections but was denied by the Punjabi military and elite from taking power (Sisson & Rose, 1992).

Eventually, the repression of the Bengali Pakistan culminated in a horrendous bloodbath in 1971 when, in response to Bengali-Muslims struggle for their rights; Punjabi soldiers massacred over 300,000 innocent Bengalis and raped tens of thousands of women (Jahan, 1997; Sisson & Rose, 1992). Ironically, West Pakistan soldiers, butchering their East Pakistan citizens, were told that Bengalis were an inferior race, short, dark, and weak (Ali, 1983).[2] It is remarkable that the prejudices and hatred maintained by the British officers were reflected in the attitudes of the successor army in Pakistan. It is also remarkable that Pakistan, a nation created for South Asia's Muslims, brutalized its own Muslim citizens, leading to a genocidal event, culminating in the breakup of the nation state 24 years after its creation.

The result of this civil war was eventual secession of East Pakistan, with Indian help, to form Bangladesh, in 1971. The consequence of Pakistan's fragmentation was even deeper entrenchment of Punjabi dominance over Pakistan's military. Additionally, since the army had employed Islamic rhetoric to assert its superiority over Bengali Muslims, who were belittled as cowardly converted Hindus, the Islamic chauvinism employed by Punjabi army acted as a catalyst to radicalize Pakistan (Haqqani, 2005). The only unifying theme left for Pakistan after its eastern half's secession was Islam. This theme was later played too well with disastrous results in Pakistan's relations with India, Afghanistan, and even its ally, the United States.

Horrendous violence during the partition of India in 1947 can also be linked to the after-effect of the 1857 rebellion. Vast majority of the violence occurred in Punjab, the land where the British had focused their military recruitment after the 1857 rebellion. Remarkably, of the two provinces partitioned, Punjab and Bengal, to create Pakistan, no violence occurred in Bengal. A significant contributor to the violence was the large number of demobilized soldiers, who, after the Second World War, were localized in Punjab.

[2] The number of people killed is disputed, with the estimates ranging from 300,000 to 2 million.

B. THE DURAND LINE

The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been one of the most important borders in the world since September 11, 2001. It is a contested border, the boundaries of which have not been accepted by the successive Afghan governments since 1947, when Pakistan was created. Prior to 1947, this border existed between British India and Afghanistan. The bilateral border dispute transformed into an issue with international dimension when the U.S. military militarily removed the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001, and the insurgents fled across to Pakistan to seek safe havens and bases to launch cross-border attacks against the United States and allied forces. Parts of the boundary region, especially the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), in Pakistan have served as a haven for al Qaeda leaders and a base for the Taliban (Barfield, 2007; Jones, 2011; Rashid, 2008; Siddiqi, 2011). The history of the disputed border reveals how British colonial decisions shaped the region as a disputed and lawless region between British India and Afghanistan, later becoming a national security issue for the United States, and a source of terrorism and destabilization, due to the competition between India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Durand Line, is about 1,640 miles long. Prior to 1947, when there was no state of Pakistan in existence, this was the loosely defined border between British India and Afghanistan. Large parts of the frontier include forbidding topography, including narrow valleys, desert plains, inaccessible mountainous terrain and difficult rocky regions, making it a difficult border to police. Furthermore, due to geopolitical considerations, from colonial to present times, authorities avoided enforcing border-crossing rules, and, at times, aided problematic cross-border traffic. During the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, insurgents mastered the art of crossing the border without detection by authorities; there was a mimetic assimilation of this art by the Taliban and al Qaeda members as they battled the U.S. forces post-September 2001 (Ghufran, 2009; Isby, 2010; Emadi, 1990; Tomsen, 2011).

The Durand Line, though it exists on printed maps, is ignored by local populations living on both sides of the boundary who have never paid much attention to it, and people cross the border at will without treating it as a boundary. The boundary is

either not demarcated or poorly demarcated in most places. State authority has always been weak to nonexistent in the area of the line. Both Afghanistan and British India instead used indirect forms of rule that relied on tribal elders to settle problems and to ensure security by means of armed local militias (Lieberman, 1980; Barfield, 2007).

Practically, the border does not exist for the majority of Pashtun tribes inhabiting the frontier in eastern and southern Afghanistan. Pashtuns frequently traverse the border without any regard for the boundary line (Siddiqi, 2011). Pashtuns, the largest tribal group in the world, constitute the overwhelming majority of this region. The region has been a haven to al Qaeda network, the Taliban, and other militants who have engaged in violent confrontations with U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Indian forces in Kashmir. The Taliban operating on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border are predominantly Pashtuns (Barfield, 2007).

Any discussion of the strategic importance and history of Afghanistan necessitates a comment on the "Great Game" played between Russia and England for supremacy in Central Asia. The strategic importance of the region now called Afghanistan arose in the mid-nineteenth century as the British Empire was extending and consolidating its power in the Indian subcontinent and the Russia was looking to expand eastward (Lieberman, 1980; Nawid, 1997). In the nineteenth century, Britain viewed India as the “jewel in the crown” of its colonial possessions and took an aggressive stance toward any perceived threat toward their control of India. Possession of India was considered a key to the wealth of the British Empire. Fear of Russian encroachment made the tribal areas between Afghanistan and India important territory for the British. Afghanistan was treated by the British as a dependency, and, until the 1919 border war in which Afghanistan won complete sovereignty; Afghan foreign relations were directed by British India. However, lacking sufficient military power and financial resources required to assert a complete control over the tribal areas bordering India, the British opted to follow a flexible governance policy in tribal areas while keeping Afghanistan as a buffer against Russian expansion eastward and southward (Ghufran, 2009; Isby, 2010).

During mid-to late 19th century, several warring tribes and minor mountain states constituted Afghanistan. The British and the Russian Empires competed for influence by

backing rival groups. The British intent to exercise direct military control of the Hindu Kush region and its eastern and southern flanks, called "forward policy," failed due to tough native resistance, was abandoned, and was followed by "masterly inactivity," a policy of nonintervention, with the aim of creating an Afghan buffer state between British India and Russia. Following their successful imperial formula of using native allies to exercise control in colonies, the British supported Amir Abdurrahman (1880–1901) who was encouraged to unify the country and promised a free hand in his internal policies, as long as British strategic interests were met (Lieberman, 1980).

The Durand Line formalized annexation of Afghan territory, including Peshawar, which was Afghanistan's old winter capital and taken over by the Sikhs in 1834. The Durand Agreement afforded the British strategic control of border passes and established an international boundary for Afghanistan and annexed regions, including what is now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as the Northwest Frontier Province). The British mapped out administrative territories, depending upon their governability. Moving westward from Peshawar, the British paid less attention to the territories more distant from Peshawar and thus those territories each had proportionately less colonial control. The British assumed control of easier to manage 'settled zones' and the neighboring difficult to rule tribal zones were kept under British sovereignty but left to govern themselves. The Durand Line indicated the outermost limit of British control on its India-Afghanistan borders (Barfield, 2007).

C. IMPACT OF DURAND LINE ON BRITISH EMPIRE

The reason for creation of the Durand Line was expedient imperial necessity—not topographic or cartographic requirement. The British Empire, due to the challenges it perceived from Russian interest in South Asia, feared that their monopoly control in India might be challenged by Russia. The British also believed that Russia had designs over Afghanistan as a conduit to warm water port access in South Asia, which would have enhanced economic power of Russia, creating a strong colonial challenger to the British. Afghanistan separated the two imperial powers and by default became a buffer state between the two. In effect, creation of the Durand Line provided two benefits to the

British interests: convenient administrative areas were delineated for the British and a buffer zone was created against a perceived Russian incursion in Indian subcontinent. However, this came with a heavy price for the economic, political, and cultural integrity of the still evolving Afghan state (Emadi, 1990; Isby, 2010; Lieberman, 1980).

Isby has argued that the frontiers of Afghanistan were created by imperial Britain without any intention to make Afghanistan cohesive or self-supporting. This led to Afghanistan eventually ending up as a pawn in other nations' conflicts, Britain and Russia a century ago, India, Pakistan, and United States now. Isby claims that even though the tools of the British Empire—force and legitimacy—created the frontier in 1893, the Pashtun ethnicity and Islam as factors were not, and could not be, divided by the boundary line on a map (Isby, 2010).

The imposition of the Durand Line as the border between British India and Afghanistan was unacceptable to the local Pashtuns, who treated it with contempt. They considered the boundary as artificial and imaginary. Portions of the border, delineated by the Durand Line were so arbitrary that they even split villages into two. Due to the imperial imposition of the Durand Line with disregard to ground realities, the status of the Durand Line remained unclear. Unlike Afghanistan's international boundaries with Russia in the north or Iran in the west that were recognized as such by all parties at the time, natives on the British-India Afghanistan border refused to recognize the existence of the frontier. This resulted because the British negotiations with the Afghans was considered an internal colonial issue rather than as an international one. Delineation of Afghan eastern borders was not a goal of Britain; the aim was to reorganization of British administration of the area in the Northwest Frontier Province (Ewans, 2005; Johnson & Mason, 2008; Siddiqi, 2011).

Because of long-established political, cultural, and economic connections among the various regional Pashtun tribes, the Afghans viewed their division by the Durand Line as illegitimate. Furthermore, Durand Line also divided the Baloch population between Afghanistan and British India, dividing communities and creating resentment. The line on the map dividing the Pashtun and Baloch populations was construed by the natives as illegitimate effort of a colonial power. Due to the history and topography of the boundary

area, the division was also unenforceable, which further delegitimized the boundary creation. Since the division was made with the goal of creating buffer areas, the needs, identities, and realities of the communities were disregarded by the imperial policy makers; however, as the British ability to enforce control was nonexistent in the new frontier that was created, the lack of interest in governance created issues that became apparent a century later, including distrust of foreign entities and central or federal government structure (Emadi, 2005; Johnson & Mason, 2008).

1. Durand Line and Conflict Between Afghanistan and Pakistan

When Afghanistan became fully independent in 1919, it accepted the Durand Line as its de facto border with British India. But, Kabul revived its earlier and more fundamental objections to the Line's legitimacy in 1947 when Pakistan became an independent state when British India was partitioned. Pakistan declared the Durand Line its international border with Afghanistan. However, the Afghanistan government claimed that the border created by the departing colonialists was not valid as the treaty was signed under duress and staked a claim for the Pashtun region across the Durand Line. Afghan government put forth a demand for Pashtunistan and proposed that the Pashtuns and Pashto-speaking tribes in northwestern Pakistan should have an option to "opt out" of Pakistan and set up an autonomous state (Emadi, 1990; Hasan, 1962; Johnson & Mason, 2008; Shahrani, 2002).

Afghanistan's proposition was that during the partition of British India, the Pashtun regions should have been offered the additional options of becoming an independent state or joining with Afghanistan. Furthermore, Afghans contented that various agreements between British India and Afghanistan, including the Durand Line, lapsed when the British left South Asia. The implication was that imperial agreements could not be transferable to the new state of Pakistan as successor state of British India. Afghans argued that Durand Line remained illegitimate because they had been coerced by the British into accepting the agreement. Since that time, successive Afghan regimes in Kabul have all refused to recognize their existing border with Pakistan. The antagonism between Afghan and Pakistan government caused Afghanistan to be the only

nation that opposed entry of Pakistan in United Nations in 1947. Most Afghan maps still show the territory across the border as Pashtunistan, with the Pakistan boundary beginning at Punjab (Barfield, 2007).

In 1949, a loya jirga in Afghanistan declared that the Durand Line was invalid. In the succeeding decades, Afghan governments put forth the idea of Pashtunistan, an independent state for Pashtun people. The Awami National Party (ANP) of Afghanistan also agitated for the creation of a new Pashtun province, which would incorporate majority Pashtun areas from the Pakistan side of the border. The idea was considered an existential challenge by the Pakistan, a state formed solely on the basis of religion as common identity while all the other identities of its citizens were smothered by the nation state in order to coalesce various centrifugal linguistic, ethnic, and cultural identities. One of the major conflicts between such identities had resulted in division of Pakistan in 1971 into Pakistan and Bangladesh (Johnson & Mason, 2008).

By contrast, Pakistan considers the Durand Line its formal international boundary as a successor state to the British India. Pakistan, though (just like the British) it never succeeded in establishing direct state administrative authority in the old Tribal Agencies, the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), does not consider the issue open to negotiation. Pakistan has also been concerned of Afghan exploitation of separatists in Baluchistan and the NWFP, since disaffected individuals Balochis and Pashtuns in those regions, since the creation of Pakistan, have argued that Baluchistan and the NWFP have been colonies of Pakistan, as they were of British India. Pakistan was created as a nation for Muslims; as such, the existing state system, relying on Islam alone, has been weak, as evidenced by the secession of eastern Pakistan in 1971, which resulted in loss of half of Pakistan's territory and population (Sisson & Rose, 1990; Tan and Kudaisya, 2002)). Therefore, Pakistan, despite being a nuclear-armed state, considers a weak state of Afghanistan as a threat, even though it has failed to exercise governmental control in FATA and its frontier bordering Afghanistan.

The disputed Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier makes the boundary question difficult to solve. The Durand Line created an expedient machination for imperial Britain where even though the people on the eastern side of the Line were absorbed into British Indian

Empire, they retained an unusual stateless status. The British could exploit easy to govern revenue generating regions and ignore difficult to govern and expensive to police tribal areas. British control was exercised indirectly by appointing of local clan leaders and by harsh Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) of 1901, which included vicious punishments, including burning of houses and group punishments without right of appeal. Even though it is a part of Pakistan now, the FATA is still ruled by colonial-era FCR regulations. For almost six decades, no serious attempts were made to assimilate the region into Pakistan. It could be argued that Pakistan continued the colonial policy of keeping the area ungoverned, marginalizing the population, and exploiting the Pashtuns when it suited the state's purpose. National Pakistani law does not apply in these territories and the central government has only indirect control over its people. A paradoxical situation exists in the border region across the Durand Line, as historically both the British Empire and Pakistan state refused to exercise full control over parts of the territory, creating a situation where an international boundary exist, but the state claiming the territory does not or cannot exercise authority over the people who live there (Barfield, 2007; Fayyaz, 2007).

2. Durand Line and Its Impact on South Asia Terrorism

After the departure of the British, the Pakistan government left the frontier area in FATA as a lawless region where laws of Pakistan were not enforced. Beginning with 1948, Pakistan recruited Pashtun armed group in the region across the Durand Line to fight the Indians in Kashmir. Furthermore, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Directorate for Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's spy agency, created a network of camps on both sides of the Durand Line to manufacture and support insurgency against the Soviets (Coll, 2004; Haqqani, 2005). In the 1980s, ISI brought in militants to the area who were engaged in terrorist actions in Kashmir. The two sides of the Line were used by the ISI for terrorist and insurgent-support networks providing safe houses, logistics, communications, and transportation, and a supportive population, something described as "the privatization of terror" by Pakistani intelligence (Isby, 2010). This network was later expanded in 1990s with Pakistan's support of the Taliban and other militant organizations like Harkat-ul-Mujahedin (HM), Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-

Mohammad (JeM), Hizb-ul-Mujahideen(HuM), and others[3]. Coupled with these facts, the Taliban's ideology, which was based on a belief that the Durand Line should not be a barrier to the Pashtuns it divided, has made the region across the Durand Line a hotbed of insurgency and terrorism.

Until the Soviets were in Afghanistan, the insurgent networks created by Pakistan across the Durand Line were tacitly supported by the United States. The terrorist networks and camps being used to train insurgents to wage war in Kashmir were generally ignored (Barfield, 2007). This situation changed dramatically in 2001 when the United States military removed the Taliban government in Afghanistan. As the Islamist groups fled into their Pakistan, the United States pressed upon Pakistan the need to end FATA and Baluchistan's ability to serve as the base for the Taliban and Islamic radicals. With American troops based in Afghanistan's border areas, the question of where the border was and Pakistan's responsibilities for maintaining order in its own territories has acquired international significance. The old colonial era based expediencies that left the frontier region ungoverned by Pakistan's national government have facilitated the emergence of violent jihadists that sought to topple governments in both Kabul and Islamabad (Ghufran, 2009; Rubin & Siddique, 2006; Siddiqi, 2009).

D. CONCLUSIONS

The borderline demarcating Afghanistan-Pakistan border has been contentious and used as a bargaining tool by the Afghan governments since 1947. Currently, the porous nature of the Durand Line, and the quasi- and virtual-autonomous status of the region on both sides of the Line, has had a serious impact on the U.S.-led operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan due to the ability of the insurgents to launch attacks in Afghanistan and regroup in safe havens on the Pakistan side. The Line was created for British Empire's expediency—the "imperial necessity," without any consideration of the impact on populations inhabiting the region. The disregard for the native population's tribes, ethnicities, cultural and ethnic affiliation, and historic

[3] For additional information and detailed analysis, see Clarke, 2010; Fair, 2011 (a); Fair, 2011 (b); Howenstein, 2008; Jones, 2007; Jones, 2011, & Rashid, 2008.

association resulted in a border that divided the Pashtun and Baloch populations in two separate nation states. Not only did the border region that was created have an unenforceable boundary, colonial prerogatives allowed the frontier region to remain ungoverned, creating an autonomous area where the tribes refused to accept any federal authority. The British kept the tribal areas under their jurisdiction in check with oppressive and abusive FCR, making the frontier population highly alienated from the governments imposed from without. This alienation and distrust of government persisted after the departure of the British, as the Pakistan government continued the oppressive and alienating British colonial model in FATA. Furthermore, since the Durand Line was considered an artificial construct by the inhabitants of the frontier region, a latent and sometimes politically created demand for reunification of the Pashtuns further complicated the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan since 1947.

Asking for a reunification of the Pashtuns under a "Pashtunistan and the demand for the return of Pashtun and Baloch areas annexed by the British in the 19th century, creates an existential fear for Pakistan.

The legacy of the conflict in areas demarcated by the Durand Line is a legacy of colonial decisions that were made more than a century ago in British India. Without addressing the underlying issues, the Pashtun-based Taliban movement cannot be permanently defeated. Durand Line is not a boundary dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan; it is an indicator for a set of unresolved social, economic, and historical relationships that impact Afghan- Pakistan relations, and, by extension, South Asia and the rest of the world.

E. IMPERIAL NECESSITY: EXPLOITATION OF HINDU–MUSLIM DIFFERENCES

1. History of Hindu-Muslim Syncretism and Differences in the Subcontinent

The motives of the British Empire in the Indian subcontinent included economic exploitation, use of India as a strategic military base to defend profitable trade routes in Asia, defeat competitors, and strengthen the Empire. The main strategy to achieve these

missions was force. However, to use military to rule over a vast territory, home to hundreds of millions of inhabitants, six-month's voyage away on a ship, was prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the British approach to achieve colonial goals in India included expedient strategies, including getting the consent of the native ruling class to prevent military actions, and preserving caste, class, and linguistic divisions. For administrative expediency, colonial bureaucracy also created groupings that lumped together disparate groups within single religious entities, which, combined with divide and rule strategies, later led to serious communal problems. The British actions eventually ended up promoting a severe new split in India based upon religious differences; this split was their key to perpetuation of colonial rule, especially between the inter-war years. This divide-and-rule strategy has been blamed for communal violence in India, estranged relations between the Hindus, Sikhs and the Muslims, which continues to destabilize the region decades after the British departure from the subcontinent (Ahmad, 2002; Bayly, 1985; Green & Deasey, 1985; Pennington, 2004; Pandey, 2004, 2006; Sarilla, 2005).

Using cross-national statistical methods, a study explored the impact of colonialism on extant communal conflicts and wars. In an analysis of the colonial heritage of 160 countries, conducted to explore whether a history of colonialism was a predictor of inter-communal conflicts, political rebellion, and civil war, specifically between the years 1960–1999, Lange and Dawson did not find evidence that colonialism was a *universal* cause of civil violence. However, their research specifically supported the assertion that inter-communal violence is a common legacy of colonialism, especially of British colonialism (Lange & Dawson, 2009). Others have suggested that British colonialism can be directly connected to wars and contemporary terrorism in case of the Indian subcontinent (Dutta, 2010; Dutta, 2010; Haqqani, 2005; Rashid, 2008; Riedel, 2011).

Historians have claimed that in the Indian subcontinent, British colonialism contributed to postcolonial violence by construction of oppositional identities (specifically between the majority Hindus and the minority Muslims, but also class-based distinctions), exacerbation of communal differences to perpetuate the imperial rule, and

imposition of arbitrary political borders (division of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan). Furthermore, it is also suggested that reification of Hinduism was largely in response to dynamic patron-client relationships forged and transformed between the Hindus, British, Muslims, and other groups, based upon imperial necessities (Hassan, 1997, Hasan, 2005; Nandy, 1983; Pennington, 2004; Page 1999). My thesis agrees partially with scholars who have proposed various versions of the *divide and rule* theory: that the British raised Muslim communalism[4] as a counter-weight to emerging Indian nationalism.

Another school of thought has attempted to explain the antagonistic split between Hinduism and Islam in India to opening of new arenas of local power, due to shifting power structures (decline of the Mogul Emperor as a result of rise of the British East India Company, and changing patron-client relationship with shifting imperial dynamics) in which local social conflicts could be played out (Freitag, 1990). However, even when scholars have pointed towards the existence of conflict between Hindus and Muslims or Muslims and Sikhs, prior to consolidation of the British rule in the subcontinent, significant fissures existed *within* these communities that prevented any uniform solidarity; therefore one could not affirm that there existed a unified Hindu or a unified Muslim identity in colonial times. The disputes between the communities were related to disputes over symbols, rites and precedents, a group's social, economic and political life, and a jockeying for power, and not as a result of any unified religious identity or affiliation. Bayly (1985) questioned whether any broader or homogeneous Hindu or Muslim or Sikh 'consciousness' existed in the colonial time, and if it did exist, it is unknown the extent to which such a consciousness provided an impetus to conflict between these groups.

Precolonial and colonial periods in India were marked by widespread Hindu-Muslim symbiosis and the culture was predominantly syncretic (Dalrymple, 2007). Even though a syncretic culture does not preclude religious conflicts, the necessity for the

[4] The term “communalism” is widely used across South Asia to describe the systematic misuse of religion, including manufacturing prejudice, tension, and conflict between communities for political purposes.

Muslim emperors to employ Hindu generals and for Hindu kings to hire Muslim mercenaries was an established practice in colonial and precolonial periods (Bayly, 1985; Freitag, 1990). Sacred incorporation had been common to Hindu kingdoms that predated the Moghul Empire and also to Muslim rulers since the time of Akbar. Also, unlike the British imperium in India, where the British governed India as a distant dependency with disregard for its culture, earlier Muslim invaders of Hindustan had settled in the subcontinent, married Hindu women, and adopted the customs of the country (Bayly, 1985; Green & Deasey, 1985).

In the Islam of the Indian subcontinent, although the notion of brotherhood was stressed conceptually, there was a disconnect between several Muslim communities. Through its history, India had been invaded and occupied by waves of invaders from the west. Arabs, Turks, Afghans and the Mughals had invaded India during various periods of the subcontinent's history and established their dominion over the subcontinent at different times. However, these Muslim rulers arriving from the west generally ignored the local masses that converted to Islam and held the converts, most of them low-caste locals, in low esteem. The descendants of the foreign aristocracy, the elite Muslims, began to stress the fact of Muslim brotherhood only after the British had fully established themselves as the predominant power in the subcontinent after replacing Muslim power. The elite needed the local Muslim support to assert their political strength in the new world of British domination and devolution of Mughal and Muslim dominion. Thus, the reason for jointure, reflecting in a new principle of brotherhood was not religious but predominantly the result of socio-political compulsions. Therefore, majority of the historical analysis reveals that Hindu–Muslim animosity, as observed and reflected in great acts of violence between 1946–47, was not an extant force during most of colonial times (Ahmad, 1991; Freitag, 1990; Hasan, 2002; Haynes, 1991; Robinson, 1998; Talbot, 1995).

The British aided communal nationalism by identifying subjects under religious categories, such as Hindus, Sikhs, Christians and Muslims, providing a sense of unity in heretofore fragmented religious identities that were more shaped by regions, class, caste, sub-castes, linguistic, and ethnic divisions. The administrative classification together of

high and low castes by the British created a new single monolithic grouping of Hinduism. Similarly, the elite Muslims and the local Muslims, who were poor native converts to Islam, were pigeonholed together to create a monolith of Islam in the subcontinent. Such groupings ignored cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and regional differences between the co-religionists, which were stronger than the bond of same religion.

A vast amount of scholarly literature exists, providing evidence of deliberate colonial efforts that orchestrated the construction of identities. It is suggested that the identities constructed during the colonial era resulted in divisive and violent communal politics after independence. In case of India, there is a general agreement that the colonial construction of identity was utilized specifically to weaken opposition to colonial British rule. This strategy, termed "divide-and-rule," allegedly strengthened communal identities, to pit indigenous groups (Hindus and Muslims, higher caste Hindus against lower caste Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, et al.) to prevent broad-based opposition to British rule. In fact, King, Nandy, and Thapar have claimed that British promoted the concept of a unified Hindu religion and that Hinduism did not exist as a unified construct prior to the British colonial rule. Baber and Breuilly have suggested that British colonial power, by unequal treatment and construction of a system of communal representation, reified oppositional Hindu and Muslim identities and such construction of oppositional identities have been at the core of ethnic conflicts in colonial and postcolonial India. In the case of India, the violence began before the independence and became worse after the independence. (Baber, 2004; Breuilly, 1993; Dirks, 2001; Gilmartin, 1998; Gilmartin & Lawrence, 2000; King, 1999; Nandy, 1983). It has been acknowledged that economic and social conflicts between the Hindu and Muslim elite were extant prior to the British arrival in the subcontinent; whether such conflicts would have evolved to a level that contributed to the division of the subcontinent at the end of the British Empire is, however, not a given (Gilmartin, 1998).

Eqbal Ahmad asserted that the British divided India along communal lines, especially between 1757 and 1920. "When Muslims would resist British rule, as they did between 1757 and 1857, they were discriminated against in favor of bringing up Hindus. When Congress became organized (in the late nineteenth century), more Hindu

nationalist figures were there than Muslim ones. Then they favored Muslims against the Congress. So there was a whole set of divide-and-rule policies that the British followed for two centuries." (Ahmad quoted in Barsamian, 2000). Divide and rule was attributed to the success of the British Empire and related to nurturing of local hatred. Carroll relates Hindu-Muslim hatred in the Indian subcontinent, Catholic-Protestant hatred in Ireland, and Arab-Jew hatred in Israel to the British Empire's policy of divide and rule (Carroll, 2001).

2. The Dynamics of Institutionalizing Religious Differences

At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Muslim elite in the central part of India had seen their status being reduced as the power of the Hindus rose. As the aristocratic inheritors of the Mughal Empire, Muslims had earned the mistrust of the British when they took part in the Indian Mutiny in 1857 (Jafferlot, 2002; Pandey, 2006; Rawat, 2007). Furthermore, the Muslim elite were concerned that in case of decolonization leading to democracy, their minority status would lead to loss in status and political power. The British skillfully exploited these fears with their well-honed strategy of divide and rule in order to perpetuate their imperial rule in India (Hasan, 2005; Jafferlot, 2002). The Muslim League was a creation of Muslim conservatives and was founded in 1906 with the blessing of the British viceroy in India, Lord Minto. A delegation of Muslim nobles and landed gentry had met Lord Minto in 1906, pledging loyalty to the empire, demanding job quotas and separate electorates for Muslims. The underlying reason for Muslim League’s creation was the fear that the Muslim aristocrats and large landowners would stand to lose power and stature in a democratic India, and they believed that their interests were more protected under the British rule versus the Hindu majority rule, especially as the discourse of the Congress leadership veered towards socialistic rhetoric with promises of land reform for the poor. British successfully exploited these fears (Ali, 2008; Hasan, 2002; Page, 1999)

3. Creation of Indian National Congress and the Indian Muslim League

The Indian National Congress (Congress) was founded in 1885 by a British official, Allan Octavian Hume, with an implicit aim to provide for a dialogue between

educated Indian elite and the British Empire and prevent the natives from engaging in violence or think about self-rule. The logic was that a pro-Government Indian organization could serve as an intermediary between the imperial power and its subjects.

The British goal, after the 1857 rebellion against the British rule in India, had been to gain support of the English-educated Indians, primarily upper class Hindus, to support and justify their governance of India. Ironically, the foundation of the Congress is considered a key event in a systematic coalescing of opposition to the British Empire in India. The Congress evolved from a loyalist grouping of an upper class elite intellectual set, primarily including Hindus but also Muslims, Parsis, Christians, and some sympathetic British, into a nationalist organization. The loyalist agenda of Congress is evident in Hume's description (Hume, 1911):

> Despite the apparent outward unity in all the deliverances of the Congress there has been a growing cleavage of sentiment and aim between the radical and conservative sections in the community. This cleavage recently came to a clash and a rupture in the Congress movement itself. The Moderate party has as its goal only the desire for a larger measure of home rule like that in Canada and Australia, together with loyal connection with British supremacy in a world empire. The Extremists would omit the last half of the twofold program of the Moderates, though without openly advocating any early separation from British connection.

Despite its elitist membership and history of subservience to the Empire, Congress quickly developed into a mass organization, especially between the interwar years, with a secular agenda, and demanded independence from British occupation. Beginning in the early part of the 20th century, under the leadership of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, better known as Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948), the Congress embarked on a fitful and drawn out freedom movement. The strategy to resist the colonial rule consisted of combining peaceful civil disobedience with mass action. Although Muslims were involved in Congress, including some at the highest levels, broad participation of predominantly upper-caste Hindus provided majority of Congress support (Mehrotra, 1972).

Congress was ostensibly a secular organization, its appeal directed to Indians without any regard to class or religion. However, in practice, some of the symbolism used

by the Congress in mass campaigns against the British was laden with Hindu symbolism and mythology. Furthermore, Gandhi, the dominant Congress leader, heavily utilized Hindu symbolism in his speeches. While such tactics could be described as an effort to appeal to the broad public, majority of which indeed was Hindu, the British exploited this by supporting a political force that was anti-majoritarian. As the Congress began to grow, the British felt that they had to encourage the formation of a counterbalancing force, which they accomplished by encouraging the formation of a Muslim party. Thus, during the early twentieth century, the British cultivated Muslim aristocracy, industrialists, and large landlords as a balance against the Congress, and supported the formation of the Indian Muslim League. The Muslim League openly acted as a supporter of the British Raj. In 1906, the Viceroy of India, Lord Minto, was petitioned by the Muslim aristocracy to set up a separate electorate for the Muslims. Minto, adept at the art of divide and rule, agreed to this demand. The Muslim League's demand for separate electorate was conceded by the British Government under the Act of 1909. The most serious implication of this act was that the colonial regime provided official sanction to religious nationalism through the linking of religion with political representation, power and patronage. The Communal Award by the British government, which extended separate electorates to Sikhs, Indian Christians, and Anglo-Indians, was another step in British policy of fostering communal divide (Hasan, 1997; Page 1999).

As we will see, eventually this evolving divide between communities in colonial India resulted in such poisoning of relationships that it culminated in hatred, religious rioting, and devastating violence between the Hindus and Muslims when India was divided into India and Pakistan by the departing British. The poisoned relations between the Hindu and Muslim elite were transferred to the nascent nations and continued in an enduring rivalry that has resulted in a destabilized South Asia where Pakistan has nurtured jihadi insurgents in order to counterbalance its larger adversary, India. The spillover of the dispute between India and Pakistan has resulted in terrorist attacks against the United States and the West. We shall return to these arguments.

Prior to the British conquest of India, relations between subcontinent's people and their rulers had never been defined solely by religion. David Page concluded that

enfranchised members of Muslim and other communities were made to vote communally, think communally, and express their grievances communally; there was no need to collaborate with or accommodate other communities: “Muslim politicians did not have to appeal to non-Muslims; non-Muslims did not have to appeal to Muslims. This made it very difficult for a genuine Indian nationalism to emerge” (Page 1999). Page argues that British initiative was ultimately responsible for dividing Hindus and Muslims, pointing to the Montague-Chelmsford constitutional reform of 1920. He claims that Montague-Chelmsford institutionalized the principle of separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims and was crucial in development of divisive politics. Separate electorates, reservations, and weight given to religion helped evolve a conception of Muslim community with an image of a unified entity that was segregated from the Hindus League’s aim to advance the political rights of the Muslims at the expense of other communities and their opposition to the possible political unity in the country led to the isolation of the Muslim community from the mainstream of the Indian nationalist Movement.

The League's founding charter stated its central objective to be 'To foster a sense of loyalty to the British Empire among the Muslims of India'. This loyalty was demonstrated by the refusal of Muslim elite and the League to participate in anticolonial movement being spearheaded by the Congress (Ali, 1983; Nandy, 1983; Pandey, 2006). However, several important Muslim leaders, including Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (known as the Frontier Gandhi) in the North-West Frontier Province, Mian Iftikharuddin in the Punjab, and Maulana Azad in the United Provinces all decided to work with the Indian National Congress rather than the Muslim League (Wali, 1987). Despite the British support, politically, the Muslim League was powerless and virtually nonexistent until the late 1930s. In fact, ten years before the partition of India, the League was crushed in 1937 limited elections and had failed to win Muslim separate electorate, indicating that it had no support in the Indian Muslim population.

As the Indian nationalistic movement intensified, gathering intensity in the early twentieth century, British provided overt and covert support to the Muslim League. During the Second World War, when the British Empire was fighting for its existence, the tilt of the British towards the Muslim League became pronounced. Without consent of

the Indians, the British had declared that India was participating in the war efforts, angering the nationalists. Congress demanded immediate independence to allow a free India to decide whether it would participate in the war, angering the British. The British were reliant on Indian resources for the war and assured the Congress leaders that after the war, political advances towards independence would follow; these assurances were rejected by the Congress leadership. In contrast to the Congress, the Muslim League had, as usual, remained supportive of the British and supported the war effort. The British increasingly relied on the Muslim League for war effort support and adroitly used the League's support for the British Empire against Congress' nationalism (Ali, 2008; Singh, 1990). The colonial Britain heavily relied on the India Army, with bulk of it constituted by Indian soldiers and its officer corps mostly British. Between May 1940 and September 1941, the British recruited 550,000 Indians to fight for Britain in the Second World War. The monthly recruitment of Indian for the war effort averaged approximately 50,000 Indians a month. During the war, two million Indians fought for Britain as part of the Indian Army. Furthermore, despite a shortage of wheat in India, Britain ordered India to supply 50,000 tons of wheat per month for British and Indian troops stationed in the Middle East and Iran (Roy, 2009).

The British were challenged by the Congress and reminded that Britain had promised political advances to the nationalists during World War I and had abandoned its commitments once the war was over (Abernathy, 2000). Feeling existential challenges by the pressure of the War and the possibility of a major rebellion in India, which was not only the crown jewel of the Empire, but also a major source of war funding and soldiers to fight at different fronts for Britain, the British resorted to rule India with an iron hand during World War II and imprisoned Congress leaders who were demanded that the British leave India.

The war period saw the British strengthen the resolve of the Muslim League by favoritism based upon war support necessities. Furthermore, an absence of Congress leaders due to imprisonment, and heavy repression of any political dissent, was paralleled by the Muslim League leaders gaining advantage in the political arena by claiming to represent all the Muslims in India and suggesting that it was the only party speaking for

Muslim interests (Singh, 1990). The leader of Muslim League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, received tacit support from the British, who exploited Jinnah's desire to be seen as the sole Muslim representative in the subcontinent. As a corollary between the split between the Hindu and Muslim elite politicians, the polarization between the Hindus and Muslims deepened extensively towards the later years of World War II. Congress leaders resented Jinnah's claim that he was the sole representative of subcontinent's Muslims, as this claim directly challenged Congress's claim to represent all Indians regardless of their religious affiliations. The vertical high politics conflict eventually filtered horizontally, with the emergence of deep conflicts between Hindu and Muslim communities in some part of the subcontinent, resulting in increasing acts of violence in 1945 and 1946. Added to the volatile mixture, in 1940, the Muslim League had proposed carving of a separate Islamic state in India where the Muslims were in majority; consequently, relations between Hindu and Muslim communities continued to worsen (Hasan, 1997).

In hindsight, it is easy to conclude that imperial bureaucracy in colonial India had promoted separatism between Hindus and Muslims, often entertaining the ideas of Muslim civilization versus Hindu civilization. However, the most significant push towards creating a clash of Hindu-Muslim interests, leading to partition of the subcontinent, were British imperatives during World War II. As Britain fought for its existence, the Congress Party demanded immediate independence to allow a free India to decide freely whether to participate in the war effort. The British refusal to entertain this demand and the resulting agitation by the Congress to launch "Quit India" movement angered the British and put them on Muslim League's side. In brief, long-term impacts of imperial necessities were never taken into consideration and deliberate resorting to expedient decisions to perpetuate the empire was always in the forefront. Consequentially, the seeds sown in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are bearing fruit in South Asia in the form of perpetual conflict and destabilization.

III. THE PARTITION AND ITS IMPACT ON INDIA AND PAKISTAN'S RULERS

A. PARTITION OF INDIA

Partition

Unbiased at least he was when he arrived on his mission,
Having never set eyes on the land he was called to partition
Between two peoples fanatically at odds,
With their different diets and incompatible gods.
"Time," they had briefed him in London, "is short. It's too late
For mutual reconciliation or rational debate:
The only solution now lies in separation.
The Viceroy thinks, as you will see from his letter,
That the less you are seen in his company the better,
So we've arranged to provide you with other accommodation.
We can give you four judges, two Moslem and two Hindu,
To consult with, but the final decision must rest with you."

Shut up in a lonely mansion, with police night and day
Patrolling the gardens to keep the assassins away,
He got down to work, to the task of settling the fate
Of millions. The maps at his disposal were out of date
And the Census Returns almost certainly incorrect,
But there was no time to check them, no time to inspect
Contested areas. The weather was frightfully hot,
And a bout of dysentery kept him constantly on the trot,
But in seven weeks it was done, the frontiers decided,
A continent for better or worse divided.

The next day he sailed for England, where he could quickly forget
The case, as a good lawyer must. Return he would not,
Afraid, as he told his Club, that he might get shot.

W. H. Auden, Collected Poems

History's long march eventually brought an end to the British Empire in colonial India in August 14, 1947, culminating into the partitioning of the Indian subcontinent. The end of the British power was marked with a remarkable shift in ethnic/communal politics in the subcontinent, with an enduring effect that has worsened instead of disappearing. When the British arrived in India and eventually established their rule over

the subcontinent, religion was not the overarching theme in the various princely states and dominions. However, as the British departed, the country was afflicted with Hindu-Muslim rivalry (Baber, 2004; Freitag, 1990; Talbot, 1995).

The most ironic feature of the impending independence from British rule was that large sections of population in Punjab and Bengal did not know which new state they would end up in. The borders to the new states had not been revealed even though August 14–15 1947 brought an end to western colonization of India, and the new state of Pakistan. Viceroy Mountbatten had held back the details of partition until August 17. This postponement simply delayed the reaction of the people. And, the reaction did come as a holocaust of unequalled proportions. The newly created borders forced hastily and thoughtlessly created artificial lines on people, dividing clans, families, and uprooting people's connections with lands on which they had lived for centuries (Ahmad, 2002; Ali, 1983; Hasan, 1997; Hasan, 2002).

The partition was a far-reaching political event in South Asia. The partition is considered one of the most complex exercises ever accomplished in demarcation of national boundaries (Chester, 2009; Herschy, 1994; Tan & Kudaisya, 2000). It is remarkable that such an overarching historical event with significant implications was brought about with such abruptness, disregard for consequences, and lack of sufficient planning. The arrogance of the British regime was evident until the last day of the British Raj, as Viceroy Mountbatten did not reveal the boundaries of the new nations two days after their formal independence. It is remarkable that power was transferred to two governments who did not know the geographical boundaries of their own states. This penchant for secrecy and control over the minions, and a disregard for the long-term impact of colonial decisions, made the newly created states unprepared for the bloodbath that was to ensue.

The Partition resulted in one of the most brutal and bloody forced migrations in history, in which Sikhs and Hindus were chased from newly created Pakistan and Muslims from India. The ensuing violence resulted in the massacre of between one to two million Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs and expulsion of approximately 12 million people from their homes, abduction and rape of over 75,000 women, and creating one of

the largest refugee migrations in the history (Ali, 1983; Ahmad, 2002; Cohen, 2004; Herschy, 1994; Khosla, 1950; Hasan, 2002; Moon, 1961; Tan & Kudaisya, 2000). This migration is considered on of the greatest population movements in recorded history. This enormous number of refugees posed a gigantic resettlement problem for India and Pakistan. The religious violence unleashed by the partition was concomitantly followed by a war between the nascent states over the dispute over Kashmir, which both India and Pakistan claimed on different grounds. That perpetual war has been the source of terrorism in South Asia and its impact has been felt around the world. The trauma incurred by partition was so profound that the relations between the two states, 64-years after the event, have not yet normalized. The communal animosities were converted to institutional and inter-state animosities. In fact, the relations continued to worsen with time, so much so, that the regional rivalry has taken an international dimension and now requires international engagement to keep the area from blowing up.

Margaret Bourke-White, who was in India to photograph the birth of two nations in the fall of 1947 for Life Magazine, described the migration of refugees in miles-long columns, with approximately five million people on the move right after independence, brutal attacks on caravans, and butchering of entire train-loads of refugees who were going east to India or west to Pakistan by Muslim and Hindu/Sikh mobs (Bourke-White, 1949).

How did the partition of British India, which resulted in the birth of two separate states, which were ostensibly created to solve the "communal problem" by providing the Muslim minority with their own nation, Pakistan, and state for Hindus, India, result in such a holocaust? The engineered and theoretical “communal” problem of British India, which evolved and intensified due to the British colonialism and *realpolitik*, should have been resolved by providing the minority Muslim population with a nation state of its own where there was no fear of Hindu domination. However, salient decisions taken in the past by the British to perpetuate colonial rule in India once again interfered with the intentions and muddied the impact of current events, even when the British had decided to relinquish their dominion over the subcontinent and transfer the power to the natives.

Mountbatten was sent as the last Viceroy to India with a mandate to dismantle the British Empire and the Indian leaders had agreed with his version of the partition plan of the Indian Empire on June 3, 1947. Punjab and Bengal states, on the western and eastern periphery of British India, with a majority Muslim population, were to be divided to create West and East Pakistan. Parts of these states with Muslim majorities were to become Pakistan (Morris-Jones, 1983). The presence of large Hindu and Sikh minority populations in these states complicated the creation of new borders, as the minority populations were widely distributed in Punjab and Bengal and land ownership and business interests of minority communities happened to fall in the majority areas. Historical artifacts and cultural centers of a community fell in areas where the other community was more populous. Topographical features further confounded a simple demarcation of boundaries. Furthermore, the process of determining the boundaries was made even more daunting as the territorial basis underlying the concept of partition, which throughout the demand of Pakistan, had never been defined and remained theoretical even though the tangible date for partition was finalized (Read & Fisher, 1998).

The concept of Pakistan had remained vague because the Muslim elite, who had demanded Pakistan, had been uncertain about the concept themselves, and there had been divisions within the Muslim elite, especially from Punjab and Bengal, with some leaders preferring to keep provincial self-rule within a weak central government in India. Additionally, even two years before the country was partitioned, it was uncertain whether a division of India would indeed occur, as efforts to keep the country unified after the British departure continued well into the beginning of 1947. As a result, with two months to go before the partition, a serious undertaking to create new boundaries in a loose federation of dominions that had existed for centuries, to divide twenty percent of the world's population and its assets, the concept was still theoretical and had been given an artificial deadline imposed by Mountbatten (Chester, 2000; Hasan, 2002; Mansergh & Moon, 1983).

The individual selected as the chairman of the boundary commission, Cyril Radcliffe, had never been to India, had no connections with India or its politics, and, ironically, had absolutely no knowledge of the territories he was about to divide. Adding to this confounding mix, Radcliffe had no experience in division of territories. Radcliffe is said to have remarked to Mountbatten that given the vastness of India and its huge population, it would take even the most qualified arbitrator 'years to decide on a boundary that would certainly cut across homes and populations. Radcliffe was shocked to discover that he had only five weeks to complete his work of dividing up territories and communities about which he had very little to no knowledge (Chester, 2000; Chester, 2009; Hasan, 2002; Mosley, 1961). Radcliffe was made responsible for the separation of 88 million people and for dividing 175,000 square miles of territory between them. However, his sole briefing for this enormous project consisted of a 30-minute session with the permanent under-secretary in the India Office, which consisted of going over a large-scale map of India. Radcliffe was expecting to be provided with sufficient time—several months—for his endeavor. However, to conclude a historically unprecedented enterprise of immense proportions, he arrived in Delhi on July 8, 1947, and was given a firm, unchangeable deadline of mid-August, 1947 (Read & Fisher, 1998).

On the surface, the terms of reference for the Boundary Commission were fairly simple: the commission was entrusted with demarcation of boundaries on the basis of contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. However, Radcliffe's unimaginably difficult work was made problematic by confusing terms of reference on how the boundaries of the partitioned areas were to be determined. For example, besides considering contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims, the commission also had to take into account "other factors" that were not defined. Even the units of territory (block, village, or district level, etc.) were not defined for the commission while considering "contiguous areas" for division. And, since only Hindu and Muslim contiguous areas were to be divided, no provision was made for the Sikh population, and the Sikh population in Punjab was threatened with a split down the middle, with their fertile lands and holy sites going to Pakistan (Chester, 2000).

Besides population distribution based upon religion, Congress, Muslim League, and Sikh leaders laid conflicting claims over territory based upon economic, cultural, and historical reasons. Demarcation of some of the regions was highly contentious because of complex demographics, with Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs populations more or less equally spread out over the districts. Furthermore, the two Indian states with majority Muslim population that were to be divided to create Pakistan, were so densely populated that any potential dividing line would have to slice through densely populated areas, severing railroads and roadways, irrigation systems, and individual landholdings. Some of the areas had evenly distributed Muslim and Hindu populations and therefore confounded the boundary creations. Other regions complicated laying new borders due to natural boundaries such as rivers and topography. Additionally, Sikhs, who owned large areas in Punjab and considered Punjab their heartland, were opposed to the partition of their land and the concomitant loss of political and other powers. Sikh population, compared to the Hindu and Muslim, was significantly smaller and their much smaller minority status lead to a neglect of Sikh interests during the partition negotiations between the British, the Congress, and the Muslim League. Virtually all of the Sikh population, approximately six million in 1941, lived in Punjab. Although Sikhs comprised 13 percent of Punjab's population, they controlled the best lands in the province and were considerably wealthier than the other communities on average (Kaufman, 1998). They were planning to using violence to oppose any loss of their lands and power. By July 1947, it was evident that the Sikhs were intent on resorting to violence if boundary commission's decisions were disadvantageous to their community at the expense of Hindus and Muslims (Chester, 2009; Hasan, 2002; Mosley, 1961; Read & Fisher, 1998).

With such impossible conditions to work with, Radcliffe ended up with a product that he knew was deficient and would be controversial. He wrote to his stepson, "Nobody in India will love me for the award about the Punjab and Bengal and there will be roughly 80 million people with a grievance who will begin looking for me. I do not want them to find me" (Khilnani, 1998).

Historians agree that partition was negotiated and concluded with an unexplained haste, although many have attributed the haste to inability of the postwar weakened Britain persist in India in face of increased nationalist fervor it couldn't control. The specifics of the partition were so ineptly handled that the only known fact in June of 1947 was that India would be partitioned into a Hindu India and a Muslim Pakistan. The territorial shape of the two new states was unknown and the exact borders were unknown and disputed to the end, until after India and Pakistan gained independence from the British (Read & Fisher, 1998). The dispute over unsettled boundaries continued, and, eventually metastasized into a perpetual asymmetric conflict between India and Pakistan. The disputed regions also took form as incubators of terrorism from which plots were hatched to attack not only India, but also the United States and other nations.

The boundary awards by Radcliffe generated great controversy due to the lack of consistent criteria, were regarded as being equally unfair to both Hindu and Muslim communities, illogical, and problematic. The boundary award followed no natural dividing features, cut across villages, canal systems and communication lines, and in the process, separated communities. Allegations were also made against Mountbatten that he influenced Radcliffe to favor India. Mountbatten received Radcliffe's awards on August 12, two days before the transfer of power to Pakistan and three days before the transfer of power to India. There was no time to make arrangements for mutual transfer of population or to provide security in the newly created border areas. On August 17, with the announcement of Radcliffe awards, countless people found themselves on the wrong side of the border (Chester, 2009; Talbot, 2009).

Several factors resulted in eruption of large-scale violence during and after the partition. The proximate cause resulted from the British failure to anticipate the built-up anger and potential for violence. Furthermore, not knowing the exact boundaries until after the partition of subcontinent had already been accomplished, the British failed to plan or arrange for an orderly transfer or exchange of populations. The departing Empire also failed to organize an adequate police force under the British officers to counter violence between Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. The religious rhetoric accompanying the jockeying for power after the British departure compounded the communal hatred that

had been building since 1940. This was compounded by the uncertainty, as communities in the boundary areas did not know where they were going to end up after the partition. On August 17, 1947, when the boundary commission awards were made public, instead of bringing peace between the communities, they intensified hatred; there was a frenzy not to be caught on the wrong side of the border.

The magnitude of the population displacement caused by new boundaries was enormous and had not been anticipated by the British. Just in Punjab, within months of partition, an estimated 4.5 million Sikhs and Hindus were uprooted and forced to migrate from West Punjab to the east and approximately 5.5 million Muslims moved in the opposite direction. It is estimated that between 12 to 17 million people were made refugees in the aftermath of partition (Ali, 1983; Ahmad, 2002; Bourke-White, 1949; Brass, 2003; Cohen, 2004; Herschy, 1994; Khosla, 1950; Hasan, 2002; Kaufman, 1998; Moon, 1961; Tan & Kudaisya, 2000; Talbot, 2007; Talbot, 2009). Refugees left their homes by every means possible, but most travelled on foot in order to seek refuge with their co-religionists as violence raged. Some of the columns of refugees stretched for miles, the longest one was estimated to be 50 miles long. Some of the columns heading in opposite directions, when they passed each other, engaged in wholesale slaughter of the other side. Historians have painted horrific images of trains leaving from Lahore and Delhi, packed with refugees going to the other side, and arriving at their destinations filled with butchered and bloated remains of the refugees (Bourke-White, 1949). The trains were routinely stopped in the countryside and travelers were hacked into pieces, with only the train engineer surviving the massacre. Remarkably, the only travelers who survived harm were the British or Europeans. The Punjab Boundary Force did little to prevent the massacres and was forbidden from mounting any offensive operations. There is no consensus on the exact number of people who died in the violence. Estimates ranged from between quarter of a million (official British estimates—however, to save face, British government was intent on minimizing the number of people slaughtered for which they bore the responsibility) to two million (Brass, 2003; Butalia, 2000; Cohen, 2004). Over the years, a consensus has been reached that between one million to a million and a half perished in the partition-related violence. Majority of the violence was

confined to Punjab, where the final shape of the territory of Pakistan would eventually emerge after East Pakistan seceded and became Bangladesh (Kaufman, 1998).

Partition of colonial India was the defining event of independent India and Pakistan and it continues to be the defining event of modern India and Pakistan (Hasan, 1997; Hasan, 2005; Haqqani, 2005; Racine, 2002). Larson claims that Partition of India is at the heart of great regional conflicts and also an important component or factor in a whole series of religious-cum-political conflicts reaching down to the present time (Larson, 1995). The cause of extensive violence in South Asia can be traced to the structured imperial categories designed to differentiate one community from another. These categories were created and translated into formal political arrangements via pestiferous campaigns to perpetuate colonial rule (Lange, 2006; Nandy, 1983; Pennington, 2004). The imperial imposition of categories did perpetuate British rule over colonial India for over two centuries; and, even though the imperial rule came to an end, the imposed identities and fostering of division between Hindus and Muslim had created such a matrix of hatred and immense violence that the Partition brought two poisoned nations in existence.

In summary, the Partition of British India was followed by one of the bloodiest migrations and ethnic cleansings in history. The religious fury and violence that it unleashed caused the deaths of between one to two million Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. Over 12 million people, caught on the wrong side of the border, were uprooted from their ancestral lands and were forcibly transferred between the two countries. Tens of thousands of women were raped, and tens of thousands more were kidnapped and forcibly converted to their adversary's religion (Butalia, 2000). The trauma incurred in the process has been profound, with severe and lasting results. Relations between India and Pakistan have, instead of normalizing, continued to get worse with each passing year. Ethnic conflict, territorial conflict, and pathological irredentist politics pervades the subcontinent, leading the two nations into an arms race which has pushed them on the verge of a nuclear war since May 1998, when both demonstrated their ability to explode nuclear devices (Ahmad, 2002).

Artificial boundary creation by the British has caused continued conflict between India and Pakistan (Kashmir) and Afghanistan and Pakistan (Durand Line). Furthermore, British colonialism has been responsible for destabilization of various other colonies after decolonization in Asia and the Middle East (DeVotta, 2009; Lange, Mahoney, & Matthias, 2006; Lange & Dawson, 2009; Pandey, 2006). From a humanitarian perspective, the decision to partition India proved to be disastrous for the subcontinent, especially immediately after the transfer of power. From a political and geostrategic perspective, the decision to partition India was to prove even more disastrous, with consequences for the entire world to bear. The lessons learned are that since the partition of 1947, the rivalry between India and Pakistan sowed the seeds of asymmetric warfare between the two nations, leading to use of political Islam and terrorism as the tools of the state of Pakistan. This, combined with the U.S. government's bankrolling of the Afghanistan war via the Pakistani military to drive off the Soviet military from Afghanistan, caused a hardening of political Islam in South Asia as the Pakistani military came to rely more and more on Jihad as the tool of the state by employing fundamentalist Muslims to fight asymmetric warfare. Eventually the use of terrorism by Pakistan against India and Afghanistan filtered out of the region and engulfed the United States and European nations. In the next chapters, I will discuss how the partition inevitably lead towards worsening of relations between India and Pakistan and contributed to ongoing conflict and sowed the seeds of terrorism in the region.

IV. KASHMIR IN THE MIDST OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

A. BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT: KASHMIR AND PARTITION

Independence for India and Pakistan evolved in a matrix of acrimony and hostility, where mass slaughter of more than a million, which would qualify as ethnic cleansing in modern terms, accompanied the Partition. Indian and Pakistani leaders were steeped in distrust of each other. The end of the British rule did not bring peace or resolve dissonance between the Congress and the Indian Muslim League. After the partition, the enmity, distrust and hatred, continued and progressively worsened, with the nascent states starting their relationship in violence by going to war over Kashmir almost immediately after gaining freedom from the British rule. The tragedy accompanying the partition resulted in a legacy of hatred. The leaders of India and Pakistan mistrusted each other, sought vengeance, and believed the worst of each other. The two states were formed based on two divergent conceptions that severely conflicted with each other. The Indian nationalist movement, represented by the Indian National Congress, although pulled by inherent political tensions, backed the philosophy of a secular and democratic India, the need for which was necessitated by an incredibly diverse population of the subcontinent. Conversely, the Muslim League's ideology was based upon an exclusionary nationalism, where the Muslims of the subcontinent needed to separate from other communities and create their own homeland. The two ideological opposite and conflicting goals of the two parties put the two nascent nation states on a collision course as the British Empire came to an end in the subcontinent.

One of the most damaging, bitter, and dangerous legacies of partition that continues to have a debilitating impact in South Asia, is the unresolved issue of Kashmir's status. Kashmir continues to occupy center stage in a six-decade long dispute between India and Pakistan, with each claiming the former kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir (Ganguly, 2001; Lamb, 2002). It has been suggested that Indian and Pakistan's ongoing dispute over Kashmir lies at the heart of the conflict in South Asia (Kapur, 2009; Paul, 2005). Kashmir dispute has been the proximate cause for three wars between India

and Pakistan, an ongoing low intensity conflict that has lasted for over six decades, potential for nuclear confrontation, and institutionalization of use of terrorism as a nation-state's strategy.

The boundaries of colonial India were expediently shaped by the British Empire, in Britain's favor. No account for the history, cultural linguistic and ethnic kinships, physical scale, and geographical considerations for the natives were taken during the redrawing of the boundaries by the colonial powers. The expansion of the empire, by progressive annexation of territories in South Asia, interfered with sovereignty of several nation states, including Afghanistan and the subcontinent, reshaped the borders, and divided ethnic populations, and created serious destabilization in South Asia (Ganguly, 2001; Wirsing, 1994). Once the British Empire began to retreat from the Indian subcontinent after World War II, once again a significant redrawing of the boundaries in South Asia occurred. Unlike the colonial times, when the power of the Empire was formidable, the circumstance during decolonization were not propitious; there were numerous pressures, and rational decision making was precluded due to the unforgiving circumstances of decolonization, escalating violence, a deep divide between the elite who had negotiated independence from the British, a lack of will and power to hold on to territories, increasing resistance of the natives, and the contradictions inherent in such a situation. The negotiations had been bitter, especially over the carving of territory between India and Pakistan. The ideological divide between the Congress, which fought for a secular undivided India, and the Muslim League, which agitated under the banner of "Islam in danger" and sloganeering that Hindus and Muslims constituted two separate nations and therefore could not coexist, became deeper and poisonous as the negotiations with Britain continued for an end to the British rule (Ganguly, 2001; Jafferlot, 2002; Hasan, 2002; Singh, 1990).

Between 1945 and 1947, the Muslim League had engaged in incendiary rhetoric and resorted to a rallying cry of "Islam in danger" in order to mobilize the masses. The rhetoric was essential for the success of the Muslim League, as the common Muslim had shown no interest in the elite and landowner-run organization until threatened by the bogey of Hindu majority mobilizing to destroy Islam in India free of British rule.

Pakistan was achieved in the name of Islam, with a battle cry of Hindu majority trying to oppress or subsume the Muslim community. Widespread bloodshed, rioting, abduction of women, and forced population transfers had created a virulent atmosphere. As a result, an atmosphere of siege mentality prevailed after the independence (Ali, 1983; Ali, 2008; Hasan, 2002).

Pakistan was especially bitter, as its leaders believed that the British had cheated her of territory that rightfully should have gone to Pakistan. Conspiracy theories were afoot that Viceroy Mountbatten had favored India due to his dislike of Muslim League leader Jinnah and deprived the new nation of strategic or important areas.

The reasons for the conflict over Kashmir are complex and interrelated; however, at the root of the problem is the existential battle that makes the disagreement irreconcilable: independent India came into being as a secular nation, whereas Muslim nationalism lies at the heart of Pakistan's creation. Due to its geography and demography, Kashmir lies at the fault lines of these nationalisms and both India and Pakistan have made possession of Kashmir as the central reason for their national existence. There are no compromises in this zero sum game; thus, every effort to dialogue, compromise, and negotiate in the past has failed (Bose, 1999; Bose 2003).

During the negotiations to partition India, a decision had to be made about the status of 562 princely states, which largely had been ruled autonomously but under British dominion. With the lapse of British rule, the princely states were free to accede to either India or Pakistan or become independent states. However, in reality, the last option was not on the table. Viceroy Mountbatten, the last British administrator of India had asked the rulers of the princely states to accede to India or Pakistan after evaluating two main criteria: geographical contiguity to India or Pakistan and the wishes of their subject populations. Thus, to avoid India and Pakistan becoming fragmented entities, those states that fell in Pakistani territory would accede to Pakistan and those princely states that fell deep in Indian territory would join India. Similarly, primarily Hindu states would join India and primarily Muslim states would join Pakistan (Bose, 2003; Kapur, 2009; Paul, 2005).

Kashmir was in a unique situation as its territory abutted both India and Pakistan, the majority of its population was Muslim, but Kashmir's ruler, Hari Singh, was a Hindu. Complicating the situation, a strong Kashmiri regional movement, the National Conference, had close ties to the Indian National Congress and was not inclined to join Pakistan. Kashmiri nationalist leader, Sheikh Abdullah, who was committed to a process of land reform and redistributive justice and a strict anti-monarchist, was against joining Pakistan and instead favored Kashmir's independence. When the time for independence came, Hari Singh had not made a decision to join either India or Pakistan, hoping to keep Kashmir independent. In constitutional terms, Kashmir was a 'princely state', which meant that the Maharaja had the legal right to choose whether to accede to India or to Pakistan. In cases where the ruler did not share the faith of a large majority of his population it was assumed he would nevertheless go along with the wishes of the people (Ganguly, 2002; Lamb, 2002; Schoefield, 2000).

After the partition, Hari Singh was pressured by both India and Pakistan to accede but kept vacillating. There was a strong imperative amongst Pakistani leadership that Kashmir should join Pakistan, which eventually lead to Pakistani military backing Pathan tribal intruders to attack and capture Kashmir in October 1947, while Hari Singh was still weighing his options. Pathan tribesmen were guided by the Pakistani military regulars during their push towards Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. Hari Singh, panicking that his regime was about to be overthrown panicked and asked India for help against the intruders. Indian help was promised in return for Kashmir's accession to India. Desperate to save his kingdom and under pressure, on October 27, 1947, the Maharaja joined the Indian union in return for India's military aid to stem the tribal attack. Pakistan did not accept the accession and sent in troops. Indian troops arrived shortly thereafter to Kashmir and the first war over Kashmir broke out between India and Pakistan, lasting until a United Nations-sponsored cease fire was declared in January 1949. When the war ended, approximately one-third of the Kashmiri territory was under Pakistan's control and the remaining under Indian. The first war between the two countries began right after their birth. The end of the first war was just the beginning of the never-ending conflict between the newly birthed states of India and Pakistan (Schofield, 2000).

Indian government considered Maharaja Hari Singh's signing of accession papers as a legally binding contract, making Kashmir a part of India. However, Pakistan position was that since Kashmir was a Muslim-majority state, it rightfully should have gone to Pakistan. Furthermore, India did not hold a plebiscite for Kashmiri people to decide whether they wished to join India or Pakistan, making accession undemocratic. The bitterly contested territory has caused Pakistan to launch wars and support insurgency in an effort to seize Kashmir. The Indian government is equally determined to keep the territory under its control. The dispute is more than territorial; it is an existential conflict between the two nation states. The division of Indian subcontinent was based upon the premises that the Muslims and Hindus in India constituted two separate nations and therefore could not live together; therefore a nation state explicitly for Muslims was needed as their homeland (Jafferlot, 2002). Conversely, postcolonial India was founded as a secular pluralistic democracy, a home for the diverse South Asian population. Development of these contrasting identities created starkly adversarial national projects in the neighboring nations.

India and Pakistan have made possession of Kashmir as foundation of their identities as nation states (Cohen, 2004; Kaushik, 2005). Indian position is that India's identity, as an inclusive secular state, would be damaged by losing Kashmir, the only Muslim-majority province in India. Allowing Pakistan to take over Kashmir would imply that minority groups cannot live or thrive in India and need religiously or ethnically based nations, which would invite severe destabilization or even breakup of an incredibly diverse nation state India is. India views Kashmir as an integral part of India, unified with India legally by the instrument of accession signed by the ruler of Kashmir. The partition, in India's view, was completed in 1947 and any territorial concession to Pakistan would be a second partition. It is also India's position that relinquishing Kashmir would lead to separatist tendencies in other parts of India and negate India's secular credentials. Pakistan considers itself territorially and ideologically incomplete because it was conceived as a homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. If Pakistan accepts Indian control of Kashmir, it would imply that Pakistan's creation was unnecessary as subcontinent's Muslims can live and thrive in a Hindu-majority India. Thus both the

nations justify control of Kashmir as essential to their national identity that was forged during the path to partition of India, making the conflict irreconcilable (Kapur, 2009; Paul, 2005).

Both the arguments are logically flawed. For India, it is not essential to retain Kashmir to validate India's secular credentials, especially as more than 150 million Muslims live in India. How the Indian state treats these Muslims validates its pluralistic polity, not retention of Kashmir. Similarly, the Pakistani proposition that since it was conceived as a homeland for Muslims, and since Pakistani nationalism has Islam as the sole glue that binds the nation state, Pakistan is ideologically incomplete without Kashmir, is a fallacious argument. The argument that Pakistan's claims to Kashmir are fundamentally related to its founding ideology as a state for the Muslims of the subcontinent was fallacious even in 1947, as a third of British India's Muslims chose (or resigned themselves) to remain in India after the partition. The dubiousness of the argument was further shredded when East Pakistan broke away from Pakistan to become Bangladesh. However, the ideological power of these dubious arguments has constructed the nationalistic enterprise of both India and Pakistan for the last 64 years (Bose, 2003). Especially in Pakistan, where the nation state was riven by regional tensions, ethnic and linguistic divisions, religious conflicts (Sunni versus Shias, Sunnis versus Ahmadiya) ethno nationalist conflicts (as in Baluchistan, Bengal, the NWFP, and Sindh) and plagued by the inability of any political force to acquire a genuinely popular base, religion remained as the sole unifying coordinate. As such, Kashmir became a nucleus for the state building project in Pakistan (Swami, 2007; Wirsing, 1994; Wolpert, 2010).

The ceasefire line of 1949, renamed the Line of Control in 1972, has essentially remained the same, with India retaining approximately 63 percent of Kashmir's territory and bulk of the population. In 1955, India offered to settle the boundary dispute by converting the ceasefire line into permanent international boundary between India and Pakistan. The offer was rejected by Pakistan.

B. POWER ASYMMETRY—CONTINUATION AND EXACERBATION OF THE CONFLICT

When the subcontinent was divided, India's military strength was substantially greater than Pakistan. The military infrastructure and units of the old British Indian army had been divided on a 7:3 ratio between India and Pakistan. However, the Pakistani elite and military leaders held very chauvinistic views about Hindus and had a very high opinion about the martial prowess of Muslims. Opinion of Pakistani General Akbar Khan, as quoted in Ganguly (2001, p. 20):

> In the remotest of our villages, the humblest of our people possess a self-confidence and ready willingness to march into India – a spirit the equivalent of which cannot be found on the other side…. In India, in the absence of homogeneity, a penetration in any direction can result in separation of different units geographically as well as morally because there is no basic unity among the Shudras, Brahmins, Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims who will follow their own different interests. At present, and for a long time to come, India is in the same position as she was centuries ago, exposed to disintegration in emergencies.

Despite the fact that Pakistan was smaller, militarily weaker, and could not win Kashmir in a direct war, the Pakistan military's chauvinistic attitude about Hindus resulted in a belief that they could defeat India and capture Kashmir. However, due to the power asymmetry, the full-scale war resulted in a stalemate. The UN brokered ceasefire did not cease Pakistan's irredentist goals; the Pakistani leadership remained committed to taking over the entire Kashmir. Pakistan's leadership remained committed to using diplomatic and military pressure on India. However, the Indian government remained intransigent, refused to cede any ground on Kashmir, and steadily tightened its grip on Kashmir. Thus, Pakistan's identity as the homeland of the Muslims of Indian subcontinent, especially in terms of Kashmir, was left unfulfilled. Consequently, the Pakistani leadership continued its quest to wrest Kashmir from India. The quest was shaped by false optimism and exaggerated self-image based on flawed inference (Ganguly, 2001). Pakistan's significant geographical advantage in Kashmir, as Pakistan was physically much closer to Kashmir, leading to much shorter supply lines during a war, also made Pakistan confident of its prospects of wresting Kashmir away from India. As a result, the two states were at war again in 1965 (Kapur, 2010).

Pakistan and India engaged in several multilateral and bilateral negotiations between 1949 and 1965. However, due to their unchangeable positions, there was no possibility for compromise. A strong belief, that Pakistan remained "incomplete" without Kashmir, persisted in Pakistan. In the words of Pakistan's foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto:

> If a Muslim majority can remain a part of India, then the raison d'etre of Pakistan collapses…. Pakistan is incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir both territorially and ideologically. It would be fatal if, in sheer exhaustion or out of intimidation, Pakistan were to abandon the struggle, and a bad compromise would be tantamount to abandonment; which might, in turn, lead to the collapse of Pakistan.

In 1965, Pakistan formulated "Operation Gibraltar" to infiltrate Kashmir and stir up a rebellion, expecting Kashmiri Muslims to support the rebellion, after which Pakistani military would invade the territory. The Pakistani leadership believed that India lacked stomach for battle and was reeling from the shock of a disastrous military defeat at the hands of China in 1962. Pakistan mistakenly believed that the Muslim population of Kashmir had pro-Pakistan sentiment and had an impression that the Chinese would assist Pakistan in a war with India. (Ganguly, 2001; Kapur, 2010). In August of 1965, the infiltration in Kashmir was started by Pakistan. The local Kashmiris, instead of welcoming the insurgents and joining a rebellion, alerted the authorities. Soon thereafter, Pakistan launched an attack, starting the second Kashmir war. The war turned into a stalemate by September, with India and Pakistan accepting UN Security Council cease-fire resolution on September 21 and September 22, 1965. The war failed to resolve the Kashmir dispute and within six years, India and Pakistan went to war again, in 1971 (Ganguly, 2002).

The 1971 war was different from the previous two and started in East Pakistan, where a civil war between the West Pakistani troops and Bengali-speaking East Pakistanis resulted in a massacre of tens of thousands of civilians, and a flight of approximately ten million refugees from East Pakistan to India led to a major crisis. India intervened in the civil, providing a humanitarian justification to end loss of life in East Pakistan (although the Indian goals were expedient and much larger, including exploiting a window of opportunity to weaken Pakistan by dividing its eastern and western halves)

and also to end tremendous economic pressure resulting from the large refugee population. The war formally began on December 3, 1971, by an attack by Pakistan on India's air bases and by December 17, it had ended in a complete rout of Pakistani forces, with India taking 90,000 prisoners and causing the division of Pakistan into half, with East Pakistan seceding and becoming Bangladesh.

It can be argued that the seeds for terrorism in South Asia were planted by Pakistan's defeat in 1971 war. Prior to 1971, Pakistani opinion was that their soldiers, belonging to the "martial" races, were inherently superior to Indian soldiers. However, the absolute defeat of Pakistan, combined with loss of half of its territory, and display of overwhelming military superiority by India, indicated clearly that a direct war to win Kashmir was not only unwinnable, it could pose an existential threat to Pakistan which, besides Bengali-challenge in East Pakistan, faced other linguistic and ethnic tensions in Baluchistan, NWFP, and Sindh. The ideological basis of Pakistan's claim over Kashmir was demolished, as half of Pakistan's Muslims seceded to create their own linguistic, ethnic, and cultural based nation state. Religion alone was demonstrated to be not the sole basis of creating a nation state. However, despite her defeat in the 1971 war, Pakistan did not give up her aim to take over Kashmir. However, the realization that Pakistan could not rely on a direct war to challenge Indian control of Kashmir forever changed the nature of Pakistan's strategy to achieve union with Kashmir. Pakistan's future strategy of death by a thousand cuts and asymmetric warfare was born (Kapur, 2010).

C. PAKISTAN'S RELIANCE ON ASYMMETRIC WARFARE IN KASHMIR AND AFGHANISTAN

In recent years, significant amount of research has been devoted to Pakistan's reliance on irregular warfare in South Asia as an instrument of its national security policy. This irregular warfare entangles not only India, but transudes to neighboring Afghanistan and to Europe and the United States. The perceptions that Pakistan has a dual approach of practicing harsh repression against domestic terrorists and leniency toward home-based regional terrorists who attack American interests in Afghanistan and Indian interests in Kashmir have gained strength (Ahmad, 2011; Ganguly & Kapur, 2010; Jones, 2007; Tellis, 2008).

It is generally believed that Pakistan first heavily invested in and polished its proxy war capabilities, by utilizing militants and nonstate actors, during the anti-Soviet jihad (Coll, 2005; Rashid, 2008). However, this practice of using nonstate actors as tools of state policy goes back to 1947. Since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, Pakistan has never been at ease with its larger, more powerful neighbor, India, and refused to accept India's conventional military (and, later nuclear) superiority. To countervail India's conventional military superiority, Pakistan has deliberately employed the use of irregulars as a conscious strategy in achieving its political and military objectives (Ali, 2008; Fair, 2011; Haqqani, 2005; Hussain, 2007; Kfir, 2009; Riedel, 2011; Rashid, 2008; Siddiqa, 2011). Pakistan's deceptive policy of deliberately utilizing nonstate actors as a tool of asymmetric warfare against stronger adversaries, including the Soviet Union and India, has been a policy that took shape with Pakistan's birth as a nation state.

Fighting proxy wars using nonstate actors has enabled Pakistan to provide plausible deniability, however tenuous, and to engage in a war of attrition, without having to face larger and more resourceful enemies in a direct conflict. By employing nonstate fighters, Pakistan has attempted to convince others that since these asymmetric operations were conducted by nonstate actors, Pakistan government should not be held responsible for such acts, and thus remain immune from retribution (Fair, 2011; Ganguly & Kapur, 2010; Kapur, 2009).

As soon as Pakistan was carved out of British India, it used nonstate actors to prosecute foreign policy objectives in Kashmir. In October of 1947, Pakistan mobilized tribal militias to invade and seize Kashmir. In the 1947 conflict, Pakistan utilized irregular fighters, as well as regular fighters drawn from the military, paramilitary, and intelligence agencies disguised as irregular fighters. As the conflict expanded into a full-fledged war, it eventually involved the military. This first engagement in asymmetric warfare started the first India-Pakistan war (Kapur, 2010). In the first India-Pakistan war of 1947, while Pakistan was not able to capture the entire state, it was able to gain control over a sizeable area of Kashmir. This first war was preceded by Pakistan's low intensity conflict and proxy war in Kashmir, which it found to be low cost and useful. Pakistan

never accepted its involvement in the conflict from October 1947 to May 1948, and called the incursion by the irregulars it supported an indigenous movement. Very early in the game, the Pakistani government learned about convenience of deniability, something it has been using since its inception to support Pakistani policies in India, Afghanistan, the United States and the rest of the world. While this first experience in asymmetric warfare did not completely succeed, Pakistan did not forgo its objective nor abandon war by proxy. As it is evident, Pakistan relied increasingly on war by proxy, utilizing Islam as a rallying cry, eventually creating terrorist havens within its territory.

After the first Indo-Pakistan war, Pakistan supported numerous covert cells within Indian-administered Kashmir. In 1965, internal discord in Kashmir led Pakistan to believe that Kashmir was ripe for fomenting indigenous insurgency. A covert plan, called Operation Gibraltar, was hatched to instigate insurgency in Kashmir as a prelude to Pakistani military intervention. Volunteers were trained to infiltrate Kashmir. Military and paramilitary personnel accompanied these irregulars to provide support and guidance. Pakistan dispatched approximately 30,000 infiltrators into Indian-administered Kashmir to set up bases, engage in sabotage, and foment a wider indigenous insurrection. The objective of instigating insurrection was to facilitate the induction of regular Pakistani troops into the conflict. Operation Gibraltar failed and the Kashmiri people did not rise up in a rebellion against India; however, it caused the second full scale Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir. This war too failed to wrest Indian-controlled Kashmir and ended up in a stalemate (Ali, 1983; Cohen, 2004; Fair, 2011; Ganguly, 2001; Swami, 2007).

India and Pakistan again went to war in 1971, this time due to the conflict between East and West Pakistan. This war resulted in a crushing defeat for Pakistan, with East Pakistan seceding from the West, creating Bangladesh. The war of 1971 made it clear to the Pakistani military that they could not win a conventional war against India. This could be termed as a turning point in Pakistan's strategy to win Kashmir—the strategy completely shifted to "death by a thousand cuts" via covert asymmetric warfare.

More importantly, the defeat of 1971 lead to a determined quest by Pakistan to seek nuclear weapons to neutralize India's conventional military superiority (Haqqani 2005; Rashid, 2008; Riedel, 2011; Shah, 2010).

While engaging in prolonged covert warfare in Kashmir, Pakistan also concomitantly had engaged in covert support of militant Pashtun groups in Afghanistan in 1970s and of Khalistani terrorists in Punjab in 1980s. To influence Afghanistan's domestic affairs, Pakistan introduced Jamaat-e-Islami to Afghanistan in 1960s. Its support to Pashtun militants preceded the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, with an objective of retaliating against nonrecognition of Durand Line and to neutralize the Pashtunistan threat. When Afghan President Daud began his repression of Afghanistan's Islamic fundamentalist groups, they fled across the border to Pakistan. Some of the prominent Afghan Islamists who fled to Pakistan included Gulbuddin Hekmatiyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Ahmad Shah Masood, who later received fame as U.S. backed Mujahideen in the war against Soviet Union (Rashid, 2008).

The Afghan Islamists had links to the Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Islami and received sanctuary in Pakistan from them. During Daud's reign, Pakistan's intelligence agencies trained Afghan Islamists and sent them back to Afghanistan to launch a guerilla movement. During the 1970s, Pakistan assisted religious leaders who had fled Afghanistan to escape President Daud's repression. The policy of using Islamist Pashtun militias to achieve foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan goes back at least to 1973 (Fair, 2011; Haqqani, 2005; Rashid, 2011).

Eight years after Pakistan's defeat and secession of East Pakistan to form Bangladesh, Afghanistan was invaded by Soviet Union. The United States government used the assistance of Pakistan's military dictator, General Mohammad Zia ul Haq, to fight a proxy war and drive the Soviets from Afghanistan. Due to Pakistan's geographical location, the United States heavily relied on Pakistan to meet its strategic needs in Afghanistan against the Soviets. One of the most critical decisions made by the United States, through the CIA, was to use Pakistan's ISI as the instrument of support for the Afghan rebels (Coll, 2005). The U.S. government allowed the ISI to control the logistics of the guerrilla war against the Soviet military, including training of the insurgents and

disbursement of weapons and funds. America's complete reliance on ISI allowed Pakistani military to skim off money and weapons intended for Afghan rebels; additionally, the aid provided by the United States in return for Afghanistan jihad against Soviets assisted in strengthening of Pakistani military. As the conflict in Afghanistan continued, by the late 1980s, Pakistan was able to leverage the assistance of the United States to enhance its military capability and also build a pool of battle-trained mujahedeen, ready to be deployed in Kashmir (Coll, 2005; Howenstein, 2008; Kronstadt, 2011; Shahzad, 2011).

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan intensified its use of covert activities and exploited networks and infrastructure it had created to support insurgents in Kashmir and Punjab. However, now the Pakistan military received active financial and military hardware support from the United States and Saudi Arabia. The war against Soviet army was not only given a jihadi color, Pakistan actively employed religious institutions and parties to train and prepare Pakistan-based militant groups for operations in Afghanistan. Sunni Pashtuns were deliberately supported by Pakistan to run the proxy war against the Soviets. The developments in Afghanistan also lead to Pakistan's increasing focus on using militant Arab and foreign Muslim volunteers from Libya, Egypt, Chechnya, and elsewhere, and uniting them under the umbrella of Islam to fight a "jihad" (Haqqani, 2005; Rashid, 2000; Rashid, 2008; Tajbakhsh, 2011). Later these Islamic jihadis would turn their attention towards United States, plot terrorist acts in the United States and Europe, and employ asymmetric warfare strategies against the U.S. military in Afghanistan.

In 1989, the Soviet military withdrew from Afghanistan. This was construed as a great victory of asymmetric warfare by Pakistan; the lesson drawn was that a militarily unsubstantial group of fighters, using guerilla tactics, could defeat a superpower. The success of asymmetric warfare against the much larger and powerful Soviet Union was a defining point for Pakistan. The defeat of Soviets led Pakistan to believe that mujahedeen victory in Afghanistan could be replicated in Indian-administered Kashmir. A serious consequence of the Afghan jihad was manipulation of Islam as a political tool by

Pakistan, which eventually culminated in increasing radicalization of South Asia and turned Pakistan's border areas into a terrorist haven (Fair, 2011).

During the 1980s, when large parts of Punjab in India were affected by Khalistan terrorism, which took a great toll in terms of civilian and police casualties, Pakistan, under General Zia, exploited the situation by covertly aiding the insurgents, by providing training camps, refuge, and material support to Khalistani insurgents. The insurgency cost approximately 20,000 lives and the violence was so uncontrollable that Indian army had to be deployed in Punjab to restore order (Baggavali, 2010; Fair, 2005; Ganguly, 2001; Gill, 1997; Kumar 1997).

As the Soviet military began its exit from Afghanistan, as if by design, domestic rebellion in Kashmir erupted against India in 1989. The rise in insurgency in Kashmir was attributed both to India's domestic policies and Pakistan's support for the militants, though the beginning of the rebellion was clearly tied to the grievances of Kashmiri people against the Indian government. The insurgency in Kashmir benefitted Pakistan's goal of wresting Kashmir from India and indicated that the goal could be achieved through a low-intensity conflict, by employing native insurgents and causing a continuous and sustained drain of Indian resources, eroding India's military advantage over Pakistan. Afghanistan conflict had provided Pakistan with a pool of battle-hardened Jihadis and the infrastructure to train and deploy them. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, Pakistan redeployed many Mujahideen to the Kashmir front and established militant training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Baggavali, 2010; Evans, 2000).

The year 1989 could be described as a unique point in history when a convergence of events—defeat of Soviet military, Pakistan's emergence as a key player in Afghanistan, domestic discord in Kashmir, and availability of thousands of mujahedeen who were elated over their victory but without a jihadi mission—would initiate a sequence of events that would eventually impact the U.S. homeland security and launch terrorist events across the globe. Two intertwined critical steps in the sequence were Pakistan's decision to use asymmetric warfare to wrest Kashmir from India by moving jihadis from Afghanistan to the Kashmir Valley, and, Pakistan's orchestration of

the rise of the Taliban to install a pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan. Few people in 1989 could have predicted that the conflict between India and Pakistan, over a mountainous piece of real estate with little strategic or economic value, would result in a devastating global terrorist movement.

While the desire of Pakistan to wrest Kashmir was a longstanding Pakistani aim related to its identity as a Muslim state, Pakistan's calculus in employing the Taliban to install a friendly government in Kabul was more strategic: to secure its western flank and allow it to concentrate on its eastern flank in Kashmir. Pakistan's domination of Afghan government was also considered essential to providing strategic depth in the case of an Indian offensive. To achieve its objective in Afghanistan, Pakistan aided the Taliban with weapons, logistics, finance, and political support in while helping insurgents cross the Kashmir border to launch attacks in Kashmir (Jafferlot, 2002; Rashid, 2008; Riedel, 2011).

The militants in Kashmir were provided with large scale support by Pakistani military, including weapons, training, and logistical support to cross the Line of Control into India (Evans, 2000; Ganguly, 2002; Indurthy, 2011; Swami, 2007). The low-intensity conflict strategy proved to be highly effective. Between 1990 and 1994, over 6,000 members of Indian security forces and other officers were killed in insurgent violence in Kashmir. In 1993, there were over 5,000 acts of violence by militants, including attacks, bombings, and arson. As the violence spiraled out of control, India was forced to deploy more than a quarter of a million soldiers and security personnel in Kashmir. The insurgency caused serious damage, killing large number of civilians and security personnel, creating a climate of fear, widespread destruction, a severe drain of Indian resources, and damaged India's reputation. Pakistan's support of a large number of insurgent groups in Kashmir and adoption of low intensity conflict assisted it to blunt the advantages of India had in terms of its size, power, and economy. Since 1989, the Pakistan-backed separatist-Islamist insurgency has killed over 50,000 people in Kashmir and embroiled approximately half a million Indian military and paramilitary personnel (Usher, 2009). Baggavalli equated Pakistan's employment of low intensity conflict in

Kashmir as a means of warfare which can be waged over prolonged periods of time with little or no cost while imposing substantial costs on the opposing party (Baggavalli, 2010).

Similar to its strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistani military supported and trained only those Kashmiri groups that supported union with Pakistan. Initially, the Pakistani government supported the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), until it was clear that the JKLF's goal was creation of an independent Kashmir. Pakistani military and ISI redirected their support to Islamist organizations, such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (Ganguly & Kapur, 2010). Those seeking independence, rather than union with Pakistan, were systematically eliminated by Pakistan-backed militants. A focused and systemic elimination of indigenous Kashmiri groups advocating independence or autonomy soon put the insurgency in Kashmir under Pakistan-based militant groups' control who were violently pursuing Islamabad's agenda of wresting Kashmir from India (Evans, 2000; Howenstein, 2008; Swami, 2007).

In 1999, emboldened by its newfound status as an overt nuclear weapon state, Pakistan sent its Northern light infantry, disguised as mujahedin, in Indian Kashmir to occupy key terrain features, precipitating Kargil conflict, which threatened to escalate into a full scale war between the two nuclear weapon states. The Mujahideen story was used to obscure the fact that Pakistani regular and irregular military forces intruded well into Indian Territory. Scholars have argued that Pakistan use of asymmetric and proxy warfare in Kashmir intensified especially after 1998, suggesting that a nuclear Pakistan is emboldened and more reckless in its use of militancy. Scholars have suggested that nuclear weapons facilitated Pakistan's adoption and escalation of low-intensity conflict strategy against India during the last two decades by preventing large-scale Indian conventional retaliation in response to Pakistan-backed terrorist attacks in Indian Kashmir and elsewhere. Thus, nuclear weapons limit India's military options, as India cannot take punishing action to convince Pakistan to rethink its tolerance for anti-Indian terrorist groups (Kapur, 2007; Khan, 2005).

Pakistan's asymmetric warfare to win Kashmir has expanded since the early 1990s, and the terror operations filtered out from Kashmir to the rest of India. Pakistan-backed militants have launched terror attacks across India that were increasingly brazen and increasingly provocative. On December 13, 2001, an unsuccessful attack was launched by the LeT and JeM at the Indian Parliament, while it was in session. Between 2005–2008, a series of bombing attacks were launched at major Indian metropolitan areas, including the national capital New Delhi. India implicated the LeT to several of these attacks, which Pakistani authorities denied. A major terrorist assault was launched on Mumbai in November 2008. Despite overwhelming evidence that the terrorists were members of LeT and that their operation had been planned in, launched from, and directed in real time by operatives in Pakistan, Pakistan government denied any links between the Mumbai attackers and Pakistan. Due to increasing U.S. and world pressure, and unable to deny Pakistan's Mumbai connection, Pakistan arrested Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, the head of the LeT's charitable front organization, Jamaat-ud- Dawa. However, as world's attention was diverted from the Mumbai incident, Saeed was freed by a Pakistani court in June 2009 (Fair, 2011; Jones, 2007; Jones, 2011; Ganguly & Kapur, 2010; Howenstein, 2008).

Pakistan's asymmetric warfare strategy has historically been successful. Its support of Mujahideen forces in Afghanistan played a crucial role in the Soviets' defeat. In Indian Kashmir, asymmetric warfare has inflicted serious economic, military, and diplomatic costs on India. Furthermore, in response to sustained terrorist attacks, Indian government adopted draconian antiterrorism policies, tarnishing its international image. These expedient results were obtained by Pakistan without engaging in direct combat against a stronger adversary. Instead, employment of Islamic zealots and nonstate actors enabled Pakistan to inflict significant losses to the Soviet Union and India, while avoiding direct conflict and risk of ruinous defeat. Pakistan's strategy has indeed achieved important goals (Ganguly & Kapur, 2010).

As it was established in previous passages, Pakistan's history of irregulars in war against India and its utilization of asymmetric warfare can be traced back to its origin. However, less well known is the fact that Pakistan's use of irregulars and Islamists insurgents against Afghanistan also predates the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Voluminous literature exists elucidating Pakistan's role in jihadi insurgency against the Soviet army in Afghanistan. Rashid (2008) provides a comprehensive analysis of that history. However, the Afghan-Pakistan conflict came in existence with the birth of Pakistan in 1947. Afghanistan was the only nation in the world opposing Pakistan's entry into the United Nations in September 1947. The opposition was based upon Durand Line conflict. This opposition created a conflict for Pakistan on both its western (Afghan) and eastern (Indian) border and lead to a feeling of persecution complex for the newly born nation. Under Prime Minister (later President) Daud Khan, Afghanistan supported militias in the border region against Pakistan and also engaged in irredentist rhetoric of reunifying Pashtun areas that were in Pakistan (Siddiqi, 2009). It was under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime when Pakistan armed and supported Afghan Islamists, including Ahmad Shah Massoud, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Gulbuddin Hekmatiyar, who had fled Daud, who was perceived as un-Islamic and influenced by communists. Pakistan supported the unsuccessful Islamist uprising in 1975 against the Daud government. Pakistan not only provided refuge and weapons, it likely provided special operations training to the would□be Islamist revolutionaries (Fair, 2011; Haqqani, 2005). Some of these Islamist rebels later became famous during the insurgency against Soviet army.

D. PAKISTAN AND TERRORISM—A VERY INTIMATE NEXUS

An article in the Christian Science Monitor reported that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during her visit to Pakistan, stated in a press conference on October 21, 2011, that the United States expected Pakistan to act against militant havens within its borders "over the next days and weeks." The article portrayed Mrs. Clinton's comments as underscoring growing U.S. impatience with Pakistan's reluctance to deal with the potent Haqqani network, which carries out cross-border raids from its territory into Afghanistan (Ahmad, 2011). The article mentioned that Obama administration had

intensified pressure on Pakistan to do more to crack down Islamist militants destabilizing Afghanistan, as Clinton delivered a tough public message that extremists have been able to operate in and from Pakistan for too long. However, in a rebuke to the U.S., the same article mentioned that earlier in the week, Pakistan Army chief General Ashfaq Kayani had told a parliamentary standing committee that he was not convinced fighting the Haqqani network would solve Pakistan's problems. Numerous similar news items and scholarly works have been published in the last several years which detail Pakistan's nexus with terrorist groups, and despite overwhelming evidence of such nexus, Pakistan's blatant prevarications that it does not have any ties with insurgent groups that attack and kill U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan and plot terror attacks against the U.S. and the west from Pakistani territory (for an extensive analysis of Pakistan's nexus with terrorist groups, see Bajoria, 2011; Cruickshank, 2010; Fair, 2011, Fair, 2009; Haqqani, 2004; Howenstein, 2008; Hussain, 2007; Jones, 2007, Jones, 2011; Kfir, 2008; Rashid, 2008).

The Christian Science Monitor's article was emblematic of the divergent interests of the U.S. and Pakistan, and the duplicitous role of Pakistan in the war against terrorism. It is ironic that in the ten years of working with Pakistan as a "strategic partner" and an "ally" against terrorism, and giving more than $20 billion in aid to Pakistan, the U.S. still has to make entreaties to Pakistan to stop its support of terrorist networks that operate against U.S. interests, without being able to convince the perpetually aid seeking ally to give up. The U.S. administration has so far failed to understand that Pakistan will never stop its support of insurgent groups it has been nurturing to establish a compliant Afghan government and wrest Kashmir from India. No amount of entreaties, coaxing, bribes, or drone attacks in Pakistani territory would stop its support of such groups, which are counted as parts of Pakistan's arsenal in its never-ending quest for Kashmir and force equalizer against a militarily stronger India. As Bennett Jones (2009) put it succinctly, the U.S. has been giving billions of dollars to a government that is actively helping jihadis to kill U.S. troops in Afghanistan. This chapter establishes the role of Pakistan in support of various militant groups that have engaged in terrorism.

As is widely reported, shortly after September 11, Pakistan's General Pervez Musharraf, was presented with an ultimatum by the United States, and agreed to abandon his support for the Taliban (Hussain, 2007; Musharraf, 2006). Reportedly, Musharraf agreed to cooperate with the U.S.-led campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda, and agreed to provide the U.S. military with access to Pakistani air and naval bases. The span of Pakistani cooperation also included joint operations with the C.I.A and establishment of a blocking force along the Pakistani-Afghan border to capture al Qaeda and Taliban members. Musharraf did not abandon the core policies that had guided Pakistan since its birth; he simply made some adjustments to gain U.S. trust and support. No provisions were made to address Pakistan's support for jihadi groups operating in Kashmir and India (Coll, 2006; Tellis, 2008). Furthermore, the fact that Pakistan had created and nurtured Taliban specifically to plant a friendly regime in Afghanistan to prevent Indian influence on its western flank was either ignored or not understood (Haqqani, 2005; Rashid, 2008). Evidence indicates that the alliance with the United States to defeat the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and to capture some al Qaeda members was a short-term tactical move and not a reversal of Pakistani army's long-term support to jihadi militants. The Bush administration was pleased to work with Musharraf. as long as his military provided cooperation with U.S. goals of apprehending and eliminating al Qaeda leadership. Ironically, ignorance of South Asia's conflict by the Washington decision makers guaranteed that the U.S. efforts to eliminate al Qaeda and insurgency in Afghanistan would not be successful.

In promising to support U.S. objectives in Afghanistan, Pakistani military had calculated that the U.S. would shortly exit Afghanistan, after which Pakistan would be able to place a compliant regime in Kabul again (Rashid, 2008). In fact, even though Pakistan assented to supporting the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan had such strong ties with Taliban that throughout the initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom, General Musharraf implored the United States to desist from destroying Mullah Muhammad Omar's regime in Afghanistan (Tellis, 2008). Unable to achieve the

objective, Pakistani military covertly permitted and assisted thousands of defeated jihadi insurgents to cross over to safety across the frontier and into Pakistani territory (Rashid, 2008; Tellis, 2008).

Since the late 1950s, U.S. administrations have preferred, bolstered, and provided support to military regimes in Pakistan (Blom, 2011; Ganguly, 2002; Jalal, 1990; Kundi, 2008). The democratization of Pakistan was seen as a threat to the military regime of General Zia ul Haq in 1980s and the U.S. administration did not apply pressure to civilianize his government. Similarly, U.S. administrations acquiesced with General Musharraf's self-serving argument that democratization could bring incompetent politicians or Muslim radicals to power (Cohen, 2004). Post-September 11, 2001, the U.S. continued to bolster Pakistani military and dictator Musharraf at the expense of already weak civilian institutions (Ali, 2008; Hussain, 2007; Rashid, 2008). This further encouraged and allowed the Pakistani military to continue its historical strategy of employing jihadi elements for furtherance of its foreign policy objectives. In effect, the U.S. focus on elimination of al Qaeda, without accounting for the historical factors and forces that had allowed al Qaeda to find refuge in South Asia, ensured that the U.S. would be embroiled in a stalemate in Afghanistan. The support of military dictators to prevent Islamic radicals or corrupt politicians from coming to power only perpetuated military's barely concealed agenda of preserving their radical proxies.

It can be argued that by focusing on Pakistani military as an ally, the United States further strengthened the entrenched military's control of Pakistani state, aiding and abetting the military in its continual efforts to undermine civilian institutions and political leadership. Even after the return of civilian rule in Pakistan in 2008, army exercises absolute control over the state and foreign policy decisions (Shah, 2010; Shahzad, 2011). Hoping that the military dictator Musharraf would be able to help achieve U.S. strategic goals was a wishful calculation on Washington's part. In the past, other Pakistani dictators and Musharraf's predecessors, including Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, and Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, had played similar games when they attempted to please in some areas whereas advancing Pakistani agendas that were contrary to U.S. interests (Haqqani,

2005). The same misdirected belief in current Pakistani generals, including Kayani, would not bring a different result and only perpetuate the conundrum in South Asia.

Pakistan's decision to support the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan and the "global war on terror" was not based on a shared belief or interest (Siddiqa, 2011; Haqqani, 2005, Rashid, 2008). Although Pakistan has been called a frontline state in the war on terror since September 11, 2001, the only reason General Musharraf agreed to join the United States was fear. Enmity with U.S. would have implied deeply negative impacts on Pakistan's economy, its nuclear weapons program, its longstanding rivalry with India, and its irredentist goals in Kashmir (Rashid, 2008; Tellis, 2008). However, as this chapter would elucidate, Pakistan remained a duplicitous ally in the war on terror, and, despite professing support to the U.S., it remained committed to supporting and nurturing certain terrorist groups, even though these groups were the enemies of the U.S. and the ISAF in Afghanistan, while selectively cracking down on insurgent groups which were the enemies of the Pakistani state. This duplicity has resulted in extension of war in Afghanistan and concomitant drain of resources and lost lives, destabilization and a ceaseless streak of violence and terrorist attacks in South Asia, and a succession of plots against the U.S. and the West hatched within the territory of Pakistan.

After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan's ally against terrorism, General Musharraf, said all the right things in response to U.S. pressure. He spoke out against extremism and terrorism to his countrymen. However, his decisions conflicted with the statements he made for U.S. consumptions. It has been an open secret that despite receiving financial aid and military reimbursements from the U.S., Pakistan has pursued its own agenda in Afghanistan by providing cross-border sanctuary for Taliban and Haqqani militants, which has caused serious U.S., ISAF, and Afghan casualties (Curtis & Phillips, 2007; Dutta, 2010; Kronstadt & Vaughn, 2004; Kronstadt, 2011; Rashid, 2008; Vira & Cordesman, 2011). Though Pakistan had employed asynchronous warfare as state policy since its inception, overt and significant growth of Pakistani jihadi groups was most notable in 1980 when thousands of volunteers came together to become anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan. Of the most well known of these jihadi groups, including LeT, JeM, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and Harkat-al-Jihad-al-Islami, none of these

organizations was covert or acted in a clandestine manner. Their growth has been either sponsored by the Pakistani state or they have been looked upon favorably by the state; and their activities are certainly not conducted in secret (Ganguly & Kapur, 2010; ICG, 2004; Hussain, 2007; Rashid, 2008; Riedel, 2011). Under the state patronage, these groups and their subsidiaries raise funds in public places, freely distribute literature, engage in open recruitment, and publicly celebrate terror attacks against the United States.

Militant insurgent groups, including al-Qaeda, continue to operate and collaborate inside the tribal areas in the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA) and the neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), in support of the global as well as regional jihads in Afghanistan and Kashmir (ICG, 2006; Vira & Cordesman, 2011). Several high-profile al Qaeda figures and other terrorists were apprehended while hiding in safe houses in Pakistan. For example, Abu Zubaydah was captured in a safe house belonging to LeT in Faisalabad. The "mastermind of the 9/11 attacks," Khalid Shad Muhammad, was captured in Rawalpindi (which is home to Pakistani army's high command) in a secure military housing estate (Rashid, 2008; Riedel, 2011). Khalid al-Attash, a Yemeni terrorist connected to bombing of USS Cole, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a leader of the Hamburg cell, were arrested in Karachi (Rashid, 2008). And, Osama bin Laden, the world's most wanted terrorist mastermind, had found refuge for years in Abbotabad, a garrison town, most likely under protection provided by elements with Pakistani military (Dutta, 2011; Fisk, 2011). Several militants in Pakistan have been arrested from the houses of JI supporters. The functioning of al Qaeda after September 11, 2001, and the attacks it executed in Pakistan and abroad, would have been inconceivable without the support provided by Pakistani extremist groups and from Islamic parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami. Astonishingly, while Musharraf acknowledged in his memoir that to execute attacks, al Qaeda provided the money, weapons, and equipment and the local organizations provided the manpower and motivation (Musharraf, 2006), he made no efforts to control the Islamic parties or militant groups, except in the case of groups that attacked Pakistan. Groups were banned but allowed to function under new names. Furthermore, Pakistani

government turned a blind eye to inflammatory jihadi literature after the 9/11 attacks while allowing open recruiting and fund-raising by militant organizations.

Jones noted that success for a U.S. mission in Afghanistan would depend on convincing the government of Pakistan to undermine the insurgent sanctuary on its soil (Jones, 2007). Jones suggested that the sanctuary provided by crossing into the Pakistan tribal areas and in Baluchistan contributed more to the survival of the insurgents than any other factor. The ISI is not a rogue organization and is a part of Pakistani military (Bennett-Jones, 2009; Shah, 2010). As such, the missions and goals of the ISI reflect the missions and goals of Pakistani state. The ISI has provided financial assistance, weapons and ammunition to the Taliban, and paid the medical bills of some wounded Taliban fighters, helped train Taliban and other insurgents destined for Afghanistan and Kashmir. Furthermore, ISI has also provided intelligence to Taliban insurgents at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, tipping off Taliban forces about the location and movement of Afghan and coalition forces, thereby undermining several anti-Taliban military operations (Jones, 2007).

Recent work by Jones indicates that al-Qaeda has become embedded in multiple networks that operate on both sides of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, with Pakistan as their sanctuary. With its leadership structure based primarily in Pakistan, al Qaeda has collaborated with Pakistani insurgent groups to attack the United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan (Jones, 2011). As stated by Jones:

> Key groups include Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e Tayiba (LeT). In addition, al-Qaeda has cooperated with other groups, including Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen (HuM), inside Pakistan. Al-Qaeda has effectively established a foothold with several tribes and sub-tribes in the region, such as the Ahmadzai Wazirs, Mehsuds, Utmanzai Wazirs, Mohmands, Salarzais and Zadrans. The secret to al-Qaeda's staying power, it turns out, has been its success in cultivating supportive networks in an area generally inhospitable to outsiders.

The collaboration of these groups has resulted in serious attacks against the United States in Afghanistan. For example, the 2009 attack against the CIA base in Khost Province, Afghanistan, appeared to involve Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Haqqani network and al-Qaeda (Jones, 2011). Other Pakistani Sunni extremists groups, including

the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba, and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JuM) operate autonomously and also as franchisees of al Qaeda. Furthermore, al Qaeda has also found support from elements in mainstream Pakistani Islamic parties, including the Jamaat-e-Islami (Nawaz, 2011).

Pakistan's nexus with al Qaeda was known before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Riedel (2011) asserts that he and others in the Clinton White House, in 1998, were aware of Pakistan's close ties with terrorists. Commenting on the cruise missile strike at a terrorist training camp, intended for bin Laden, which instead killed a number of ISI officers along with several Kashmiri fighters they were training, Riedel and others had concluded "…the fact that bin Laden was visiting a camp with ISI officers present dramatically underlined the close ties between al Qaeda's top leader and Pakistan's army and intelligence service."

A Defense Intelligence Agency assessment summarized the incident as follows: "Consider the location of bin Laden's camp targeted by U.S. cruise missiles. Positioned on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it was built by Pakistani contractors, and funded by the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Directorate … the real hosts in the facility [were] the Pakistani ISI, [so] then serious questions are raised by the early relationship between bin Laden and ISI." (as cited in Riedel, 2011).

One of the more salient examples of the ISI-Taliban-al Qaeda connection is Muhammad Ilyas Kashmiri, a senior al Qaeda member and notorious terrorist, who was killed by a U.S. drone attack in 2011. Kashmiri was born in Kashmir, trained by the ISI in North Waziristan, and fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan. After the Soviet exit from Afghanistan, Kashmiri returned to Kashmir, formed *313 Brigade* with ISI assistance, and engaged in several attacks against India, including kidnapping of western tourists. In 2000, when Kashmiri arrived at the ISI headquarters in Islamabad, he brought with the severed head of an Indian soldier (Riedel, 2011). General Musharraf and General Ahmad, then head of ISI, personally thanked Kashmiri for his accomplishments in the jihad (Jamal, 2010). Kashmiri broke up with the ISI in 2002 over Pakistan's decision to help the United States.

Pakistan, besides Saudi Arabia and UAE, was amongst the only three nations in the world that had recognized the Taliban government in Afghanistan and provided it with critical oil supplies. Even when Pakistan was under the rule of its most liberal leaders, Benazir Bhutto, she championed the Taliban in the international arena by suggesting that the Taliban were the only hope for stability and ultimately peace in Afghanistan (Riedel, 2011). In his memoir after his release from the Guantanamo prison, Abdul Salam Zaeef, former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, described ISI's connection to the Taliban as that of a controlling patron-client relationship, with ISI, and disparaged the ISI as deceptive manipulators (Zaeef, 2010).

A decade after the United States began operations in Afghanistan, finally some U.S. officials have started to note and declare the obvious. After a devastating attack against the United States Embassy in Kabul on September 13, 2011, Admiral Mike Mullens, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated:

> The Haqqani network ... acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency, 'With ISI support, Haqqani operatives plan and conducted' a truck bomb attack that wounded more than 70 U.S. and NATO troops on Sept. 11, '"as well as the assault on our embassy' two days later. 'In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy,' Mullen said in a prepared opening statement, 'the government of Pakistan, and most especially the Pakistani army and ISI, jeopardizes not only the prospect of our strategic partnership but Pakistan's opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence.

Admiral Mullen's comments were the most direct and noteworthy accusations by a senior U.S. official, accusing Pakistan's chief intelligence agency of complicity in attacks on American facilities and military personnel in Afghanistan (Deyoung, 2011; Cloud, Dilanian, Rodriguez, 2011). However, Mullen, perhaps, was feeling unconstrained in his remarks because he was just a week from retiring. As is always the case, even though evidence of Pakistan's involvement in terrorist acts is provided, Pakistan's government angrily denied any involvement. Mullen's accusations were reminiscent of the 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai, India, in which 10 LeT gunmen had killed 166 people, including six Americans. Evidence, including communications intercepts, had indicated

that the militants took orders from Pakistani authorities during the attack. For a period, Pakistan continued to deny having any connection with the Mumbai attacks.

Pakistan is among the worlds leading recipients of U.S. aid. By the end of fiscal year 2010, Pakistan had obtained about $10.7 billion in overt assistance since 2001, including more than $6 billion in development and humanitarian aid. Additionally, Pakistan also had received more than $8 billion in military reimbursements for its support of and engagement in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts against Islamist militants (Kronstadt, 2011). Despite the large amount of military and financial assistance, the United States has failed to achieve its mission of convincing Pakistan to stop its covert and overt support of insurgent groups that find safe haven in Pakistan and launch attacks against the United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan and plot terrorist acts against the West (Ganguly, 2002; Jones, 2011). Instead, ever since the United States and Pakistan begin collaborating against the “global war on terror,” Pakistan is even more insecure, and the Pakistani public is increasingly more distrustful and resentful of the United States (Fair, 2009; Kronstadt, 2011).

Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and swaths of the country’s northwest remain al-Qaeda and its allies remain safe haven. In the majority of the 21 'serious' terrorist plots against the west between 2004–2010, plotters either received direction from or trained with al-Qaeda or its allies in Pakistan, throwing into sharp relief the danger posed by terrorist safe havens in Pakistan. People from the West have travelled to the region for paramilitary training. In 2009, 100 to 150 were suspected of making the trip to Pakistan to receive terrorist training (Cruickshank, 2010). The violence engendered by militant groups supported by Pakistan is not limited to the United States alone. As cited by Bajoria, in fall 2006, a leaked report by a British Defense Ministry think tank charged, "Indirectly Pakistan (through the ISI) has been supporting terrorism and extremism--whether in London on 7/7 [the July 2005 attacks on London's transit system], or in Afghanistan, or Iraq (Bajoria, 2011). The insurgency in Afghanistan and attacks against U.S. interests in Afghanistan can be directly connected to Pakistan and its military. Matt Waldman maintains that there is extensive cooperation at both the operational and strategic level between the ISI and the Afghan Taliban. Based upon his

interviews with Taliban commanders, Waldman asserts that Pakistan's security services and the insurgency in Afghanistan are not only interrelated, this relationship is far-reaching and detrimental to U.S. interests in the region and to United States homeland security. Taliban commanders have stated that the ISI orchestrates, sustains and strongly influences their movement, giving sanctuary to both Taliban and Haqqani groups, and providing huge support in terms of training, funding, and supplies (Waldman, 2010).

In June 2008, Afghan officials accused Pakistan of plotting a failed assassination attempt on President Hamid Karzai. Shortly thereafter, Indian officials blamed the ISI for the July 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul. Pakistani officials have denied such a connection. Numerous U.S. officials have also accused the ISI of supporting terrorist groups, even as the Pakistani government seeks increased aid from Washington with assurances of fighting militants. In a May 2009 interview with CBS' 60 Minutes, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said, "to a certain extent, they play both sides." Gates and others suggest the ISI maintains links with groups like the Afghan Taliban as a "strategic hedge" to help Islamabad gain influence in Kabul once U.S. troops exit the region. These allegations surfaced yet again in July 2010 when WikiLeaks.org made public a trove of U.S. intelligence records on the war in Afghanistan. The documents described ISI's links to militant groups fighting U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan (Bajoria, 2011).

Despite all this evidence of Pakistan nurturing forces that attack U.S. soldiers, the U.S. policy makers continue to rely on same Pakistani military that simultaneously plays an allied and adversarial duplicitous role. Unfortunately, the adversarial role is so dangerous that it has not only harmed U.S. interests, it has lead to killing of U.S. troops and terrorist attacks on the United States and allied forces.

Since the late nineteen-eighties, the ISI has covertly funded and armed violent Islamic groups in the Indian-occupied areas of Kashmir (Haqqani, 2005; Ganguly, 2002). By 2001, two of the larger jihadi groups, LeT, and JuM, had also developed ties to the Taliban and Al Qaeda, mainly through shared training camps and safe houses. Pakistan has backed jihadi groups that carry out provocative terrorist attacks on other states as a state policy (Coll, 2006; Howenstein, 2009). Except for Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

and other militant groups that engage in attacking targets in the Pakistani government, Pakistani military does not consider the original Afghan Taliban, LeT, the Haqqani network, and other specific proxy groups as their enemies. These groups are overtly used as a means of extending Pakistan's reach into Afghanistan, India, and throughout the region. Consequently, due to the conflicting interests of Pakistan's decision makers, the strategic priorities of the U.S. and Pakistan conflict and the attempts to stabilize Afghanistan have so far not succeeded (Malou, 2009). Consequently, Pakistan has become a major international problem as the epicenter from where terrorist planning, plotting, training, and export of terrorism radiate. The lack of control or will over the tribal belt and the ability of jihadist terrorists to operate along the Afghani-Pakistani border guarantees the survival of the global jihad movement and assist those Islamists that want to turn Pakistan and Afghanistan into "true" Islamic states (Kfir, 2009).

Pakistan has been accused of sponsoring terrorism against India. It is believed to have engaged several groups to conduct these efforts, but by far the most prolific and sophisticated has been the LeT (Tellis, 2008; Howenstein, 2009; Vira & Cordesman, 2011). An India-centric organization, its primary objective continues to be the liberation of Kashmir and the destruction of India, and it devotes much of its resources and manpower this goal, inside India and abroad. Amongst the high-profile terrorist attacks launched by LeT were the attacks on 2001 attack on Indian Kashmir's provincial parliament, December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, which lead to full-scale mobilization of Indian and Pakistani armed forces, and Mumbai attacks of 2008. However, LeT has been actively and directly involved in attacking U.S. global interests through its activities ranging from Afghanistan to Western Europe. And in many of these theaters, LeT has explicitly cooperated with al-Qaeda, and both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. While LeT's threats to U.S. citizens have mostly been indirect so far, it has a long history of cooperating with other terrorist groups who attack American citizens and American interests. Direct threats to U.S. homeland by LeT, so far, have only been latent. LeT cells within the United States have focused on fundraising, recruitment, liaison, and the facilitation of terrorist training, primarily assisting recruits in the United States to go to Pakistan for terrorist training, but they have not engaged in lethal

operations in the United States as yet (Tellis, 2008). Since 2006, LeT has been implicated in several complex high-profile attacks in Afghanistan, including dual attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul. Although it remains primarily committed to destroying India, LeT has begun to act more overtly against Western interests during the past several years. This includes deploying cadres to fight against coalition forces in Afghanistan and mainly in the form of training and logistical support to al-Qaeda and others waging a global jihad (Fair, 2011; Tankel, 2011; Vira & Cordesman, 2011).

The LeT was officially banned in 2002 by the Pakistani government, in response to which the LeT spun off its political wing, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). The JuD openly operates in many cities across Pakistan. Similarly in response to international pressure LeT leader Hafeez Saeed has occasionally been arrested and detained in largely sham operations (Fisk, 2010). In 2010, he has openly appeared at various rallies across Pakistan. According to Fair, Pakistan's intelligence agencies and army tend to segment the country's militants into a range of groups over which the state exercises varying degrees of control. Pakistan is widely assumed to wield significant influence over the Afghan Taliban, including the network of Jalaludin Haqqani based in North Waziristan, by holding Taliban families hostage in Pakistan to ensure compliance (Fair, 2011). Tellis describes LeT as a threat to regional and global security second only to al-Qaeda, which he explains is due to its ideology is shaped by the Ahl al- Hadith school of Saudi Wahhabism. Amongst one of LeT's objectives is the recovery of lost Muslim lands, governed by Muslim rulers of the past which makes LeT a natural ally and a close collaborator of al-Qaeda. Tellis argues that LeT has collaborated with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan since at least 1987. One of the main reasons for LeT's success and resilience is its patronization by the ISI for use in Pakistan's ongoing conflict with India. However, LeT's objectives, as evidenced by statements of its leader Hafiz Saeed, transcend and reach beyond South Asia. Israel and the United States also figure as targets of LeT objectives in addition to India (Tellis, 2008).

The extent of the cooperation between al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban was evident in the Khost suicide bombing that killed seven CIA officers and contractors in the American base in eastern Afghanistan on December 30, 2009. The bombing was carried

on by Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi. Two months after the suicide attack, al Qaeda's video production unit released a prerecorded interview with Balawi. The chief of the Pakistani Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsud, appeared in the video with Balawi and stated that the attack was revenge for the drone strike that had killed his predecessor, Baitullah Mehsud (Bergen & Hoffman, 2010). The 2005 London bombing perpetrators had al Qaeda connections and had received training in FATA and NWFP. Another example of a key terrorist player who operated out of Pakistan is Rashid Rauf. Rauf had long been involved with al-Qaeda plots in Pakistan and abroad, including the 2006 plot to blow up seven U.S. and Canadian passenger airliners en route from London to North America (Cruickshank, 2010). Eleven individuals, convicted for plotting terrorist bombings of Barcelona metro train system in 2009, had links with Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda. The ringleader of the group had received training in the Waziristan region of Pakistan the now deceased Pakistani Taliban commander, Baitullah Mehsud (Reinares, 2010).

Pakistan's nexus to terrorist attacks against the United States is not limited to violence against the United States and ISAF soldiers in Afghanistan, the connection runs all the way to acts of terrorism planned to be executed on American soil. Three al-Qaeda planners were responsible for recruiting Najibullah Zazi to perpetrate acts of terrorism in the United States. Zazi and two of his former classmates from Flushing High School in New York, Zarein Ahmedzay and Adis Medunjanin received instruction in Pakistan from in the fabrication of improvised explosive devices to carry out suicide bomb attacks in the New York City subway in September 2009. Faisal Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber, received bomb-making training from the Pakistani Taliban in the tribal region of Waziristan (Cruickshank, 2010; Jones, 2011; McNeill, Carafano, Zuckerman, 2011).

Samina Ahmad has contended that by cultivating ties with jihadi elements as proxies to weaken India and to dominate Afghanistan, Pakistan's military was responsible for a forging of links between military-backed homegrown extremists and regional insurgents such as the Haqqani network and transnational terrorist groups

including al Qaeda. The nexus of these jihadi groups is linked to terror plots aimed at the United States and bears direct responsibility for the deaths of U.S. soldiers and American allies in Afghanistan (Ahmad, 2011).

1. Pakistan's Selective War Against Terrorists

Pakistan has shown no hesitation and has used brute force against foreign elements operating in its territory, if those groups target the Pakistani state. However, so far Pakistan has not launched any major offensives against the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan. The Taliban Council, Quetta Shura, is allowed to exist and act freely in the Pakistani city of Quetta (Fair, 2009).

Pakistan's counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan, imposed by U.S. demands after September 2001, is rife with inherent contradictions. The biggest contradiction is that Pakistan has to fight some militant jihadist groups that attack U.S. and NATO forces *while* protecting and supporting other militant jihadist groups that Pakistan created and partnered with to achieve its core strategic state goals. In her analysis, Siddiqa notes that "the policy flows out of Pakistan's multiple strategic requirements: its need to remain engaged with the United States, to save itself from the Taliban attacking the Pakistani state, and to fight India's growing presence in Afghanistan" (Siddiqa, 2011). These multiple requirements cause tremendous pressures and contradictions since Pakistan must protect self against the terrorist groups that operate on its soil but have recently turned against it, balance perceived external threat against India that requires it to use asymmetric warfare utilizing jihadists, while some of the previously sponsored jihadists are turning against Pakistani interests; and balance Washington's counterterrorism needs that directly contradict Pakistan's perceived security needs. Unfortunately, the Pakistani military has yet to understand that non-militaristic means to resolve its conflict with India exist. As Siddiqa concludes, the primary flaw of Pakistan's counterterrorism policy is that it is defined and driven by the military and military's strategic objectives and self-interest (Siddiqa, 2011).

I will return to this point in a later chapter that since its inception, Pakistan has deliberately allied itself with the United States—not because its elite believes in the U.S.

ideology—because it seeks rent for supporting the United States' ideological requirements for self-serving reasons. The primary self-serving reason has been, since 1947, to defray the costs of enormous military expenditures against the perceived and manufactured threat against India (Haqqani, 2005). The rivalry with India has been Pakistan's primary foreign policy objective since inception. As a result, the weak state with poor infrastructure and economy has never adequately invested in economic or educational development, resulting in a persistent need for external economic and military aid. The United States has filled that need as a patron since mid 1950. As a result of U.S. support, although Pakistani administrations have kept the relationship of convenience going with the United States, they have resented their dependence on the United States. Additionally, the perceived identity-generated existential goals of Pakistan are held non-negotiable by the military as military controls Pakistan's foreign policy and its zero sum philosophy has never allowed political flexibility or art of diplomacy to achieve state goals. Thus, even though Pakistan must rely on the United States to maintain its rentier economy, its existential rivalry with India takes precedence. This existential rivalry has been in a virtual stalemate even after Pakistan became a nuclear weapon state. Thus the reliance on asymmetric warfare is the only means by which Pakistan can keep pressurizing India for its irredentist goals on Kashmir. This reliance historically has been accomplished via irregulars and jihadi insurgents and explains why Pakistan fights against only *those* jihadi insurgents that have turned against the state of Pakistan and state's goal of attacking India and allows *those* jihadi groups to exist that follow Pakistan's state policy.

2. Pakistan's Support for Terrorism Due to Its Focus on India as an Adversary

There has to be a compelling reason why a nation state, which accepts financial and military aid from the West, engages in self-destructive and duplicitous behavior. The reason is Pakistan state's entrenched obsession with its Muslim identity against its eastern neighbor. If the preposterous hypothesis of Hindus and Muslims being two separate nations, which time and again was disproven by forces of history in South Asia, is discarded (for example, secession of Bengali Muslims from Pakistan to create

Bangladesh in 1971), the reason for creation of Pakistan as a nation state becomes dubious. The sole reason for creation of Pakistan was to be a haven for South Asia's Muslims. That national identity had to be forged by manufacture of an adversarial identity against the majority Hindu population of colonial India.

Before and after the partition of the subcontinent, India and Pakistan created sharply contrasting self-images. Pakistan saw itself as the homeland for all Muslims in South Asia, whereas India flaunted its secular polity (Tan & Kudaisya, 2000). However, I believe several layers of adversarial identities were created and shaped before and after decolonization of the subcontinent. Hindu and Muslim identities were not essentially adversarial as these communities had existed prior to the British arrival in the subcontinent. It was the jockeying for political power between the Muslim League and the Congress, adroitly exploited by the British whose aim was not to ever depart from India, which created adversarial relations between the Muslim and Hindu elite. The great conflict between the goals of the two organizations, with Muslim League demanding secession for India's Muslims, and the Congress demanding independence from Britain while keeping the subcontinent unified, created sharply adversarial identities. Since the Congress had been agitating against the British rule since the early twentieth century, and the Muslim League had come into being as a loyalist organization, the identity contrast between the two organizations imposed another layer of adversity, especially as the pre-partition politics was extremely acrimonious between 1945–1947. The partition, with controversial division of territories, forced population transfer in millions, and its accompanying horrendous violence, created another layer of adversarial identity as victims and victimizers (although the true victimizer, the British Empire, responsible for shaping events that culminated in partition, was never identified as such). For the state created as the home for South Asia's Muslims, it was a matter of great shame for the elite not having received Kashmir as part of their territory. Besides the conflict over Kashmir, conflict over resources, including sharing of funds and river waters, created a serious security threat perception in Pakistan after the partition (Tan & Kudaisya, 2000).

The state of Pakistan had little else in terms of national identity except Islam, especially Islam with an adversarial relationship with Hindu India, which, according to

Pakistan, had usurped Muslim Kashmir. For Pakistan to back down from its irredentist claim over Kashmir is to deny its foundational identity and to deny its reason for existence. Conversely, the secular identity created by the Indian republic after the partition makes it similarly difficult for India to cede Kashmir or make even the slightest accommodation over Kashmir. Indian elite believes that for India to give up claim over Kashmir would imply acceptance of the two-nation hypothesis and open up the Pandora's box as the political conflicts between India's numerous minorities could take secessionist turns. The United States, therefore, is caught in the middle of two intractable identity conflicts in South Asia but has taken no significant policy steps to extricate itself by keeping the focus solely on terrorism—which is a symptom and not the root of South Asia problem.

The reliance on Islam as the sole basis of nation building project or state formation has also lead to Pakistan into becoming an insecure and autocratic state by riding roughshod over its provinces and rejecting regional history, cultures and provincial autonomy (Bennett Jones, 2009).

As Tajbakhsh states, the durability of India–Pakistan conflict is a legacy of the painful 1947 partition, which resulted in irreconcilable positions on national identity (Tajbakhsh, 2011). Since Pakistan separated itself from the secular, multicultural, and multi-religious India as the home of the Muslims in the continent, not having Muslim Kashmir as a part of Pakistan became the overarching honor-shame theme in Pakistan's ruling elite. Furthermore, as the second largest Muslim nation in the world, Pakistan's elite wished to claim leadership of the Umma, the global Muslim community; however, due to the symbolic defeat in the early first war for Kashmir, Pakistan was unable to claim such leadership position of the Umma. Thus, the military conflict and the irredentist goal towards Kashmir is a continuation of identity-based conflicts—a conflict in which denial of an identity almost becomes denial of existence for a state. This quandary lies beneath the conflict between India and Pakistan.

The jihadist component of the Kashmiri struggle was seeded and controlled by Pakistan government, with ISI taking the lead in training the militants and smuggling them across the border into Indian Kashmir. Pro-Pakistani groups including the LET,

JEM, Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) have had a near monopoly on organized militant violence in Kashmir. There is substantial evidence that Pakistan has provided extensive training, weapons, funding and sanctuary to violent jihadists who operated in Kashmir (Blom, 2011; Ganguly & Kapur, 2010; Riedel, 2011; Vira & Cordesman, 2011).

That Pakistan has used jihadists, including al Qaeda, for its irredentist goals towards Kashmir was noted by *The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004). The Commission Report noted that ISI set up the first meeting between the Taliban and Osama bin Laden in the hope that they would work together, especially to train Kashmiri jihadists.

In his September 19, 2001, address to Pakistan, Musharraf did not condemn the Taliban or al Qaida, or blame them for 9/11 attacks. He stated that the decision to support the United States was made in Pakistan's national interests and not supporting the United States would have jeopardized the Kashmir cause and endangered Pakistan's nuclear installations. Musharraf's claim elucidates Pakistan's consideration of the Kashmir issue as the Pakistani foreign policy's raison d'etre. Also, by asserting that his support for the United States was to protect Pakistan's Kashmir's policy, he sent a signal to jihadi insurgents that militancy in Kashmir would continue (Rashid, 2008). Pakistan assumed that by helping the United States against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan would allow it to let Kashmiri jihadi insurgents operate without hindrance. Additionally, Pakistani military calculated that its new re-founded alliance with the United States, where the United States was dependent on Pakistan for conducting war in Afghanistan, placed Pakistan in a position of strength against India.

Jihadi violence in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Pakistan's Tribal Areas is separated by geography and has some distinct local characteristics. However, there is a close relationship between militancy in the three regions. The first generation of the Kashmir-oriented Jihadist organizations received their training in the Afghan jihad in the 1980's. Consequently, there is a close link between these organizations with the ISI and many Taliban commanders. Furthermore, the introduction of suicide bombing operations in Kashmir jihad is co-related to Taliban insurgency, originating from the strategy of self-

sacrificial violence promoted by the Pakistan army and the Jihadist groups on the Eastern front (Blom, 2011). In fact, popular Pakistani movies from 1990s glorify such acts of "martyrdom" by suicide bombers.

In brief, Pakistan has evolved into a praetorian and insecure state due to its obsession with rivalry over Kashmir and become the center of radical Islamist groups (who were and are patronized by the state). The historical and current support of these jihadi groups, fighting the Indian rule in Kashmir, drives the secondary desire of Pakistan to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan, hence its protection of Afghanistan Taliban *while* accepting military and economic aid from its benefactor, the United States.

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V. PAKISTAN AND UNITED STATES–A RELATIONSHIP OF CONVENIENCE

A. STRATEGIC SELECTIVE SELLING OF ALLIANCE: PAKISTAN'S ADROIT MANIPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES

For the last ten years, homeland security efforts of the United States have been stymied in an interrelated web of dependencies, involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The United States has had to rely on an unreliable Pakistani army and its duplicitous intelligence agency for logistics and intelligence, deal with an unstable and corrupt Kabul government, and face conflicting pressures by India—while receiving minimal returns for its investment related to counterinsurgency and war efforts. The U.S. policy in South Asia faces intricate challenges since it is concomitantly dependent on U.S. commitments to Afghanistan, on relations between India and Pakistan, and domestic Pakistani politics (Staniland, 2011). A lack of understanding and deliberate ignorance of historical relations between South Asian states further exacerbates complexities and impedes U.S. missions in South Asia.

The current state of counterterrorism collaboration and relations between Pakistan and the United States can be best understood by drawing parallels to the historical relationship between Pakistan and the United States. There has been a remarkable consistency and similarity between the strained and conflicted U.S.–Pakistan relations in post-9/11 period and the relationship between the two states that evolved after Pakistan's independence. The relations, from the beginning, were short-term, episodic, and expedient—with the United States seeking to use Pakistan as its proxy against American adversaries, and Pakistan selling its services as a U.S. ally in return for economic and military patronage (Haqqani, 2005; Jalal, 1990; McMahon, 1988; Schaffer & Schaffer, 2011). These factors have not changed in the past six decades. The post-9/11 duplicitous role played by Pakistan as a U.S. ally *while* also acting as a sponsor of terrorism, can be understood by considering Pakistan's real and imagined security needs and the nature of dependence between the United States and Pakistan.

As Cohen mentioned, until the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the U.S. South Asia policy was based on anti-Soviet policy and didn't pay attention to South Asia unless there was a crisis or specific U.S interests were at stake (Cohen, 2004). Historically, as a superpower and as the dominant partner in the relationship, the United States utilized Pakistan as a proxy whereas Pakistan, as the lesser of the two partners, used its alliance with the United States to seek diplomatic, economic, and military support. During the Cold War, Pakistan was part of the United States strategy for containment of Soviet Union; however, there is no evidence that Washington devised any coherent long-term Pakistan policy now or in the post-Cold War period. As early as 1949, the United States was exploring strategic value of Pakistan as the base for air operations against Soviet Union and also as the staging area for forces engaged in the defense of the Middle East oil areas. Arguments in support of close relations with Pakistan in 1949 were solely based upon strategic considerations, specifically due to Pakistan's proximity to the USSR and the Middle East (McMahon, 1998).

A critical fact, required to understand Pakistan's manipulative behavior, has not received prominent attention: as a rentier state, Pakistan has consistently and cleverly exploited its relationship with the United States since attaining independence. Pakistan used its perceived strategic importance as a bargaining chip in its solicitation of aid from the United States. Pakistan coveted aid and assistance from the United States and was a willing partner of the United States during the Cold War. Its leaders skillfully took advantage of and manipulated the Soviet-U.S. conflict to further Pakistan's interests (Bourke-White, 1949; McMahon, 1998).

Bourke-White (1949) was prescient in her observations of Pakistan's manipulative machinations to get aid from the United States. She described Jinnah's belief that Pakistan could extract rent from the United States for an anti-communist alliance because of Pakistan's strategic location near Russia. In his interviews with Bourke-White, Jinnah asserted that if Russia walked into Pakistan, the whole world would be menaced and therefore America should invest in Pakistan to prevent Russia from walking in. Bourke-White penetratingly noted:

> This hope of tapping the U.S. Treasury was voiced so persistently that one wondered whether the purpose was to bolster the world against Bolshevism or to bolster Pakistan's uncertain position as a new political entity.

Bourke-White also noted that Pakistan had a policy of profiting from the disputes of others. This propensity of Pakistan has barely changed since 1947, as its regimes consistently profited from disputes between the superpowers, and, when the Cold War was over, they profited from U.S. efforts to curb Islamic militancy in Afghanistan—something that Pakistan itself had created, albeit with complicity and acquiescence of CIA during the war against Soviets.

After its independence, the United States was the first country Pakistan asked for financial aid. Between 1947 and 1954, its leaders repeatedly called attention to Pakistan's geopolitical significance in their efforts to coax large-scale financial and military support from Washington. It was just two months after independence when Pakistan's Governor General Mohammad Ali Jinnah requested a loan of almost $2 billion for Pakistan's military and for agriculture and industrial development projects. Jinnah's request was a quid pro quo, selling Pakistan's alignment with the United States in return for a commitment of developmental aid and military security. It was transparent that India was the sole security concern for Pakistan. However, Pakistani appeals were always couched in a virulently anti-Soviet rhetoric, with the goal of striking a responsive chord with the Truman administration's Cold War planners. For example, one of the documents seeking American aid lists Pakistan's proximity and vulnerability to Russia as its most vexing external problem (Jalal, 1987; McMahon, 1988).

Since India chose to keep nonalignment as the focus of its foreign policy and refused to align with United States, Pakistan's assiduous and opportunistic diplomacy fructified in U.S.–Pakistan alignment in 1950s (Ganguly, 2002). Using Islamic identity as an opposing ideology to communism, Pakistan, from the beginning, focused on the United States as its patron of choice, specifically as a source of weapons and economic aid. Fabricated evidence of communist threats against Pakistan was used to get the attention and favors of the United States, asking for help from American intelligence to build an "Islamic barrier against the Soviets." (Haqqani, 2005; Jalal, 1990)

Pakistan faced multiple insecurities at its birth. It was flanked on the eastern border by India, which was significantly larger in territory and possessed stronger military. Horrific violence accompanying subcontinent's partition, controversial division of territories, and forced uprooting of tens of millions of people forged deep suspicion and distrust between India and Pakistan—more so in Pakistan as Pakistan considered self as the victim. The state of Pakistan evolved with significant deficiencies, including a lack of legitimacy, since after the partition of the subcontinent; India was construed as the true inheritor of the British Raj whereas Pakistan was a state that was carved out of British India. Pakistan also lacked an adequate industrial base as most of the industrial regions happened to fall under Indian territory, leaving Pakistan with just 10 percent of the industrial base. The immediate war and stalemate in Kashmir also hardened the feeling of being surrounded by enemies in Pakistan. Besides the territorial dispute, dispute over sharing of resources, including river water sharing, also poisoned the atmosphere. Pakistani leaders also believed that India's aim was to undo partition and reabsorb Pakistan into India. Additionally, on its western flank, Afghanistan had opposed Pakistan's entry into the United Nation and had expressed irredentist aims over Pakistan's Pashtun areas, which it claimed had been artificially divided by the Durand Line (Cohen, 2004; Shah, 2010; Tan & Kudaisya, 2000).

As the two states came into being, compared to Pakistan, India was overwhelmingly larger territorially, economically, and in conventional military power. Due to the exceedingly belligerent circumstances in which the countries were created, and the continuation of belligerent territorial and identity disputes, Pakistan perceived India as its enemy and security against India was institutionalized as a state priority. The fear of India also resulted in Pakistan committing disproportionate resources to the military. Thus, from day one, because of its military and economic weakness, Pakistan searched for patrons to finance its military expansion and modernization at the expense of state development. Due to the created and perceived fear that India represented an existential threat to Pakistan allowed the military to control the Pakistan government. Insecurity, feeling of betrayal, hostility towards India, weak institutions due to Partition, and an obsession over building military not only shaped Pakistan's birth, they also led to

the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan. All these factors were synthesized and expressed through the conflict over Kashmir (Bose, 2003; Ganguly, 2001; Hasan, 2005; Haqqani, 2005).

The incipient insecure Pakistani state, due to its relative military and infrastructural weakness, almost immediately began to seek to equalize and neutralize India's military strength by seeking benefactors for military and economic aid. For that end, Pakistani bureaucrats and generals immediately began to deceptively sell their anti-communist credentials to the United States, even though the funds and military hardware sought were never intended for Soviet Union, they were solely intended for the congenital enemy India.

When India and Pakistan came into being, due to U.S. concern over immediate issues in Europe and elsewhere, senior American officials devoted little in-depth attention to the problems of India and Pakistan. However, due to Pakistan's near-contiguous border with the Soviet Union and its proximity to the Persian Gulf, in 1949, the United States was already looking at Pakistan as a base for air operations against the USSR and as a staging area for forces engaged in the defense or recapture of Middle East oil areas (for a thorough review of earlier CIA Reports, Harry S. Truman Papers, U.S. Department of Defense documents, and other relevant U.S. strategic assessments regarding India and Pakistan, see McMahon, 1988). McMahon argues that Pakistan exerted substantial influence on the United States, constantly urging and exhorting the United States for military aid for its own purposes and virtually forcing an American response. Pakistan took advantage of its geographical location and ideology-for-sale to seek rent from the United States and other states, including Saudi Arabia and turned into a praetorian state (Blom, 2011; Fair, 2011; Haqqani, 2005). Rashid states that every Pakistani government since 1970's has raised the threat of rising Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan as a way of securing aid from the United States, while at the same time nurturing Islamic fundamentalists (Rashid, 2008). Coll concludes that the Pakistani Army has learned to extract from the United States the financial and military support that it believes it requires against India (Coll, 2010). However, at the same time, Pakistan's generals resent their dependency on America, as their core interests do not coincide with American interests.

But, over the years, they have mastered the art of dealing and winning in their interactions with U.S. policy makers (Schaeffer & Schaeffer, 2011).

It is evident that ever since its inception, Pakistan has exploited its geopolitical location and volatility as a tool of seeking military and economic aid from friendly nations. It can be argued that Pakistan created an insecure identity vis-à-vis its adversarial relationship with India, and it has been cashing in on its insecurity and the concomitant violence Pakistan itself generated as a result of the insecure identity, by seeking rent from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere (Blom, 2011). Since Pakistan perceives itself as an insecure state, its military has directly and indirectly maintained an iron grip on the foreign policy of the nation since its inception and receives a major portion of the nation's budget. Despite being engage in the "war against terrorism" and struggling against jihadi militants on its own territory, Pakistani generals claim that the funding is needed, not to fight extremism—but to fight India (Weiss, 2011).

1. The United States as an Unreliable Partner

The U.S.–Pakistan relationship has been marked with three distinct periods of engagements, with the first period starting in 1954 at the height of the Cold War. In 1949, when India's leader Nehru visited Washington, Indian position of nonalignment was proposed to Washington. This was a disappointment as the American goals of creating an anti-Soviet block in South Asia. This created possibilities for Pakistan to play up differences between India and Pakistan and a mutual support and defense agreement between Pakistan and the United States in 1954, marking the beginning of the first engagement (Racine, 2002). In the mid-1950s, the United States and Pakistani interests had also converged as Pakistan was seeking out economic and military aid and the United States was trying to promote an alliance of Asian states to prevent expansion of Soviet influence (Smith, 2007).

In 1962, despite Pakistan's opposition, due to geostrategic imperatives of the United States, India received American military aid after India's defeat in its war against China in October 1962. Pakistan viewed this as strengthening of its most hated enemy by its closest ally. Due to the entrenched zero-sum ideology pervasive in Pakistan, it was not

understood by Pakistani politicians that the United States had provided aid to Pakistan against its Cold War adversary USSR and provided aid to India to counterbalance against China. This caused great bitterness in Pakistan. Pakistan was especially bitter as no pressure was made on India regarding Kashmir. Consequently, Pakistan made overtures towards China to improve relations and enter into mutually benefiting relations. Pakistan's relationship with the United States suffered a major setback in 1965 when Pakistan initiated the war in to capture Kashmir, and, in response, the United States suspended arms delivery to Pakistan. This was considered a big let down as Pakistan expected to receive support from its ally. By 1965, the United States was beginning to lose interest in Pakistan and after the 1971 secession of Bangladesh; the relationship gave way to indifference. Eventually, the United States lost strategic interest in Pakistan and did not re-engage with the country until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (Cohen, 2004; Racine, 2002; Smith, 2007).

In 1979, mobs burned down the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan without any intervention from the government. This was the lowest point in U.S.–Pakistani relations. However, there was a dramatic reversal in American policy towards Pakistan when in December of 1979 Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. This marked the second engagement with Pakistan when the U.S. focus was on reversing Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Americans encouraged Pakistani dictator, General Zia ul Haq, to initiate a covert war in Afghanistan, in which Islamist jihadis were utilized. Much has been written about the second engagement and Coll's work provides a good overview of the Machiavellian means pursued by the United States and Pakistan to defeat the Soviet army in Afghanistan (Coll, 2004).

However, the devastating impact of the Afghan war resulted in a culture of violence and religious fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The seeds of fundamentalist Islam that were spread so casually and liberally in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the war came to bear bitter fruit for everyone involved in the conflict—as the United States learned from the 9/11 attacks. During the second engagement, the Pakistani military further consolidated its grip on the state and an already frail civic polity further weakened (Cohen, 2004; Haqqani, 2005; Jafferlot, 2002). This would have a

major impact later in the radicalization of Pakistan as the Pakistani military continued to support and exploit Islamic militants for waging asymmetric warfare in Kashmir and place a compliant regime in Kabul. The spectacular emergence and victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 1994 can be tied to this period.

Not only did the United States lose interest in Pakistan after the second engagement, Washington also imposed sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear program, even though Washington had turned a blind eye towards Pakistan's efforts to make nuclear weapons before. As Benazir Bhutto argued to Riedel, America had betrayed democracy in Pakistan, treated her country unfairly, and was an unreliable ally (Riedel, 2011).

The third engagements began after the September 11, 2001 attacks (Smith, 2007). Each of the engagements was a single-issue engagement of limited focus and duration. During each of the three engagements, Pakistan was being ruled by the military or a military-dominated government (Hussain, 2005). During the first two engagements, as soon as the United States achieved its objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan, it lost interest in Pakistan, leaving the Pakistanis feeling betrayed.

Evidence indicates that Pakistan sought the United States as a source of money and arms due to existential fears in its rivalry with India. On the other hand, fear of communism is the reason the United States provided armament and aid to Pakistan (Jafferlot, 2011; Oldenburg, 2011). In a quest for containment of communism, the United States used Pakistan as a proxy against China and the Soviet Union. In 1980's, Pakistan was used as a staging ground for mounting attacks on the Soviet army in Afghanistan. Oldenburg concludes that by 1980's, Pakistan had become a rentier state by exploiting its strategic location to receive arms and cash (Oldenburg, 2011).

It can be concluded that the U.S.–Pakistan relationship has been overshadowed by limited and expedient interactions. The relationship between the two states has been episodic. On the American side, the relationship was guided by Washington's interest global strategic goals during the cold war and later by the need for allied in anti-terrorism efforts in South Asia. For Pakistan, there has been a single purpose—acquire resources

and support for Pakistan's enduring rivalry against India. An important learning point is that the U.S. aid primarily strengthened Pakistani army and weakened the democratic forces in Pakistan. Additionally, the cycles of on again and off again relationship have made the Pakistani military wary of United States. Many Pakistani decision makers believe that the present relationship with Washington would end up again in the United States ignoring Pakistan once Washington's objectives are met. This has had a direct influence on Pakistan's decision-making related to its support of Afghan Taliban, as Pakistan believes that after the United States departure from Afghanistan, it would have the chance to plant a puppet regime in Afghanistan and continue its irredentist efforts in Kashmir.

Some South Asia experts have offered to explain away Pakistan's support of terrorists as dependent upon American unreliability as an ally. Markey suggested, "If members of the Pakistani army and the Inter-Services Intelligence retain ties to militant groups, including Taliban sympathizers, they do so as a hedge against abandonment by Washington. The past six decades of on-again, off-again bilateral cooperation has undermined Pakistani confidence in long-term U.S. partnership" (Markey, 2007). Such thoughts perpetuate self-serving arguments pushed forward by the Pakistani military and diplomats for decades. However, facts indicate that Pakistan has deliberately and insistently courted the United States since its inception and manipulated east-west tensions, fear of communist Soviet aggression, and U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East to get military and financial aid (Bourke-White, 1949; Fair, 2009). At every sign of U.S. disillusionment with Pakistan, Pakistan has attempted to prove how dependent U.S. interests are on Pakistan, whether as an ally against the Soviet Union, communist aggression, or terrorism. The U.S. administrations have been consistently deceived by Pakistani entreaties since 1954 when the first decision to provide military aid to Pakistan was made as a hedge against Soviet expansionism, even though the clear goal of Pakistan was to build against its rival India (McMahon, 1988). While it is true that Washington has had selfish interests in its partnership with Pakistan, Pakistan similarly exploited the United States to pursue its own interests, even if Pakistan's interests culminated in attacks on U.S. soldiers and civilians. In forging its foreign policy, successive Pakistani regimes

have continually bolstered the military vice grip on the state by exaggerating the threat from India, obsessing over Kashmir, and assiduously courting the United States as a strategic ally (Ganguly, 2002).

2. Self-Defeating Impacts of U.S. Relationship with Pakistan

Since the United States historically viewed its alliance with Pakistan through a geostrategic lens, as a way to achieve defense goals, Washington has allied primarily with Pakistan's military. The Pakistani alliance with the United States was rewarded with substantial military and economic assistance for Pakistan. This aid strengthened Pakistan's military at the expense of civilian institutions. During the Cold War, the United States agreed to ignore Pakistan's South Asia conundrums as long as Pakistan continued to function as a proxy. No substantial efforts were made by America to encourage Pakistan to engage in domestic reforms or to resolve its conflict with India diplomatically. Consequently, Islamabad continued with its single-track foreign policy obsession and neglected development of its social and physical infrastructure. Additionally, Islamabad also continued with the egregiously wrongful colonial practice of neglecting the development of its tribal areas and failing to incorporate these areas into its polity.

Consequently, by supporting autocratic military regimes in Pakistan, the United States has caused disenfranchisement of is people by consistent erosion of civil rule and entrenchment of military power in society. This has come at the expense of the needs and the will of the Pakistani people (Tankel, 2011). Since 1958, more U.S. foreign aid reached Pakistan when it was under military or military-turned civilian ruler than public representatives, as compared to between 1970–77 and 1988–99 when Pakistan was under representative government. In fact, Pakistan received more sanctions or threats of sanctions from U.S. administrations while under elected regimes (Kundi, 2007). Kundi argues that since early in Pakistan's existence as a state, the United States promoted a military regime there against all democratic possibilities, as it assured the serving of the U.S. interests.

Reliance on Pakistan's military has caused grave harm not only to the Pakistani people; it has also seriously stung United States. By its single-minded focus on Kashmir and unremitting hostility to India, the Pakistani military made a series of unrealistic and unintelligent decisions since 1947 and continues to make injudicious decisions that are not only dangerous to Pakistan's civil society, but also inimical to its own interests. It made unduly optimistic assessments of its prowess, underestimated India's resolve to hold on to Kashmir, and miscalculated and relied upon the nonexistent support of its patron the United States over Kashmir (Cohen, 2004; Ganguly, 2002). By its persistent reliance on irregulars and Islamist jihadis, the Pakistani military created violent militant groups that now attack the state and also export the terror outside its borders. By neglecting the internal contradictions of Pakistan while providing it aid, the United States also indirectly assisted with ethnic strife in the country. The military regimes in Pakistan (as well as civilian) have historically contributed to the exacerbation of ethnic conflicts. The worst example was West Pakistan's brutal suppression of Bengali linguistic and ethnic agitation, which eventually culminated in secession of Bangladesh in 1971. The person most responsible for radicalization of Pakistan, the dictator General Zia ul Haq, received the largest military and economic aid from the United States. Military rule under Zia spawned most of the militant groups that the United States is now attempting to suppress and eliminate (Bose, 2002; Bennett Jones, 2009).

The current goals of the United States in South Asia can be summed up as the elimination or at least substantial reduction of the threats emanating from the area along the Afghan-Pakistan border, while, helping to transform Pakistan into a stable state that support U.S. interests in the region. On both these accounts, the United States has failed to achieve significant progress. Pakistan has a seriously dysfunctional civic polity, is a magnet for terrorists from around the world, is experiencing grave violence from militant groups, many of which were created by the state, is impoverished, and has a poor infrastructure (Tankel, 2011). In a 2011 survey, a majority of Pakistanis considered the United States as an enemy and a potential military threat, and also opposed American-led anti-terrorism efforts. Over 70 percent of Pakistan's people had an unfavorable opinion of America (Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 21, 2011). Worst of all, it is Pakistan where

terrorist plots against the United States and elsewhere are hatched; and, it is the state of Pakistan which sponsors militant groups that attack the United States and allied troops in Afghanistan. Most ominously, it is not Iran but Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, which poses the greatest threat to U.S. interests and to the stability and security of South Asia.

VI. INTRACTABILITY OF INDIA–PAKISTAN CONFLICT AS A FUNCTION OF BRITISH INDIA'S PARTITION AND CONCOMITANT ADVERSARIAL IDENTITY GENERATION—CONSEQUENCES FOR UNITED STATES' COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

A. HOW IDEATIONAL IDENTITIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN CREATE ENDURING CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO STATES

The conflict between India and Pakistan has been an enduring conflict which has defied possibilities of a resolution for the last 64-years. Paul classifies this conflict as an "enduring rivalry." One of the impairing features of such rivalries is zero-sum perspective of the participants (Paul, 2005). This zero-sum perspective has contributed to negative and self-damaging decisions, especially on the part of Pakistan, that have impacted U.S. homeland security.

Kashmir has been described as the fulcrum of conflict between India and Pakistan, contributing to the enduring conflict (Nasr, 2005). This rivalry has ensnared the United States in South Asia for the last ten years, as the basic United States and Pakistani goals and interests in the region not only differ, they are perpetually on a collision course. The United States would prefer a stable and allied Afghanistan bereft of Islamist elements. This goes against the strategic goals of Pakistan. Pakistan has devoted three decades to cultivating and supporting jihadi groups in Afghanistan. These groups were not only used in the jihad against the Soviet army, they were used as proxy against India in Kashmir, and to install a pliant regime in Afghanistan. The U.S. regional goals in Afghanistan are transient; Pakistan's regional goals are existential and relate to its origin and ideational identity.

It is well established that Pakistan, while voicing its alliance with the United States to fight terrorism, allows terrorism to gestate on its territory. These duplicitous actions of Pakistan may defy a rational-actor explanation but are understandable when seen under the lens of the identities Pakistan and India created during and after the independence struggle against the British. These identities came into being as deeply adversarial identities. After the partition, these identities hardened, making the conflict

between the two states violent and intractable. Without an understanding of the ideational identities of India and Pakistan, the depth of conflict between the two states cannot be understood. Consequently, efforts to permanently resolve South Asia conflict in favor of U.S. homeland security cannot entirely succeed.

Muslim nationalism that resulted in the creation of Pakistan was based upon engineering of Muslim separatism in the subcontinent, emerging from the Muslim elite's fear of loss of social and political status after independence of India (Hasan, 1997; Hasan, 2002). Further, Muslim leaders, such as Jinnah, were concerned by the Hindu symbolisms employed by the Congress nationalist leaders. What was arguably a fight for political power in postcolonial period resulted in a generation of adversarial identities with religious reference (Pandey, 2002). With the division of subcontinent in 1947, the Muslim League had laid the foundation of Pakistan's origin on a separatist identity and agenda. Conversely, the Congress had created an adversarial identity as a secular organization representing all Indians. The Congress saw itself as an anti-imperial nationalistic organization, fighting imperialism to keep India unified against separatist machinations of the Muslim League; however, the Muslim League asserted that the Congress was a party that represented interests of Hindus only.

As the British Empire engaged in acts to perpetuate colonial rule in India, sometimes pitting interests of one group against the other, the Indian nationalist movement reacted to and was shaped by the British machinations (Pandey, 2004; Pandey, 2006; Sarilla, 2005). The conflicting identities between Islamic nationalism of the Muslim League, which asked for Pakistan, and the self-identified secular national Indian National Congress, were created in an antagonistic fashion before the British departure and before the partition of India. The agitation for Pakistan as the homeland of South Asia's Muslims was premised upon the divisive "two-nation" hypothesis put forth by Jinnah, postulating that the two South Asian communities had such irreconcilable differences that they could not live together (Alavi, 1989; Hasan, 1997; Nandy, 1983). As the British used the Muslim League as a counterbalance to the Congress during World War II, to continue their soldier recruitment drive for the war effort, many in the Congress leadership denounced the Muslim League as colonial enabler and supporter of

the British Raj. While the Congress leadership was imprisoned by the British in 1942, over the Quit India agitation, which aimed to drive British from India, the Muslim League continued to collaborate with the British to strengthen its political fortunes in alliance with the British (Ali, 2008). This created considerable ill will between the progenitors of India and Pakistan even before the country was divided. The contesting adversarial identities further turned irreconcilable once the devastating violence associated with the partition of the subcontinent led to mass murder, rapes, and forcible population transfer. Since the two new states were geographically contiguous and had a shared history, the centrality of the "other" side became critical to identity of "self."[5]

Pakistan's emergences as a Muslim state, in contrast to India projecting a postcolonial secular identity, are at the heart of the South Asia dispute. The enduring conflict over Kashmir is the sideshow of each state seeking recognition and affirmation, from the other, of their ideational identity. India must claim Kashmir because it is the only Muslim-majority state in India. If Pakistan and the international community accepts India's claim over Kashmir, it legitimizes India's secular identity. On the other hand, Pakistan seeks Kashmir because the legitimacy of Pakistan's existence relies on acceptance of the "two-nation" theory. Pakistan was created for subcontinent's Muslims. If a Muslim majority state remains with India and such Muslim state thrives in India, it negates the grounds for Pakistan's creation and existence. Keeping Kashmir in India creates existential dilemma for Pakistan. This confounds the situation as a zero-sum perspective prevails in the psyche of the neighboring states—existence of one set of ideology results in negation of the other and consequent denial of the right to exist for the other. Thus the battle is between the founding ideologies of the two nation states, which manifest over possession of Kashmir.

If Pakistan does not contest India's secular self-image, and does not strive for Kashmir, the necessity of Pakistan's creation is brought into question; whereas integrating Kashmir into Pakistan fulfills and legitimizes the "two nation" theory and affirms Pakistan's existence. Kashmir has thus become the test of ideological

[5] For a detailed constructivist analysis of India-Pakistan identities, see Shafique, 2011

underpinnings of the creation of India and Pakistan. The conflict can be summarized as follows: Pakistan's creation can be deemed legitimate *only* if Hindus and Muslims represent two distinct nations. The identities of India and Pakistan thus exist in stark challenge to each other's.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's (d. 1977) statement, following the second war between India and Pakistan, is quite instructive about Kashmir's importance to Pakistan's identity:

> If a Muslim majority state can remain a part of India, then the raison d'etre of Pakistan collapses. These are reasons why India, to continue her domination of Jammu and Kashmir, defies international opinion and violates her pledges.[6]

Pakistan's identity has resulted in perpetuation of conflict with India because, as Nasr states, "Pakistani identity has largely evolved not in terms of any indigenous cultural or civilizational values but in contradistinction to the idea of India" (Nasr, 2005). This contradistinction to the idea of India has caused unremitting hostility between the two states, as evidenced by Pakistani dictator General Zia-ul Haq's statement. Zia, while explaining why Pakistan maintained a position of hostility and conflict with India, stated:

> Turkey or Egypt, if they stop being aggressively Muslim, they will remain exactly what they are – Turkey and Egypt. But if Pakistan does not become and remain aggressively Islamic, it will become India again.[7]

Pakistan came into being as an insecurity state (Thornton, 1999). This insecurity predicament and the feeling of disadvantage worsened with time and heightened greatly with disintegration of Pakistan, when half of the Muslims of Pakistan, in negation of the "two nation" hypothesis, seceded from Pakistan in 1971, with India facilitating secession of Bangladesh (Sisson & Rose, 1990).

This fact requires further elaboration as related to hardening of Pakistan's Islamic identity.

Ethnically and linguistically, Pakistan was a pluralistic society, but the state pursued policies to suppress pluralism and used Islam to justify the unitary character of

[6] As quoted in Shafique, 2011.

[7] As quoted in Shafique, 2011.

the state. Thus, the state's ideational conception of self, led to collision with the natural pluralism of its society, creating fierce conflicts. A serious issue with Pakistan's unitary identity generation is the impact it has had on radicalization of Pakistan. The nation was created with religion as the *sole* rationale for uniting a very diverse group of people. Linguistic, cultural, and historical differences separated Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the North-West Frontier Province. However, even more challenging was the geographical distance between its east and west wings. East Pakistan was a thousand miles away from the West, separated by hostile Indian Territory. However, this distance was minor compared to the ethno-linguistic-historic-cultural divide that existed between the Bengali (East) Pakistanis and their masters who ruled from West Pakistan). In short, the creation of Pakistan both as a physical and imagined (identity) community was an imposition from above, a result of high politics of elite who sought and received their power—at the expense of the common man who had to endure the outcomes of the ideologies of his omniscient leaders. However, this imposed identity proved toxic. The bulk of Pakistan's population lay in its eastern wing whereas the political and military might concentrated in the western wing. The identity creation and state building remained in the hands of the overbearing bureaucrats and the military in the west, causing resentment in the east against the dictators and autocrats who were not only imposing their values on the Bengalis, but were openly condescending towards them. The end result was a pogrom in the east when the West Pakistani military engaged in suppression of agitations and ended up butchering a million of their fellow Muslims and making four millions refugees (Ali, 2008; Talbot, 1972). This resulted in the east seceding from the west, and Bangladesh was born. Ironically, instead of realizing that it was draconian and divisive decision-making by the dictatorial West Pakistan that had caused fragmentation of Pakistan, the Pakistan that remained instead became more reliant on Islam for its identity. The result was state support of radical religious organizations, the impact of which we see in the inability of Pakistani regimes to cut their cord with militant groups.

The created and perceived existential threats to Pakistan did not come solely from India; such threats were also indigenous, resulting from Pakistan's own evolution as a

Muslim state and the concomitant identity creation. Pakistan, the result of separatism, had to use Islam as the unifying force to flatten the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences in the disparate populations of the new state.

The rationale for Pakistan's creation was that Muslims of India were different from Hindu India not only in their religion but also ethnically, culturally, historically, and economically. The slogan of the new state was "One Religion, One Language, One Country." This forcible imposition of language and flattening of identities of indigenous populations created divisive forces within Pakistan (Gauhar, 2009). The insistence on Urdu as the language of Muslims denied existence of major indigenous languages and people, including Bengali, Sindhi, Punjabi, Pashto and Balochis. It was this forcible imposition of language and identity over people that led to the violent events in 1971, culminating in the breakup of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. It was the absolute adherence to the state identity at the expense of denying the existence or repressing the identities of many people of Pakistan that caused the breakup of Pakistan. However, the state project to assert an Islamic mono-cultural sans ethnicity nation became even more hardened after 1971. Under General Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan's Islamic identity was forged based on militant religious extremism. This morphing of Islamic state ideology of Pakistan's beginning into "Islam as state" identity of Zia's time can be tied to the radicalization of the state project that employs the Taliban, JI, LeT, and other Islamic militant groups for achievement of Pakistan's state objectives.

The distinct cultures and histories of Baloch, Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, and the people of NWFP clashed with the culture of the new ruling class. The elite who created and usurped power in Pakistan did not come from the regions that constituted Pakistan; in fact, the leadership of the Muslim League predominantly came from regions that had remained in India after the partition. They spoke a different language (Urdu), and were culturally and ethnically distinct from the natives. The influx of what could be construed as newcomers to the nation, and their domination of state's politics, created conflict and ethnic tensions (Nasr, 2005; Jafferlot, 2002; Racine, 2002; Talbot & Singh, 2009). Thus, from the very inception, Pakistan was confronted with a paradox: the state that was created on the basis of the "two-nation" theory was facing separatist and secessionist

forces on linguistic and ethnic basis, negating the theory of Pakistan's formation (Kaushik, 2005). For, if Muslims in the subcontinent considered themselves a nation and deserved a nation of their own, Baloch, Pashtuns, and Sindhis in Pakistan considered themselves as separate nations too and could demand nations of their own. As Kapur (2005) states, "Without the cementing influence of Islam and anti-Indianism, Pakistan would likely have degenerated into civil war among the Punjabis, Balochis, Pashtuns, and Sindhis." Thus, Pakistan's ontological security was challenged from the beginning, heightening its insecurity and making it rely more and more on Islam as the sole cementing glue for the state. Manufacturing conflict with India also assisted with unification of the disparate Pakistani populations. Kashmir provided the unifying cause to the nascent state and allowed Pakistan to forge a national identity.

It can be argued that a major factor in the present political and ideological crisis faced by Pakistan, part of which translates into anti-Americanism and a consistent supply to terrorist mills, is the denial of the cultural and political rights of its own people. The refusal to acknowledge their distinct ethnic identities and suppression of their cultural identities has led to separatist movements in Pakistan and a lack of trust in the central government. This has reflected in a loss of interest in state building project, with military and corrupt politicians controlling the state as their cash cow. Ironically, sectarian violence, religious strife, and ethnic conflicts have resulted from Pakistan's own ideational identity, which has doggedly attempted to forge and impose a unitary state over its diverse populations since 1947. The cycle viciously perpetuates itself as disaffected groups in FATA, Baluchistan, Sind, and elsewhere rebel against the state and provide assistance to militant jihadi groups that are fighting the state. The state uses brute force to suppress provincial agitations but is reduced to use of Islam as the flag to rally behind—something, which the militant groups have usurped. Rallying behind the Islamic identity thus has become the successful ploy of jihadi groups, which claim that they are more Islamic than the state with which they are becoming disaffected. The state of Pakistan is bound to lose this ideational identity struggle; however, justifying the irrationalist perspective, it continues to rely on its historical-foundational-ideational identity.!

India faces similar identity-related conflicts. Its secular-democratic identity is challenged by the existence of Pakistan as a Muslim nation. The two-nation theory is perceived as a challenge to India's integrity and civic polity, as over 150 million Muslims live in India. Furthermore, it is believed that if Pakistan's claim over Kashmir is accepted or if Kashmir secedes from India, India's integrity maybe seriously compromised and separatist forces in India may gain force, leading to disintegration of India (Malik, 2002). In the 1990s, when the secular credentials of Indian polity began to fray and Hindu-revivalists began to turn Indian political spectrum into a rightward course, instead of weakening India's resolve over Kashmir, the conflict turned even deeper. This deepening of the conflict was due to a political shift from secularism towards Hindu-domination, which turned the Kashmir rivalry into a rivalry that was between a Hindu India and an Islamic Pakistan (versus a conflict between a secular India and an Islamic Pakistan).

It can be summarized that Pakistan, through sustaining irredentist goals in Kashmir, is able to maintain its identity as a Muslim state. Indeed, it is the conflict with India that contributes to defining what Pakistani nationhood is. If Pakistan were to abandon its goals in Kashmir, its reason for existence would collapse, leading to loss of its identity and stability that comes with it. Kashmir is important for the self-conceptions of India and Pakistan's ideational identities. Additionally, national unity in Pakistan is maintained by sustaining conflict with India and fighting over Kashmir. Understanding these identity conflicts assists with comprehending the nature of conflict in South Asia and reveals why the U.S. goals have been frustrated by Pakistan in the region.

India and Pakistan have been locked in an intractable conflict. This enduring conflict can be traced to evolution of their identities, which formed distinctly in contrast to each other's conception of self. The foundational identities of the two states are not only adversarial; they negate the existence of the other. Furthermore, the artificiality of Pakistan's foundational identity—unitary nationalism based upon Islam—negated and oppressed Pakistan's diverse native populations. This further resulted in intra-state conflicts that later metamorphosed in radicalism. The intrastate conflict resulted in further hardening and forceful imposition of the Islamic identity as no other alternative was sought to unify the people of Pakistan.

The creation of Pakistan was based upon manufacture of an adversarial identity and separatism. The "Hindu other" was portrayed as wily, dominant, exploitative, hegemonic, dangerous, usurper of power, destroyer of Islam and Islamic culture. Grievances during and after partition exacerbated the adversarial identity conflict, and the conflict could not be concluded by creation of a state for the followers of Islam. A conflict that is colored by an identity forged by insecurity and victimhood is not over when the two parties are separated by a boundary; such conflict requires a resolution. Absent the reconciliation, the conflict must continue through an almost continuous feedback loop of challenge and response. Each entity determined to maintain both honor and future control through the cycle that supports its own identity. This is what we see in South Asia where Pakistan engages in attempts to justify its existence by tenaciously adhering to its foundational identity, even if such adherence culminates in self-destructive behavior. Any other rational or materialistic approach to explain Pakistan's support of terrorism, in defiance of the demands by the United States, is simply not possible. The United States has expected Pakistan to provide transport routes to resupply troops in Afghanistan, provide space for counterterrorism operations, to assist with elimination of al Qaeda leadership, and to clamp down on militant groups in its territory. However, closing down the militant groups, that were created based upon group cohesion for state goals, while seeking a unified adversarial identity against a perceived "other"—portrayed as an existential enemy—is unrealistic without an alteration of Pakistan's self-identity. A rapprochement between India and Pakistan is required for identity alteration of both the states. This would be an essential project to achieve U.S. homeland security goals in South Asia.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The analysis indicates that decisions made by the British Empire in late 19th and early 20th centuries contributed to intractable conflicts in South Asia, leading to regional wars, arms race, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the use of Islamic militants and asymmetric warfare (terrorism) by Pakistan. Partition of British India, the last British colonial decision in South Asia, turned out to be one of the most transformational events in South Asia's history. Not only did it lead to a horrendous blood bath and a massive

forced population transfer, the sequence of events leading to the partition created an adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan, culminating in a competition for the territory of Kashmir. Pakistan's foundational identity compels it to seek Kashmir, whereas India's perceived secular (shifting to Hindu-revivalist) identity compels it to rule out any compromise over Kashmir. Thus the two states remain locked in an enduring conflict over Kashmir.

Due to power asymmetry between the two states, Pakistan, being weaker, resorted to asymmetric warfare. The utilization of irregulars and proxies to weaken India's resolve to hold on to Kashmir eventually escalated to employing Islamic rhetoric and jihadi fighters. Pakistan's border dispute with Afghanistan also caused conflict with its western neighbor. Eventually, the state-sponsored radical proxies, including the Taliban, LeT, and the other jihadi groups, trained and harbored by Pakistan, engaged in terrorism. The al Qaeda, given refuge in Pakistan and Afghanistan hinterlands, collaborated with Pakistani jihadi groups, launching attacks around the world. Pakistan has literally functioned as a terrorist factory during the last ten years, with radical elements traveling from around the world to its tribal areas for training and guidance.

It is hard to imagine that without its enduring conflict with India, Pakistan would have turned into a praetorian rentier state. No other factor, even the Durand Line dispute, appears to have shaped Pakistan's decision-making trajectory into state sponsorship of terrorism.

The United States focus on elimination of al Qaeda is short sighted as it ignores the root cause of al Qaeda's survival in South Asia. The al Qaeda and colligate terrorist groups destabilize South Asia and promote terrorist acts, including attacks on the United States and ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Terrorist groups need sponsors to survive and thrive. Without Pakistan's support for the Afghan Taliban and associated terrorist organizations, al Qaeda would have been rooted out in South Asia. To have found the most wanted terrorist in the planet living for years within the stone's throw of Pakistan's military academy is quite a revelation of Pakistan's complicity in maintaining safe havens for international terrorists.

A pertinent conclusion of the thesis is that in the absence of Kashmir conflict's resolution, India and Pakistan's adversarial relationship and war by proxies will most likely continue in South Asia. To that end, Pakistan will continue to harbor jihadi groups to use them against India. Due to the collaborative engagements of South Asian jihadi groups operating from Pakistan, American interests will continue to be in jeopardy.

Without a resolution of the conflict between India and Pakistan, the terrorism problem emanating from South Asia cannot be resolved. The findings have additional relevance because U.S. administrations have engaged in decisions similar to British imperial decisions, including pitting various ethnic groups against each other for short-term gains in Iraq and South Asia. If historical trends are a guide, disruption of these natural complex social systems by the United States could result in Black Swan events in Iraq and South Asia, although such negative impacts may not manifest for decades.

A worrisome conclusion is that Pakistan represents a weak state that has engaged in support of terrorist groups as state policy. In its quest for security and adhesion to derived ideational identity, Pakistan has turned into a rentier praetorian state. Since early in Pakistan's development, the United States contributed to disruption of Pakistan's civil society by using Pakistan as a proxy in the cold war against Soviet Union. This aim was accomplished by supporting Pakistani army and its dictators at the expense of civilian institutions. The army has entrenched itself in Pakistan and controls not only Pakistan's foreign policy, it is implicated in training, support, and protection of jihadi groups. In essence, homeland security of the United States continues to be impacted by jihadi elements that receive support and training in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Therefore, it is imperative that U.S. policy should expand to include a resolution of India Pakistan conflict in order to eliminate terrorism emanating from South Asia.

United States policy should be shaped with the consideration that it is the colonial history of South Asia that has shaped current conflicts in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. These conflicts have manifested in spawning of terrorism from the region. The most salient deduction from these facts should be that since the origin of terrorism is tied to local conflicts, a regional solution, instead of an externally imposed solution, is required to resolve the conflict.

A consideration of the historical relationship between the United States and Pakistan is essential for future U.S. policy. The relationship between the United States and Pakistan has been an expedient exploitative strategic relationship that was always based upon short-term U.S. strategic interests and utilitarian rentier interests of Pakistan. The strategic component of the relationship needs to be transformed with a long-term view of U.S. global interests. While this does not mean that the U.S. short-term goals in the region be placed on the back burner, there is a need to break from past practices that relied on short-term expediency, disregarding long-term negative implications of utilitarian goals. The proper deduction of these historical lessons is that U.S. interests are better served in South Asia not by a simplistic focus on elimination of al Qaeda and control of the Taliban, but by judicious policymaking with consideration of historical forces that gave rise to al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Short-term expedient decisions may provide immediate advantages; however, the long-term consequences of imperial expediencies can be severely disruptive. The case of the United States using Pakistan as a proxy to defeat the Soviet army in Afghanistan is instructive. Although in short term, the United States was able to achieve its goal of rolling back the Soviet invasion, the nature of insurgency sponsored through Pakistan resulted in rise of radical jihadi groups, a devastating civil war in Afghanistan, rise of the Taliban, and the region becoming the source of terrorism with global impact. Looking at the same event with a different frame, interfering in the affairs of a weak, landlocked, and hapless third world nation, caused the eventual demise of Soviet Union as one of the two hegemons of the twentieth century. Disrupting caused to the complex human systems may shape consequences that are not only unpredictable, the magnitude and intensity of the results might be a Black Swan event unleashing uncontrollable and devastating societal transformations (for example, partition of India, secession of East Pakistan, both leading to radicalization of Pakistan, resulted from expedient short-term decisions of the British Empire).

To synthesize the relevant conclusions, it is evident that Pakistan is not a valuable ally of the United States and this creates a necessity for a reevaluation of U.S. policies towards Pakistan. The United States needs to focus on the root cause of destabilization in

South Asia, instead of focusing solely on individual players. A resolution of Kashmir conflict could significantly transform the pathological politics in the region that has spawned wars, terrorism, nuclear weapon race, and radicalization of populations.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Reversing the trajectory of Pakistan from radicalism to a normative democratic direction will largely depend upon its relationship with India and a resolution of Kashmir issue. Pakistan has come to view India as the source of its insecurity and formed not only an adversarial identity related to India, but also a victim identity, which portrays India (and the West) as bent upon destroying Pakistan. This ideational framework needs to shift in a secure mode before Pakistan could begin to transform its identity in a positive and fulfilling direction and become a nation state that focuses on welfare of its citizens instead of welfare of its army. Thus, the first step for the United States should be to focus on normalization of India-Pakistan relations and a resolution of Kashmir issue. While resolution of Kashmir status might appear to be an intractable wicked problem, it is not unsolvable. Furthermore, considering the dangers of allowing the status quo to continue (including a very possible nuclear confrontation if Mumbai-type attacks were to occur again), the instability of the region and the United States entanglement there would continue.

The United States needs to encourage India and Pakistan to normalize their relationship in a staged manner. However, this would require a clear message to Pakistan military that any interference in efforts to normalize relations would not be tolerated. As Coll (2009) indicated, India and Pakistan had held secret talks over Kashmir in 2006, but the tentative plans for peace were abandoned largely due to the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Cohen (2004) suggests that many in Pakistan recognize the need for resolution of conflict with India; however, entrenched interests that benefit from continuation of the conflict are naturally averse to a resolution. It was very likely that the Mumbai attacks were carried out to derail the backchannel peace talks. Since the inception of Pakistan, the Pakistani military has been the most significant and powerful interest group, which continues to consolidate power and perks that come with unchallenged domination of the

state. The reason for existence of the Pakistani military largely would end if the South Asia conflict were to be resolved. It is precisely for this reason that the United States must adopt the next recommendation.

The focus of the United States on "stability," which has been the code word for support of the military and dictators in Pakistan since 1958 has to be redirected. In 2007, with the lawyers and Pakistan's people agitating against Musharraf, the United States chose to back the dictator to shore up the "ally in the war on terror" (Talbot, 2009). Similarly, the United States administrations in the past have backed dictators over democracy in Pakistan ever since General Ayub Khan took over in a coup in 1958. This trend of backing "stability" over chaos of democracy needs to be reversed since it is exactly this quest for stability that has created the matrix from which terrorism in South Asia has evolved. It was U.S. support of Zia ul Haq that resulted in radical jihadi groups to evolve in Pakistan and Afghanistan, eventually culminating in Pakistan becoming an assembly line factory of terrorists. Taleb and Blyth (2011) have argued that artificially suppressing volatility, in the name of stability, is dangerous as it masks potential black swan events when highly constrained systems explode. Their analysis was based upon events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya (the so called Arab Spring of 2011) but is directly relevant to what we have observed in South Asia, where cold war considerations lead United States to support Pakistani military at the expense of democracy and civil institutions. The domination of the Pakistan state by its military is directly responsible for fundamentalism and radicalization of Pakistan and the consociate terrorism.

Taleb and Blyth argue:

> Although the stated intention of political leaders and economic policymakers is to stabilize the system by inhibiting fluctuations, the result tends to be the opposite. These artificially constrained systems become prone to "Black Swans"—that is, they become extremely vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from the statistical norm and were largely unpredictable to a given set of observers. Such environments eventually experience massive blowups, catching everyone off-guard and undoing years of stability or, in some cases, ending up far worse than they were in their initial volatile state. Indeed, the longer it takes for the blowup to occur, the worse the resulting harm in both economic and political systems.

The impact of artificially constraining Indian nationalism by the Britain in late 19th and early 20th century lead to the Black Swans of 1947 (the partition of India and its incredibly damaging subsequent impacts), 1971 (secession of East Pakistan to create Bangladesh, leading to further radicalization of the state that constituted Pakistan), and the early part of the 21st century when numerous terrorist attacks were hatched and exported from Pakistan. The U.S. policies have focused artificially on constraining "instability" in Pakistan during the last five decades (during the time of U.S. engagement with Pakistan). Such policies, as Taleb and Blyth's analysis indicates, have lead to blowups, including the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. These facts are the stark reminders that any further engagement with expedient policies in Pakistan would only prove more destabilizing and dangerous in the future. This vicious cycle needs to be stopped.

It is essential to see South Asia as a complex natural system to make better policy decisions. Again, citing from Taleb and Blyth:

> It is the same misperception of the properties of natural systems that led to both the economic crisis of 2007–8 and the current turmoil in the Arab world. The policy implications are identical: to make systems robust, all risks must be visible and out in the open—fluctuat nec mergitur (it fluctuates but does not sink) goes the Latin saying. Just as a robust economic system is one that encourages early failures (the concepts of "fail small" and "fail fast"), the U.S. government should stop supporting dictatorial regimes for the sake of pseudostability and instead allow political noise to rise to the surface. Making an economy robust in the face of business swings requires allowing risk to be visible; the same is true in politics.

As the analysis in this thesis indicates, this perspicacious observation is directly applicable to Pakistan. Since the natural system of South Asia has never factored into U.S. policy making, decisions have been made treating complex domains as linear in South Asian conflict. Therefore, short-term goals and decisions of the United States have consistently resulted in long-term unwanted effects. Reliance on Pakistan for support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan led the United States to initially ignore Pakistan's support for the Taliban and terrorists who fight in Kashmir (Rashid, 2008). However, such calculated decisions created vicious feedback loops since the Taliban, al Qaeda, and

terrorist groups such as LeT collaborated against U.S. interests. There are additional factors that result in complications: the United States intends to destroy al Qaeda and conclude their missions in Afghanistan; Pakistan aims to keep the cash spigot from the United States open, and therefore, has an interest in the conflict continuing. Furthermore, Pakistan has strategic interest in supporting radical groups it intends to use once the United States leaves the region. Due to these feedback loops, the conflict, instead of being resolved, continues. This cycle needs to be broken.

To break the cycle, the United States must confront the reality that al Qaeda or the Afghan Taliban exist because the state of Pakistan, specifically its military, is the nurturing matrix for these groups. The Pakistan army has had a destabilizing and deleterious impact on Pakistan's civic institutions. During the Cold War, U.S. policy and assistance enhanced the position of Pakistan's military at the expense of its civilian leaders. History is the guide that continuing to support the military and going over the head of the civilian institutions in Pakistan has been counterproductive in the long run. Innocent (2009) concluded:

> As a matter of political expediency, coordinating issues of military intelligence and operational and tactical level planning is much simpler when done through a single authoritarian leader than with the warring factions of a dysfunctional parliament. But when U.S. policymakers openly embraced an Islamabad under one-man rule, they appeared to also be embracing the army's abrogation of that country's constitution, the removal of its judiciary, and the silencing of its independent media. Over time, as Pakistani citizens began to believe that their political independence was being denied by political pressures from Washington, their leader's continued implementation of U.S. policy grew into a political liability.

Difficult decisions need to be taken, and such decisions exist out of the comfort zone of U.S. policymakers. Historically, U.S. policymakers have relied on predictable linear domains (stable dictators bringing predictability and reliability to the region, keeping Islamic fundamentalism and chaos at bay, being easier to deal with, and safeguarding American interests). However, since confusing complex domains as linear in the past has caused the United States to become directly engaged in Afghanistan,

expending over $440 billion so far, decisions that may bring chaos and unpredictability now but stability in the long run may be more preferable.

Thus, the most salient four recommendations to stabilize South Asia would be:

- United States should use its influence, which is substantial, on India and Pakistan, to resolve Kashmir dispute. This one step would go a long way to dampen Pakistan's decades-long manipulation of the issue to raise jihadi proxies. There is evidence that India-Pakistan recently attempted to resolve the Kashmir issue through negotiation (Coll, 2009). However, without Pakistan army's sanction, no rapprochement is possible. It is not in Pakistan army's interest to see the conflict end, as its existence and perks depend upon Pakistan-India conflict. The last serious effort to resolve the Kashmir dispute was derailed because of the Mumbai attacks, which were alleged to be planned with the help of ISI. Continuing to support Pakistan army would continue the India-Pakistan conflict and all the ills associated with it, including state sponsored terrorism.

- The United States must cease all military aid to Pakistan and make the remaining aid contingent upon essential behaviors.

- Not only all military aid to Pakistan cease immediately, economic and humanitarian aid to Pakistan should be coordinated through the civilian authorities and be strictly accountable. A lack of transparency and accountability of U.S. funds has strengthened Pakistani military and engendered corruption. While this step would provoke loud protests from the army, it is essential to curb the source of radical proxies and to achieve long-term U.S. goals. Without good governance, the aid encourages not only corruption; it also weakens civil institutions without which a change in trajectory of Pakistan is not possible.

- There should be a clear and transparent move from support of military to civilian government. Once again, hidebound approach of relying on Pakistani army stands in the way of better policy making. Musharraf's autocratic regime

was brought down by a galvanized Pakistani civil society, even though the U.S. administration continued to support him while the citizens of Pakistan were fighting for democracy.

It does not help the U.S. government's credibility to ignore Pakistan's ongoing support for terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and military's vice-like grip over Pakistan—all for a partial support of the U.S. objectives in South Asia while simultaneously undermining broader U.S. objectives. It would be prudent to declare groups and individuals in Pakistan that support terrorism as terrorist groups and also declare Pakistan as the state that supports terrorist groups. While this would entail a short-term risk of strengthening Pakistani military, it is the emphasis on short-term benefits that has resulted in current toxic situation. Arguments have been made that Pakistan might stop support of U.S. counterterrorism measures and close off the supply line to American troops in Afghanistan. The fact is, a soft approach and offering inducements has not worked with Pakistan. The only success the United States had had recently with Pakistan was using a stick, when an ultimatum was given to Pakistan in September 2001, causing Pakistan to abandon its surrogate Taliban in Afghanistan (Fair, 2009).

The U.S. policy in South Asia must be realistic. Last eleven years have shown that despite considerable military and economic aid and assistance, Pakistan has remained unwilling to relinquish support for terrorist groups and continues to harbor militant groups within its territory. It is time to abandon short-term expediencies and accept natural risks, including some inherent volatility in complex systems as they adapt and move towards freedom. The U.S. policy objectives should focus on adaptability and resilience and not stability. To shape adaptability and enhance resilience in South Asia, it would be prudent that the United States not only change current pattern of aid to Pakistan, but also confront Pakistan and deploy punitive measures against Pakistan. The alternatives of maintaining the status quo or tiny attenuations of the policy are not only untenable, but have proven to be dangerous to U.S. interests and to security of South Asia.

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